CHINA AND THE U.N. GENERALITIES BEST AVOIDED ON ADMISSION QUESTION

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32612, 21 May 1971, Page 8

CHINA AND THE U.N. GENERALITIES BEST AVOIDED ON ADMISSION QUESTION

(Reprinted from the "Economist" by arrangement)

How much does it matter that China should be in the United Nations? It is going to be hard enough to fit the Chinese in on acceptable terms, even after those ping-pong games; so everybody, including the Chinese, had better be clear what it involves. The family of nations is a vague concept that has little to do with the family of man. The question of China’s representation in the United Nations is better discussed without too much resort to large generalities.

The Germans and the Swiss as well as the Chinese know that lack of United Nations membership does not bar a state from international activity. Indeed, a non-member state, being spared‘the need to reveal its attitude to various embarrassing questions, may have more freedom of manoeuvre, and thus more international impact. And the seating in New York of representatives from Peking would not, in itself, either bring the average inhabitant of China into contact with the outside world, or bring his govern-

ment out of a total limbo and into a cosy international family.

But of course a world-wide body like the .United Nations ought to include all states that have real substance, and those states ought to be represented there by the governments that actually run them. The basic case for installing Peking’s man in the China seat does not rest on the idea that United Nations membership would transform the Chinese Communists into angels. It is part of the feeling shared by many countries, and above all the United States, that relations with China have got to be restored to some sort of normality. Unfortunately, the problem of the United Nations seat is a particularly tricky part of this approach. It is complicated by the siting of the United Nations headquarters in an American city, by its charter’s indelible assignment to China of a vetocarrying permanent seat in the Security Council, and by the continuing tenure of that : seat by the rival Chinese ■ government in Taiwan. Just ; about the only thing it is not . complicated by is the ■ mysterious notion that .he ! problem would somehow be • eased if Britain and France renounced their permanent council seats, which neither of them has the slightest intention of doing. J Shared names

The United Nations comfortably accommodates two members who share the name Congo, and two who share the name Yemen. But the one point of agreement between the two Chinese governments, so far, is that there can be only one China; and this deadlock is intensified by the chartersanctified existence of the Chinese permanent seat in the council. Three weeks ago Mr Nixon received, from an advisory commission headed by Mr Henry Cabot Lodge, a recommendation that he should aim at having both Peking and Taiwan represented in the organisation. Last November, during the United Nations assembly’s annual wrangle over the China seat, the Americans’ emphasis was already -shifting from rejection of Peking’s claims to insistence on Taiwan’s right to continued representation. It is fairly

clear that Mr Nixon would now accept the Lodge commission’s advice to promote a two-China solution if he thought the two Chinas would accept it. But there is still no sign that they will. Two States formula There is much sympathy among United Nations members for the idea of a twoChina formula, or more precisely a one-China-one-Tai-wan formula, by which the privileged council seat would pass to Peking but Taiwan would stay in the General Assembly. What is lacking is Chinese acceptance of this idea. Chiang Kai-shek’s spokesmen have shown no more sympathy for it than Mao Tse-tung’s. Nobody should count on the Taiwan men to save the United Nations from further embarrassment by withdrawing before they aie I forced to; or to swing over to open support of any twoChina formula, though for most people that is plainly the best solution. Nc<* have they any illusions abc-rt their chances of obtaining admission to the United Natkms as a new member stale, Taiwan, once Peking’s men had taken over not only th* Chinese seat but also the 1 Chinese veto. An extra seat 1 that might be occupied (with ! a due show of reluctance) ! by Chiang’s men could be ’■ provided only as part of a ' deal clinched in advance with • a Peking that thought it worth paying a price to get its own seat without more delay. Search for a team

And Peking, although its interest in the United Nations seat has apparently quickened, still seems confident that it will get it, this year or next, without a price tag. Chinese eagerness to demonstrate great-Power status does not extend to the grabbing of every opportunity as soon as it appears. If Peking’s refusal to accommodate Taiwan means that it may have to wait a bit longer for the United Nations seat, it will apparently take that risk. Of course, one reason for the lack of haste Peking has hitherto shown in this matter may be its awareness of the need to prepare itself to play an adequate part in the world organisation. After the tumult of the cultural revolution—during which China could hardly have kept a New York mission properly manned, and certainly could not have taken a very active part in United Nations proceedings—there may still be much preparatory work to do before Peking can field a really competent team. It is widely assumed that, as well as claiming places in the secretariat for its own

nominees, it will be able to draw on the local expertise of some of the present Chinese staff but it will probably trust none of them fully. Apple-carts upset There are fears that Peking man’s arrival in New York could mean the upsetting of many apple-carts; for example, that loyalty to the Palestinian guerrillas might lead China to block greatPower agreement on any formula for settling the IsraeliArab conflict. These fears might loom larger if there were more prospect of any such agreement, and if it had to be. ratified by a Security Council resolution. But even then it might not prove to suit China’s book for it to try to obstruct an arrangement that was backed not only by other Communist regimes but also by Arab ones. , . At least in its early days, a Peking mission in New York might prefer to feel its way with caution through the unfamiliar pitfalls of United Nations procedure. But there is one point the Chinese must have noticed: that many of the people who seem most alarmed at the prospect of Peking’s men getting into the United Nations also maintain that the organisation is of very little importance. Is it, then, going to be revived by their entry?