THE VATICAN PROBES EAST CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IMPROVE IN EASTERN EUROPE

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32589, 24 April 1971, Page 16

THE VATICAN PROBES EAST CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IMPROVE IN EASTERN EUROPE

(By JONATHMhSTBBLB. intht ‘TStSdian" Manch**tt) 3 (IJeprinted by arrangttigint) How many atom bombs has the Pope? Stalin might be forgiven if"; he allowed himself a wry, posthumous smite at the recen|jprospect of a-; senior Vatican official travelling to Moscow to endorse ®e nuclear non- J proliferation treaty. Bizarre though the bccasion was, iwr»s made more ? so by the fact that this was the first official visit to W&p.w by a top 4 Vatican diplomat since the Revolution, Archbishop CasaratLThe man they call the Pope’s Foreign Minister, no less.

The Pope’s traditional Easter message is not a speech in which the Pontiff chooses to discuss the details of his global mission, a kind of Vatican equivalent of President Nixon’s State of the World message. But it may be an appropriate moment for looking at one facet of it, the Pope’s alitik. Quite apart from Ishop Casaroll’s visit to Moscow, there have been some fascinating twists and turns in the past year. Last month Pope Paul received President Tito, the first Communist Head of State ever to pay an official visit to the Vatican, but looking remarkably like a representative of the ancient regime in dusted down-tail coat and top hat. Then there was the Pope’s reaction to the December events in Poland, which was so cautious that some observers pointed out that the Italian Communist Party was more critical of the Polish leadership’s handling of it than was the Vatican. Now come talks with Prague which may eventually lead to diplomatic relations being opened. Agrement to live In the broadest terms, this rapprochement between the Vatican and Eastern Europe is a sign that each side realises that no amount of huffing and puffing will blow the other down. The East European Communist Governments have come of age, and are not temporary phenomena. For their part they realise that 20 years of atheistic and humanist philosophy plus bouts of outright repression have not driven Catholicism into a comer, and the next 20 years may not be more effective. The East European Governments, particularly those that rule over large Catholic populations, in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, or the Northern republics of Jugoslavia, have begun to feel that the benevolent neutrality of the Church is worth having if it means that in times of crisis like the Gdansk riots the Church will support "law and order” and be a force for stability. In return the Church will want to be free to do its own work without discrimination. The motives are the same as in

any medieval concordat between Church and State.

Some basic alignments

Beyond that the East European Governments recognise that on certain issues of world policy there is a basic alignment between them and the Vatican. Vietnam is the most obvious example. As long as the United States continues its devastating intervention in Indo-China, East Europe and the Vatican find themselves going through the peace lobby together, along with millions of other people, of course, as well. In Latin America there are also similarities of view, even Urough the Church is divided iWf The growing current gr Catholic opinion which supports revolutionary violence there has pushed the Pope into taking an occasional anti-imperalist stance. Nearer home, the Pope has come out in favour of the European Security Conference which the Eastern Europeans originally took the initiative in calling for. On the Vatican side there is the realisation that some of its most faithful and largest flocks in Europe are in the Eastern half. Many of them are without bishops

since the Governments are not prepared to recognise a foreign institution’s claim to make appointments unless an agreement has been reached. Although it was Pope John XXIII who first talked of peaceful co-existence with the Socialist States, the Vatican’s Ogtpolitik did not begin until 1964 and 1966 when Archbishop Casaroli negotiated concordats with Hungary and Jugoslavia. Earlier Vatican relations with Jugoslovia were broken off in 1952 when Pope Pius appointed as a Cardinal Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb, whom the Jugoslavs considered a war criminal. Frontiers problem The difficulties now concern the . Soviet Union and Poland, where the thorny issue of the postwar frontiers complicates matters. The Vatican has not yet officially accepted the Oder-Neisse line nor the Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic States or the old Eastern territories of Poland with their large Catholic populations. Casaroli’s dramatic visit to Moscow last month returned the two visits made by Mr Gromyko to the Vatican in 1966 and last November and the private audience which the Pope gave President Podgomy in 1967. But, in spite of this gradual exchange of contacts, there is no prospect of an immediate change of policy in the Vatican on the frontier issues or of the opening of diplomatic relations. That would involve too much swallowing of words on both sides. Rather the Vatican sees the road to Moscow leading to the rest of Eastern Europe, particularly Poland. The Vatican could not hope to improve relations with the other countries without Moscow’s tacit consent. As part of his ecumenical ambitions the Pope also wants to develop relations with the Russian Orthodox hierarchy, and this can only be done if the Soviet Union will supply regular visas. Calendar change In Poland the frontier issue is much nearer a solution, now that Bonn has signed its treaty with Warsaw accepting the OderNeisse line. As a small token the Vatican this year changed its official calendar which used to designate German bishops as being in charge of dioceses in Poland’s Western territories. The new Polish Government in a big gesture of goodwill has given the Church legal title to its lands in those areas. How far the Church inside

Poland finder. Cardinal Wyszynskrwill he prepared to be neutmi fon political matters Is stitt.Wclear. He reacted to jfots in December wjm ’“We outspoken! demand fop ; wJggtaplete free-j dom of the prtfts and the ’nobj economists"inwwhrist told! his them* bread’.” fefcfoce his his-» toric mesfflWjtortth the Primer Minister, EESHfcscewicz. in! March, ffiewSWilnai has been I more 'UttKaMP'ry and has helped wftfcSttpeals for law and order amr foe-hard work.* The Polish GtWernment, has one when it asks for ChuSMSSfcpperation in that the riMEplearly' wants to ■ possibly this yearffqfe was ; bitterly disappoiritfiK when 1 he was refused permkmon in ' 1966. Some 60 per<i®nt of 1 the country’s 30 i people are estlm»t«d<to be ' Catholics. In Czechoslovakia, talks i between the Vatican and th¥.’ : Government started again in . ■ October after a two-year ■ lapse. But some difficulties arose later when the author- • ities took a number of I restrictive measures against ' the Church arid there was i talk of reforming the soI called Movement of Priests i for Peace, which the Vatican t considered was little more i than a Government tool. Inr : spite of that the talks were • resumed in March. i Conservatives’ concern ; Many conservative Catho- , lies view this accelerating . tempo in the Vatican’s rapprochement with Com-' > munist governments as a j cause for alarm. The Church should not help to consoli- ; date such hostile regimes;. , they argue. But the argus ment works both ways. One . of the effects of the extended t recognition given to the 5 Church in Jugoslavia, for , example, may oe to make s it easier for the ecclesiastical ' hierarchy to squash radical J movements inside the Church. I A strong group of young dissenting intellectuals ha? for some time been challenging the hierarchy from the Theological Faculty in r Zagreb. Their future may not - be so easy now. ; Which only emphasises • that recent Church-State rela- ■ tions in Eastern Europe have i much in parallel, though five I years later, with developi ments between Moscow an* i Washington. From simple : ideological confrontation, i basically authoritarian emr pires and moving towards ; co-existence. And one result i could be that each side will ! be better able to deal with its own dissenters without s interference from the other.