HIMALAYAN THAW AFTER 14 YEARS INDIA AND CHINA RESTORE RELATIONS

Press, Volume CXVI, Issue 34151, 12 May 1976, Page 22

HIMALAYAN THAW AFTER 14 YEARS INDIA AND CHINA RESTORE RELATIONS

( Bi/

JOHN WILSON)

The embassy in New Delhi of one of India s major neighbours — China —has stood almost empty for 14 years. The embassy of another — Pakistan — has been empty for almost five years. Loth embassies may soon be occupied by ambassadors again as a result ot two sudden and unexpected announcements made by India last month.

On April 15, India announced that it was sending an ambassador to China for the first time in 14 years as part of an “endeavour to develop amicable relations with all countries, notably our neighbours”. New Delhi indicated at the time the announcement was made that it expected Peking to reciprocate, which Peking soon did, although with the reservation that a Chinese ambassador would not be sent to India until the new Indian ambassador had arrived in China.

A few days later came the announcement that the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, and the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had agreed to reopen negotiations which might lead to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, severed in 1971. Soviet position . The possibility of improved relations between India and China has been in the air for some time. Hopes of a thaw in 1974 faded in the chilly polemics provoked when New Delhi made Sikkim an associated state of India. Peking accused New Delhi of attempting to create a Himalayan empire with Soviet support.

But last year a Chinese Vice-Premier, during a brief halt in Calcutta, said that China was ready to talk with India about resuming relations, and when asked if the treaty of friendship between India and the Soviet Union stood in the way re-

plied “not necessarily”. Towards the end of last year India’s Foreign Minister, Mr Y. B. Chavan. said that the ball was now in China’s court but the impetus for the final step of resuming relations almost certainly came from India and not China. China’s hesitation about responding earlier to Indian overtures probably reflected its continuing doubt about associating too closely with a state as friendly with the Soviet Union as India.

India simply does not rank high in China's priorities in its foreign policy. China’s reason for finally agreeing to resume full diplomatic relations is probably that it sees a good chance to embarass the Soviet Union. China’s policy towards India, like its policy towards the United States, is subservient to its' continuing obsession about the Soviet Union.

India’s motives for pressing China to resume full relations are various. One maybe a desire to move out of the shadow of the Soviet Union and assert its independence from Moscow. Cosying up to China and Asia is as good a way as any of letting Moscow know it does not pull all the strings. Sights on " est With her sights on the West, Mrs Gandhi’s aim may be to polish up an image tarnished by her assumption of emergency powers which appear to have all but extinguished democracy' in India. Paradoxically, without those emergency powers, Mrs Gandhi might not have been free to take her diplomatic initiatives.

Any moves towards Pakistan would before have been bitterly opposed by the now largely suppressed, militantly Hindu Jan Sangh Party. India’s pro-Soviet communists might before the “emergency” have opposed, vigorously, any moves towards China.

India may also be seeking to re-establish itself as a leader of the non-aligned. Third World, a position which it held when it was ‘ led by Mrs Gandhi’s father ’ The heads of the non-aligned j countries are to meet in Sri Lanka in August, and India could hardly go t'o this meeting claiming to be wearing the mantle of Nehru if it was at odds with two of its neighbours, and too closely identified with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has almost certainly been discomfited by India’s sudden diplomatic moves. India has long been Moscow’s chief Asian counterweight to China and an improvement of relations between China and India will be particularly galling to Moscow at a time when Bangladesh appears to be drifting from the Soviet orbit into the American.

An India no longer isolated and fearful of its neighbours will be an India less amenable to Soviet influence. Relations between the United States and India should improve as a result of India’s mending its fences with the two Asian states with which America already has cordial relations. Mrs Gandhi may have a lot of explaining to do, when she

visits Moscow in June, to preserve India’s special relationship with the Soviet Union. India would probably not have risked sending an ambassador to Peking if it thought that action would harm that special relationship too badly.

Future relationsIt will not al! be plain sailing between India and China in the future merely because’ their ambassadors are again resident in each other’s capital. Tension on the Himalayan frontier, where the spheres of influence each country claims or desires overlap, will continue. The two will continue to compete for influence in Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh and Chinese aid to the rebels in Nagaland will con tinue to be a sore point with the Indians. But both countries are apparently agreed that neither will benefit from leaving relations frozen ’because of a war which occurred 14 years ago.

Suggestions have been (made that China’s favourable response to India hints at a future rapprochement 'between China and the Soviet Union. China, the argument goes, is making an ob lique approach to the Soviet Union through the Soviet Union’s closest ally in Asia It seems much more likely I that China agreed to exchange ambassadors with India because it saw an op portunity to secure an advantage in its continuing rivalry with the Sot iet Union, not because it saw an opportunity to begin bringing that rivalry to an end.

China’s response to India is an indication that hostility towards the Soviet Union is' likely to continue to be the guiding principle of China’s foreign policy. Its response is also an indication that although Chou Enlai a,nd Teng Hsiao-ping, the architect and builder respectively of China’s outwardlooking foreign policy in recent years, are both gone, China does not intend, under its new leaders, to turn tn on itself again.