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HIMALAYAN CONFRONTATION GREATER CHINESE INTEREST IN SMALL MOUNTAIN STATES

(By

GEORGE PATTERSON

in the "Daily Telegraph")

(Reprinted by arrangement)

Sikkim, the British authority on the Himalayan regicnu Sir Cnaiies Bell, has written, is “a dagger aimed at the heart of India. ’ Add Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and the North-East Frontier Area as. what ('lnna calls, “fingers on the hand of China” and you have a very menacing metaphor indeed, especially in the light of recent developments.

Over 20 years of simmering revolt in Tibet have only made it “another Vietnam” or “another Bangladesh,” depending on which .side of the Himalayan, or ideological, barrier one stands — with China, India and Russia again manoeuvering in a more modern and .dealier version of Curzon’s and Kipling’s Game.”

And now Sikkim, with its artificially engendered minirevolution against the monarchy, conspicuously involving India, has suddenly sharpened China’s interest to danger-point. An article by the influential “Commentator” in China’s “People’s Daily” of July 3, declared that India had “intensified its suppression of Sikkim’s demand for independence, in an attempt to deprive the Chogyal of Sikkim of his powers and realise its ambition to fully control and annex Sikkim.” ( “inherited the colonial policy pursued by Britain in the nineteenth century by taking Sikkim as a protectorate and carrying out colonial rule over it.”

Finally, that “Indian expansionists will have to pay for their rabid evil doings,” Another report described the I dispatching of Indian troops ;to Sikkim as a “rniniCzechoslavakia incident” and “gross trampling on Sikkim’s sovereignty” comparable with the Soviet military invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It is this deliberate — and, therefore, presumably official — linking of Russian involvement with the Himalayan situation which highlights the importance of the recent developments in the Himalayan region beyond their local significance. In the last two years Russia has issued more statements favouring Tibetan resistance and denouncing Chinese colonialist oppression in Tibet than in the previous 20 years. Reliable reports ’ speak of the Dalai Lama’s intention to visit the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the persuasion of younger Tibetans who have grown tired of the subservience to India of the old feudal and priestly reactionaries advising the Dalai '.ama. Tibetan factions However, India’s successful pressure on the Dalai Lama to accept a very restricted and non-political tour of a few Western coun-

(tries instead, and her' behind-the-scenes pressure ion the Governments of thecountries concerned to keep ' his visits strictly to this understanding, has only! served to further intensifythe disillusion of the "activ-i ist” Tibetans and to dis-1 courage any nascent Chinese: hopes of a strong official, Tibetan voice emerging to' withstand such Indian pres-i sures. The clumsy Indian actions also have only) served to polarise the differ-1 ences between the two TibeItan factions. I Under reported pressure i from China the Nepalese; [Government gave the; I marauding Khamba guerrillas on her northern bor-' ders until July 26 to surren-i Ider their arms, amid I rumours of clashes with the: Royal Nepalese Army and’ statements from Nepalese official spokesmen that the guerrillas’ weapons were. “from rich countries interested, in the region” —• taken to mean the Soviet | Union, and the American! C.I.A. with Indian con-1 nivance. But the Nepalese Army isi in no position to enforce i any surrender of Khamba. arms or personnel in northern Nepal as the 5000 mar- 1 tial and battle-hardened Khambas are spread out ' over some thousand square 'miles of 15,000 to 20,000 ft I icy and savagely mountainous territory where they ' control every pass. The Chinese were in _a|( much better position to infil- ( trate the high Himalayas i because of their network of ■ roads and their influence ’ among the local Bhutia communities (semi-Tibetan tribe, who are unable to converse 1 with the rare Nepalese offi- < cial) whose sheep-herding i and small trading activities < took them freely across the borders without interference. < I understand from recent 1 reports from Tibetan friends 1 that the Khambas there have ] “enough” arms ar.d ammunition to last another year and 1 a half or so, to withstand < the expected Chinese offer ' of support to Nepal to help I them clear up the border ' problem. Abortive coup In Bhutan the rumours of J the involvement of the Dalai ( Lama’s brother, Gyalu Thon- , dup — discredited former f representative of the reactionary faction - in the f recent abortive coup, has ) been offset, interestingly f enough, by an invitation t from the Bhutanese Govern- t ment to the Tibetan Govern- i ment-in-exile in Dharamsalla ; to send a delegation for dis- 1 cussions. The delegation sent by the Dalai Lama is under ( 'the leadership of Kundeling f Kalon, a respected adviser ] of the Dalai Lama and one ] of the few older Tibetan | leaders acceptable to the , activist Tibetans. , Which brings us to the ( North-East Frontier Area ] and Nagaland. Although the ] withdrawal of the Chinese. Army from N.E.F.A. after i the 1962 Sino-Indian border < war was interpreted by many as either a magnan- 1 imous Chinese diplomatic ■ gesture for obscure reasons, i or a tactical Chinese mili- ‘ tary manoeuvre while wait- i

■ing for neighbouring Bhutan Ito fall into her hands, or .both, since then China has ibuilt up her interest in the region inhabited by the Ttbe;tan speaking “Monpas” in northern N.E.F.A. I Finally, the totally unexpected defeat of the pro-in-•dian Naga Nationalist Or'ganisation (N.N.U.) by the INaga underground-influenced (United Democratic Front 11U.D.F.) after more than a ) decade of Indian control toIgether with increasing evidence of Chinese material and advisory involvement, is yet a further indication of the futility of India’s whole Himalayan policy. If China is as concerned (about recent developments lin the Himalayan region as (her escalating statements ! indicate then she may well 'dramatically put up the ante in the Himalayan poker game. Increased pressure by (means of military movements and/or incidents, with ja revised version of her I “Confederation of Himalayan (States” offer, might be used as a counter to the revived (Nepalese ambitions for a j “Gurkhistan” stretching along the Himalayas. Russian rival i India’s claims to a Himalayan sphere of influence are inherited from the British imperialist period, but it was the British envoy and special commissioner, Sir Ashley Eden, who declared in a dispatch, (dated April 8, 1861: “Nepal is tributary to China, Tibet is tributary to China, and Sikkim and Bhutan are tributary to Tibet.” In 1954 a Chinese textbook, “A Brief History of Modern China.” gave a list of territories “seized by the imperialists” which she is committed to recovering “when the time is ripe,” including: “Nepal, went under the British in 1898. Che-Meng-Hsiung Sikkim was occupied by Britain in 1889. Pu-tan (Bhutan) went under Britain in 1865. Ah-sa-mi (the whole of Assam, N.E.F.A. and Nagaland) was given to Britain by Burma in 1826.” And in 1960-61 the Chinese delegates to the Sino-lndian Boundary Commission refused to include Sikkim and Bhutan in the discussions because “they came into different categories,” and equivocated on N.E.F.A. “... (But) the unshakable fact remains that it is only the boundary line running along the southern foot of the Himalayas.. . which is the true, traditional, customary line of the boundary between China and India in the eastern section...” The “political Bangladesh” of India’s intervention gamble in Sikkim may be heady stuff in New Delhi but her cards are pbor in the Himalayan poker game, while her moves are significantly controlled by Moscow in the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, and Peking only has to wait and — to mix the metaphors — flex the Himalayan fingers of her hand where and when she wills as she calculates that Moscow is her only serious rival for the Himalayan jackpot. The hole-card, intriguingly, is Tibet.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19741116.2.120

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33693, 16 November 1974, Page 16

Word Count
1,266

HIMALAYAN CONFRONTATION GREATER CHINESE INTEREST IN SMALL MOUNTAIN STATES Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33693, 16 November 1974, Page 16

HIMALAYAN CONFRONTATION GREATER CHINESE INTEREST IN SMALL MOUNTAIN STATES Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33693, 16 November 1974, Page 16