States which insist on supporting terror

Press, 16 July 1980, Page 22

States which insist on supporting terror

By

DAVID CARLTON in

the ‘‘Daily Telegraph,” London

■ When the S.A.S. successfully stormed the Iranian Embassy, it was for many in .Britain a ’ moment to savour. The robust response of the British authorities may serve as a deterrent to other terrorist groups seizing embassies, just as vigorous counter. measures have greatly reduced . the number of aircraft hijackings. There is, however, no room for complacency or optimism about the general trend. If hijacking and embassy sieges have become too dangerous, terrorists Will simply have recourse to the safer, if somewhat less' spectacular technique of the hit-and-run assassination or crippling of victims. In Italy, in particular, this form of terrorism has'become endemic. ■. • Yet the , most alarming feature of recent develop-, merits has been the increas-' ing involvement of Governments in the sponsorship and protection of trans-national terrorist groups. A particularly disturbing aspect of the Iranian Embassy siege was the reported involvement of an Iraqi citizen — the socalled “master-mind.” . Whether the Iraqi Government had actual foreknowledge of . the operation may not of, course be easily established, but the regime in Bagdad has never made any

secret-of - its sympathy for various trans-national terrorists. . Whitehall’s -j response to two. other States recently involved in sponsoring transnational'violence — Iran and Libya — has been less than thoroughgoing. In the case of Iran we have seen not only the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran, : but also, in the. Case, of the London siege, a proclamation by a supposedly. moderate Iranian leader that he would order Iranian citizens in London to “liberate” the Iranian Embassy in defiance of the British authorities if the siege was not rapidly terminated. No action has been: taken iri : response .'to this latter threat and in the case of the American hostages Britain’s feeble economic sanctions ■fair well/short of freezing Iranian assets. in London banks. < In the. case of Libya we have, recently been presented with Colonel Gadaffi’s public sponsorship of threats'to the survival of enemies of . his regime currently living in various Western countries. True,' he is now temporarily willing apparently to exempt Britain from these activities but until June 11 he openly took the other line,' while in the case of several countries to whom Britain is allied his impudent threats remain in force. The expulsion, of the

Libyan head-qf-mission /.in London has' been Whitehall’s only Response. But if it is . right to expel - a diplomat from. London for threatening to organise terrorist : acts, how much longer can Britain avoid breaking ' off - diplomatic relations'S with S his master in Tripoli - /-whose language has been identical? So far, however, no’ such rupture has ' occurred / and hence lucrative. commercial contracts remain unaffected. An : interesting contrast may be drawn between Libya’s conduct and that of Bulgaria. It has been widely assumed that the “umbrella” murder?; of a Bulgarian refugee; working for . the 8.8. C.; was .organised from Sofia, but; > .the . Bulgarian Government has'consistently discounted the rumour./ Some would' indignantly describe this as ; a- brazen denial. Instead of a brazen denial Gadaffi offers a brazen affirmation .of his willingness to organise on foreign soil. /This is worse by far. For such a challenge makes it more difficult for Governments ..to turn .a blind eye where other / cbnsiderat ion s' make it. expedient to. do so. </ ’ - j It is the difference befween the pursuit of ’illegal rearmament by the Weimar Republic and • by Nazi . Germany. Whereas various Governments knew thrqugh intelligence sources that' Gustav

Stresemann, in collusion with the Soviet Union, was engaged, on various operations forbidden bv the Versailles . Treaty, they were not compelled to acknowledge it in, public. . Adolf Hitler, on the other hand, openly announced his intention to abrogate the relevant-clauses of the peace treaty. . " Such vexatious •frankness forced Sir John Simon,' the British Foreign . Secretary, to cancel a visit to . Berlin and, if' public reaction had not ■ been more spirited, ,he might have had to take ' even stronger retaliatory measures. There is also an inter-war ' parallel with respect to international terrorism. In 1934 King Alexander of ‘ Yugoslavia and Louis Barthou, the French Foreign- Minister, were assassinated in Marseilles by Croatian terrorists. Both the/ British and French . Governments were convinced that Italy, had provided a base for the assassins, but the French and British Governments were afraid to publicise their knowledge lest public opinion- demand that/ they make war on Mussolini, whose support against the rising power of Hitler they still hoped to secure. It was found expedient to put the blame for harbouring the terrorists on Hungary. Anthony. Eden, and Pierre Laval, an: apparently unlikely combination, drew up an extremely obscure

formula hinting at criticism of Budapest to present to the League of Nations. ; The noble Hungarians, under pressure from London and Paris, agreed to play their part and accept a degree of censure, but Hungary’s Foreign Minister admitted to Laval that he found the formula “utterly incomprehensible,” to .which the Frenchman replied, “Excellent!”

The Western Powers, however, owed a debt not only to the Hungarians. Mussolini was also most helpful in obfuscating the Marseilles Crisis. For he generously agreed to go along with putting the blame on the Hungarians. What a blow to the Quai d’Orsay it would have been had he insisted on taking his full share of guilt, for harbouring and sponsoring the assassins of the French Foreign Minister, but Mussolini clearly took an enlightened view of his responsibilities!

Today, alas, we face the prospect of Iran, Iraq, Libya — with Algeria poised to join them — actually proclaiming their pride in the patronage of such violence. It could become an all-too-declaratory form of undeclared war which should in all logic evoke a united and forceful N.A.T.O. response. But the West as a whole would face severe economic privation if not outright catastrophe should oil simul-.

taneously cease to flow from those four • Islamic - States. Appeasement' ratherthan resistance may thus be expected. /<■ - True, Britain is virtually self-sufficient in oil and so superficially might seem likely to favour a less “wet” course than,, say, /.Italy .or West Germany, but the British are in general economic terms among, the least self-sufficient' of States. Clearly vast quantities of British manufactures would cease to find a market if Britain’s European partners lost the capacity ; to purchase them as a result of; a slump otcasioned by a.i major oil boycott. The chances are. therefore that Britain, like the other N.A.T.O. countries, will find it expedient,' as in 1934, to seek to prevent the present vogue for State-sponsored trans-national Terrorism turning into outright intergovernmental conflict. The question for the coming months, however, is whether the Islamic radical States, in contrast to the essentially conservative Governments of inter-war. Italy and present-day Bulgaria, will behave with such outrageous audacity that the “wet” option will exclude itself.

If so, 1980 may be remembered for havirig seen a marked increase in the potency of trans-national terrorism rather than for the brave exploits of the SA..S.