Effects of Laos incursion

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32568, 30 March 1971, Page 5

Effects of Laos incursion

(By

MICHAEL PUTZEL.

of the Associated Press, through N.Z.P.A.)

QUANG TRI, March 28. Lam Son 719, the American - supported invasion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in Laos, pitted the Saigon Military Command’s best units against an enemy tougher, perhaps, than any faced in South Vietnam by a comparable allied force.

The South Vietnamese threw their Ist Infantry Division, an airborne division, rangers, marines and armoured cavalry—all crack units, and backed by formidable American air power—against five seasoned North Vietnamese divisions using armour, heavy artillery and a devastating anti-aircraft defence system. The enemy had occupied the area for years, so it was his battle ground. “It was victory and defeat in one,” a senior military officer said in assessing the 45-day drive. “It would not be wise to call it one or the other, but, of course, it was not a stand-off.” It may be weeks, even months, before allied officers can analyse fully the effect of the incursion on Hanoi’s capacity to make war.

For the time being, the officer's own assessment, made on the last day of Lam Son 719, appears close to the mark.

Responsible American and South Vietnamese officers agree that the claims of nearly 14,000 enemy dead may be exaggerated, but there is no doubt the incursion inflicted serious manpower losses on the North. This, they explain, is primarily because the North Vietnamese repeatedly massed to attack South Vietnamese fire-bases and other positions, and exposed them-

selves to American air power. Just how the loss of men will affect North Vietnam’s military moves cannot be predicted, but manpower losses are one thing that North Vietnam has always demonstrated an ability or willingness to absorb. The operation succeeded in destroying some caches of enpmy supplies, but, apparently, fell short of expectations in this respect. The South Vietnamese have produced several claims to success that are difficult to believe; the 176,000 tons of enemy munitions asserted to have been captured or destroyed can only be a guess that includes enemy losses to air strikes as well as to ground action. The effort to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail even temporarily, and thus disrupt North Vietnamese movement of men and supplies, was less successful than the American planners of the operation had hoped. Although the South Vietnamese did ultimately reach the transhipment centre of Sepone, 25 miles west of the border on Highway No. 9, they could not remain there long enough to make a thorough search of the area, or

to prevent the North Vietnamese from moving farther west. South Vietnam’s chief spokesman (Colonel Tran Vgn An) has summed up by saying that Government forces had destroyed North Vietnam’s supply capability for one year. More than half of the 4800 individual and 1800 heavier weapons that the South Vietnamese claim to have captured or destroyed were found on the battlefield, according to reliable military sources; but they point’ out that one reason for this was that “the enemy needed the weapons to fight, and took them from the supply caches.” Whatever the relative success of Saigon’s incursion, the price was high in lives, material and organisation, and, possibly, in the morale of some military forces which found their strength in Cambodia after years of uncertain and uneven performances. Well informed sources say that the South Vietnamese suffered about 10,000 casualties in the Laos operation, slightly fewer than half the total force of 22,000 men committed. These sources list 3800 dead, 5200 wounded and 775 missing. Official reports have told of 1147 killed, 4237 wounded and 246 missing. Most available figures on the accomplishments and losses are unreliable or incomplete, but one South Vietnamese source has observed: “Our own material losses were too high. The United States lost too many helicopters and we had to destroy too many of our own artillery pieces and tanks. We did some damage, but we paid the price.” American officers are concerned that the cost in lives, both of American helicopter crews and among South Vietnamese officers, may have been higher than the two armies can easily afford.

“Saigon's pool of qualified leaders is not as large as ours,” one American officer said. “They can’t just bring another colonel over from the States and, since no-one but the marines received replacements during the operation, none of the units is nearly as effective today as it was when all this began. “President Nixon may have been right in that it gave Vietnamisation more time, but. now we have more Vietnamising to do.”