AFTER CONFRONTATION ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF WHITE AND BLACK DETENTE

Press, Volume CXV, Issue 33740, 13 January 1975, Page 12

AFTER CONFRONTATION ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF WHITE AND BLACK DETENTE

By

DAVID MARTIN,

. of the Observer Foreign Neus Service, in Lusaka.)

It may be jumping’ the gun somewhat to ’*y in ' ‘ onomic and political implications of detente with - uth Afika.ttlement in Rhodesia and decolonisation by Portugal. . heady independent African majority-ruled States thex aie p " < In no case is this more true than for Zambia, which has been calle.i upon to sacrifice more than any other African countn 'or the piinupi of majority rule and human equality.

With the break-up of the Central African Federation | (1953-63) Zambia inherited massive communications [problems. Its main road and rail routes ran south through Rhodesia. Mozambique and South Africa. It was committed to supporting the struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa, but it was vulnerable to blackmail by the white minority regimes across the Zambezi River.

Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965 exposed the weakness. Through a sea of mud and potholes the Zambians battled to move their imports and exports along what became known as the “Hell run” to the Tanzanian capital port of Dar-es-Sa-laam.

Diversification of trade routes became the policy (keynote and in the past decade that has cost more than $351 million. The old pipeline from Beira to Urntali, in western Rhodesia, through which Zambia received its oil was closed as part of United Nations sanctions. First British Royal Air Force planes and trucks were used to bring in oil and then a pipeline was built from Dar-es-Salaam as Zambia underwent the hard and costly process of looking north.

The most expensive project has been the railway due to be completed (excluding ancillary work) in March. In Britain, the United States, France, Germany and Russia the Zambian appeal for aid to build lit fell on deaf ears. It was China that was to come to j the rescue with its biggest I project to date, a com[mitment of $293 million | through a long-term, inter-est-free loan. The cost to Zambia of breaking the Rhodesian connection can never be accurately measured. Politically it has meant change which cannot be measured in neat [monetary terms. Fateful mistake In early 1973 Rhodesia’s rebel Prime Minister, Mr lan Smith, in an effort to stop President Kenneth Kaunda. supporting Rhodesia’s nationalists, closed his northern frontier. It was a fateful mistake. For Rhodesia’s beleaguered economy it was to mean a loss in rail revenue of some $43 million a year. Mr Smith quickly back-tracked, realising his eror, but the Zambians stood firm and kept their side of the border closed. The United Nations Jackson Report estimated that the cost to Zambia of that decision in the first 18 months to mid 1974 was $196 million and there is reason to believe this figure was conservative.

Zambian railways lostslo.7 million mainly through the loss of copper freight on the way to Mozambique through Malawi. Copper out-

put in 1973 was down 15.000 metric tons as a result of the blockade while tourism was only two-thirds the expected level at 50.000 visitors.

One bright spot the Jack[son report drew attention to was the drop of $1.75 in the carriage insurance and freight c.i.f. rate for exporting copper through Dar-es Salaam instead of Beira.

I Beyond the economic considerations there lie the political implications for Zambia. If a settlement cannot be reached through negotiation the alternative is an escalated guerrilla war. Zambia would stand in the front line in this, forced to spend more on its own defences as well as in support of the guerrillas. In many ways as important is the outcome for Malawi and Mozambique. Malawi's President, Dr Kamuzu Banda, has been the prodigal renegade of African politics, going well beyond the bounds of necessity, making State visits to the white laagers and opening diplomatic relations. Lost revenue It is now suggested that he might be the host — although not chairman — of the Rhodesian constitutional

i talks which could give hir la foot back in the door i; independent black Africa Like Zambia his country i landlocked, dependent on th good will of it.s neighbou: for access to the sea. an [today his position is deli cate.

; Even more important is [the case of Mozambique. A I Frelimo Government after independence on June 25 would certainly co-operate in putting the screws on Mr Smith by severing his trade routes. That would cost, at least $35 million a year in I lost rail, port and other forms of revenue and although some African countries have privately com mitted themselves'to paying compensation that is not the real point.

i Compensation only (and (usually inadequately) makes up for lost revenue. And developing countries like 'Malawai. Mozambique and Zambia need additional and not comparable revenue. For them the security of peace and increased regional trade is the goal today. But if it cannot be obtained at the conference table they will support the guerrillas irrespective of political and economic cost, as Zambia has already demonstrated. — O.F.N.S. Copyright.