Friction in U.S.-Japanese relations

Press, Volume CXIII, Issue 33155, 20 February 1973, Page 13

Friction in U.S.-Japanese relations

(By

RICHARD HALLORAN.

of the New York Times News Service, through N.Z.P.A.)

TOKYO, Feb. 19. < The United) States J Presidential envoy, Dr: Henry Kissinger, ar- 1 rived in Tokyo for a ( meeting with the Prime Minister, Mr Kakuei i Tanaka, to find American relations with Japan at their lowest point since 1960, when Leftist riots forced the Japanese Government to cancel a State visit by President Eisenhower. At first glance, the reason! for the friction would seem] to be economic issues. Japan’s large surplus in trade with the United States remains unresolved and the de- ; valuation of the United States dollar and the floating of the yen last week have not solved the international monetary question. But it has become more and more clear that underlying the economic issues, < and all other differences be- i tween Washington and Tokyo 1 is the absence of a solid poli- i tical relationship between President Nixon’s Adminis- ’ tration and Mr Tanaka’s i Government. ! 1 This is far less a matter of each Government’s poll-]' cies toward the other than it is a matter of politics, or!) tactics, or style in dealing with one another. j<

Sound politics, or diplomacy in the international! arena, is based on knowledge! of the other Government’s; objectives, the way it oper- 1 ates and makes decisions, the; domestic pressures on it and! the personalities in command; of it. But in the case of] America and Japan today,!

each Government is woefully ignorant—there is no kind word for it —of the other.

There is plenty of talk between the two, but no communication in the sense of a true meeting of minds. And without that communication, there can be no mutual trust.

The Japanese Government, under Mr Tanaka and his predecessor. Mr Eisaku Sato, ap pears to have been unsophis-i ticated. indecisive, and parochial in its dealings with the Nixon Administration fori more than two. years. The Tanaka Government’s performance during the cur-, rency crisis, for instance. I showed a serious deficiency, in reading the intentions oi l the Nixon Administration. Mr Nixon and his associ-, ates have developed a clearly] recognisable style that feat-, ures surprise and bold; strokes, but Mr Tanaka’s! Government has failed to] realise that. The President acted sec-' retly and suddenly in his change of China policy, his] new economic policy, and his] handling of the textile issue! in 1971. When he w'as frustrated with the Vietnam peace nego-I tiations last fall, he launched the greatest aerial bombard-; ment in history against North Vietnam. Yet Mr Tanaka’s Government has been caught, time and again, unprepared to! cope with the political real-; ity of Mr Nixon’s style. As; Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone, the] Minister of International; Trade and Industry, said in] a speech last week, “Japan, has not tried hard enough toi understand President Nixon’s] hopes and pattern of behav-! iour.” Somewhat belatedly, Mr 1

Nakasone said: “Mr Nixon is an energetic, ambitious and practical man who believes; in experience and traditional; American values. We must; analyse the personality and; pattern of behaviour of the]

American President, leader of j the strongest country in the; world, in order to plan for' our future.” Much of the indecision in the Japanese Government' arises from the political system. The Japanese, whose! experience with Parliamentary government is really only 2ft years old, have not yet learned to make it work well enough to move in a fast-changing world. The idea of majority rule, for example, is alien to a: society that operates on con-! sensus. When Mr Tanaka’s opposition won’t go along, the process comes to a standstill.! Parliament is stalled now be-] cause the Opposition parties have threatened to boycott debate until Mr Tanaka apolo-

gises for allowing Japan to be forced into floating the yen. The parochial attitude has its roots in Japanese history. The Japanese are an insular people who were long cut off from the outside world. Even today, they appear not to. understand the West despite more than a century of intercourse with it. Japanese politicians, adept in their own milieu of finding harmony by consensus, have, seemed naive in thinking that I Western nations function that way. Moreover, Japanese poll-, ticians are more engrossed ini factional infighting and the] struggle for the Prime Minis-! ter’s office than they are ini using it effectively. As a] foreign observer here put it:] “They are more concerned ' with succession than with I success.”

For all of their attention the internal political pres-j sures, the majority of Japan’s ruling party have shown little recognition that an American! President is also faced with] political demands. The Japanese Government seems to' have dismissed repeated warnings that the Nixon Administration must cope with unemployment and protectionist sentiments from both management and labour. On the other side of the Pacific, the Nixon Administration appears to have been insensitive to the Japanese with its political tactic of! “massive retaliation.” From; the President on down; the! Administration has ignored; the importance the Japanese' attach to personal relations, to prestige and “face,” and! to resolving issues slowly, by]

o compromise, and without sur.l prises. The Administration, with one notable exception, has particularly shown little understanding of how to negotiate with the Japanese. It I has antagonised America’s (major ally in east Asia—and I still failed so far to achieve jits policy objectives. | There is a widespread feeling among senior officials] that the President and Dr Kissinger, his assistant for | National Security Affairs.! personally dislike Japanese. Stories of Mr Nixon and his, aide mocking the Japanese! i abound. Whether they are ! true or not is immaterial — (the belief is the political fact. I Moreover, many politically; , articulate Japanese think the | Nixon Administration takes Japan for granted. ! Dr Kissinger has been quoted as saying that Japan

must go along with the Uni-] ted States because it has no, place else to go. That is offensive to Japan’s resurg;ent national pride, again no, (matter what the truth. The Nixon Administration ihas irritated the Japanese, by sending relatively low-; level envoys to negotiate; with Cabinet ministers.] which many Japanese regard! as condescending. On the trade issue, for instance, it has been Mr William Eberle,! the President’s special representative for trade affairs,! who is well below Cabinet rank. A reaction set in during; (Mr Eberle’s visit 11 days ago.: (when the Prime Minister and: , other ministers with whom Mr Eberle had met before let it be known that they! would not see him. Only Mr i Nakayne received him, and

-.that was labelled a courtesy (call. Mr Eberle spent his time , with officials the Japanese ; consider his equal in rank. ’ Americans seem to thrive .on drama, surprise, and exL citement in politics. But the . Japanese prefer to move [ carefully. , They are perhaps more sensitive to the subtleties of power than any other people Jin the world. They respond ’lto power when it is applied skilfully and with finesse. If ",the Japanese are openly •threatened, their resistance • stiffens because their "face” ’lhas been called into question. ' Thus, the most successful ’ of the Nixon Administration’s 1 negotiations with the Japanese was the mission of Mr John Connally, who had the ■ stature to impress the Jap-

anese. came to persuade the then Sato Government to revalue the yen. Although Mr Connally was preceded by a reputation of a Texas gun-slinger, he was the essence of Southern courtesy. But underneath the i cloak of civility was a tough message subtly delivered: the 10 per cent import surtax imposed by Mr Nixon would remain until Japan revalued. Six weeks later. Mr Connally’s political tactics resulted in a yen revaluation, during the Smithsonian meeting in December, that xvas greater than anyone expected.