Laos invasion PROPAGANDA VICTORY FOR HANOI FOUND

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32566, 27 March 1971, Page 23

Laos invasion PROPAGANDA VICTORY FOR HANOI FOUND

(Sy ALVIN SHUSTER, of the "New York Times" through N.Z.P.A.)

SAIGON, March 24. The allied thrust into Laos against North Vietnamese supply lines might have achieved some limited military success and killed thousands of the enemy but in political propaganda terms Hanoi seems to have won the day.

Unlike the aftermath of last spring’s joint American and South Vietnamese offensive against the Cambodian sanctuaries, the allies are coming out looking like losers, whether they are or not.

And barring some new and dramatic future action, which may well be in the works, the image projected of a defeated South Vietnamese Army is likely to remain, much to the distress of American and South Vietnamese officials who believe it deserves better.

In the casualty figure, Hanoi conies out second best. But, in view of diplomats and others in Saigon, Hanoi realised the obvious —what went into Laos had to come out. And the Communists took heavy losses of life to counter-attack, reap the propaganda benefits from appearing to shove Saigon’s forces back to the borders, and cripple at least four of Saigon’s battalions in the process.

What went wrong? What went wrong? Is the appearance of a South Vietnamese Army fleeing from tough Communist troops accurate? Did the allied operation fall short of its objectives? The operation probably did end quicker than the planners would have liked, the. enemy resistance and anti-aircraft fire was more intense than expected, the operation did seem to fall short of its goals and more men should have been committed to the battle. But it is not all that simple. Military sources insist that the plan all along called for the outnumbered South Vietnamese to maintain their mobility, to move into an area or a landing zone blasted out of the jungles by 15,0001 b bombs, search and destroy what they could find, and then move out. American firepower provided by planes and artillery at the border would take care of the enemy. “We got the enemy to mass and attack,” one military source said. “That was a critical factor. It is hard to get across that this did not make us angry. They lost a lot of key people and while we did not think we would draw down their manpower that much, we did. We used mobility and firepower, once the operation got moving, and let the enemy throw away his manpower.” The debate over the operation, of course, is just beginning, but some tentative conclusions have been reached by military officers, diplomats and others trying to draw up a balance sheet.

Plus and minus Opinion seems to divide as follows:

On the plus side is the official view that the operation disrupted the Ho Chi Minh Trail network, if only temporarily, destroyed "significant” amounts of supplies, killed an estimated 13,000 Communists, damaged key supply arteries and left them mined, delayed enemy plans for offensives by three to six months, forced Hanoi to devote time and energy to rebuilding its supply network, showed that the South Vietnamese could fight in tough enemy terrain without American advisers and left the troops with the new sense of confidence. On the minus side, the view is that the action under-

scored weaknesses in South Vietnam’s Army and its virtually total dependence on American planes and helicopters, handed Hanoi its propaganda victory, dramatised the limitations of American airpower, fell so short of expected results as to be devoid of long-term benefits and created new strains at unofficial levels between Americans and South Vietnamese arising out of the oft-expressed concern among the Vietnamese that the Americans were skimping on air support. There will have to be a considerable wait for conclusive answers.

In the meantime, official spokesmen are echoing President Nixon’s view that the operation was a success and that they are satisfied. There is no doubt, however, that they would have been more satisfied if the campaign had prdduced more dramtic immediate results. Enemy strategy

High ranking military sources also say that enemy strategy, which determined whether the operation would pass from one phase to the other, was not what had been expected. They say that heavy resistance was expec-

ted because of the crucial value of the trail network, but add that it came earlier in the struggle than predicted. The planners had thought that the strongest Communist effort would appear after the .South Vietnamese had moved further into Laos. The operation seemed to bog down 16 miles from the border for about two weeks, in part because bad weather curtailed helicopter support flights. Hanoi apparently believed that it was going to stop there. Thus, in view of these military sources, the Communists decided to unleash their intense assaults at that point, over-running Hill 31, a ranger battalion north of the main thrust. Mounting presence

The attacks resumed after the South Vietnamese left the Sepone area two weeks ago and they continued as Saigon’s forces moved southeast toward the border, leaving firebase after firebase under mounting pressure. American planes dropped up to 400 tons of bombs a day, but still the enemy came, taking heavy casualties.

There were also some unexpected drawbacks on the South Vietnamese side. The South Vietnamese, because of their difficulty with English, created serious problems when calling in air strikes, medical evacuation helicopters and other air support.

And the helicopters had become even more important than planned because Highway 9, which crosses the border, could not be secured and used as a key supply road.

Moreover, the South Vietnamese Command structure left much to be desired, having separate command posts for the air force, infantry, and marines.

The key question, of course, is whether it will all work. President Nixon seems to have made up his mind already that it will, spying the operation will make it possible for him to continue the same pace of American troop withdrawals from South Vietnam. Others are not so sure of its benefits. And there are many subscribers to the comment this week of an experienced diplomat in Saigon who said: “You can tell if it works only if nothing happens.”