U.S, may stand guarantor

Press, Volume CXV, Issue 33775, 22 February 1975, Page 15

U.S, may stand guarantor

(By

JAMES RESTON,

in the "Ncu> York Times." through N.Z.PA.

NEW YORK, February 21. The one thing in the Middle Eastern diplomatic tangle is that Dr, Kissinger is back home ; talking more publicly, if still vaguely, about an American “guarantee” of Israel’s political independence within secure and internationally recognised boundaries.

It has been argued in this space for years that 130 m Arabs would never accept an inedpendent, secure Israeli State of 3,000,000 unless it was clear, both to the Arab States and the Soviet Union, that the United States, for its own and not Israeli reasons, regarded the security of Israel as a vital American interest and would not tolerate its destruction.

Until recently, however, neither the United States nor ‘the Israeli Government has shown much interest in an American guarantee of Israel’s independence and boundaries, for a variety of reasons. Commitments On the Israeli side, the argument waS that an American “guarantee,” even in treaty form, might limit Israel’s freedom of action. Washington would obviously want to be consulted on what action should be taken in a military crisis if it was expected to defend Israel. This could lead to differences of opinion and dangerous delays about when or whether to strike, and, in the end, prevent Israel from defending herself without assuring American military action. Also an American commitment to defend Israel from military attack would probably lead to a Soviet commitment to defend Syria, Egypt, and • the other Arab States from an Israeli attack, and turn every Arab-Israeli military crisis into a potential military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the American side, in addition to these obvious risks, there was the further objection that such a guarantee to Israel would limit America’s freedom of action, enrage the Arab States, separate Washington from its European allies and Japan, who tended to be more interested in Arab oil than Is- [ raeli security, and thieaten the larger objectives of de-

tente between Washington i and Moscow. There are clearly serious arguments, against a formal (United States guarantee of Israel’s independence and; [frontiers, but most of the; 'risks exist anyway, and this is the dilemma. It is hard to imagine the Arab States reconciling themselves to the permanent existence of a secure Israel, or Israel persuading itself to withdraw to its insecure 1967 borders, unless both the Arabs and the Israelis know these borders wlil be defended by the United States. Suspicious As things now stand, everything is imprecise because no nation has any assurance of anything. The Israelis have no guarantees and no freedom of action. They are utterly dependent on money and arms from the

(United States. The Arabs are in the same position with regard to the Soviet Union. They can make war, but not for long without supplies (from Moscow. [ The United States and the : Soviet Union are equally suspicious of one another. They have signed noble proclama- : tions in Moscow and else-; where to co-operate for peace j ■ in the Middle East, even to' ► limit the flow of arms intosuch inflammable areas, but ; they do not really co-operate > for peace, but keep smiling! ('and pretending, and shipping !the latest weapons to both! sides. Even Dr Kissinger’S l strenuous efforts to find a; [ way out of all these prob-; . lems have become a major! source of controversy. His; ; style, tactics, and prom-1 . inence are now discussed' : more in Washington than his j i policies and objectives,! ’ personality, and procedure' are now the main topics of. conversation in Washington. land here in New York at; [the United Nations. Decisive point Now that he is back, he’ iis trying to bring the question down from procedure to, substance. He has travelled; 16,000 miles to 11 countries ' in 10 days, listening to the . arguments in Israel and the Arab States, reporting to the , European allies, and finally to the President and the leaders of Congress. Within a month, he will have to go. back to the . Middle East with the proposals of the United States Government for a compromise settlement. Meanwhile, he is being told by t the Russians, and, oddly, by the Israelis, that he should 1 go to a Middle Eastern con- ' jference at Geneva, even before he has an agreement ' about What should be settled • there.

Dr Kissinger is now say-! ing that this is not sensible.: but probably inevitable. A few weeks ago he was saying | that “if we go to Geneva!

without an agreement beforehand, you will know that no agreement is possible.” But still he is searching for some way out of his troubles, and. in the process, he has ordered a study of an American guarantee of Israel’s independence and security, in return for an i Israeli withdrawal to its 11967 borders. In the next few weeks, [before he has to go back to the Middle East, he will be trying to define what such an [ American "guarantee” to I Israel would be. whether it I would be acceptable to the ' Senate as a treaty, and what ' the reaction to such a [guarantee would be in [Moscow, the Arab world, [and Europe. In short, he is trying to [find some way to break the ; diplomatic conflict between [lsrael and the Arabs, and to I bring Washington and Moscow to a point of decision in the Middle East, and ! the idea of an American •guarantee” of Israel's security seems now to be the most relevant, if difficult, compromise.