U.S. Policy In Asia Linked With View Of Japan

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32392, 3 September 1970, Page 8

U.S. Policy In Asia Linked With View Of Japan

(By BRUCt KOHN, N.Z.P.A staff correspondent)

WASHINGTON, Sept. 1.

Although Tokyo was not visited by VicePresident Spiro Agnew during his just-com-pleted Asian tour, America’s security policy in the region is clearly linked to its assessment of future possible developments in Japanese foreign policy. A High White House source emphasised this week that the. Administration sees the main-) tenance of United States power in the area as a prime factor;

in maintaining Japan’s proWestern leanings.

There is no immediate concern that Tokyo is about to switch its allegiances overnight Nevertheless in its longterm outlook, the Administration believes that while endeavouring to cut back its military commitment in the region America has a considerable interest in stressing its determination to remain a Pacific power with vital interests in Asia. Dramatic Shift

The White House source indicated there was a strong belief that if Tokyo should become convinced that Communist countries would become 'dominant in Asia, a dramatic shift in Japan's political orientation would have to be expected. Should Japan draw the conclusion that America was no longer a factor to be reckoned with in Asia it would have two choices—it could either try to carry the load that the United States bad, i involving a need to build up ■ its military power, or seek to 'join forces with the Communist nations. The latter might also result in a growth of Japanese military power, carrying with it the possibility of this build-up being openly (directed against America. Bearing these factors in

mind, the Administration is evidently trying to balance its disengagement programme in the region against the need as it sees it to encourage the Japanese to contribute more to the Asian security burden. Okinawa Policy

Its agreement to return sovereignty over Okinawa to Tokyo by 1972 is seen by the Administration as a major contribution toward maintaining Japanese good will. At the same time as it agreed to this, however, the Administration made it clear that it considered Japan now carried responsibility for its own defence and was expected to play a stronger role in regional defence matters. The eventual outcome of the Vietnam conflict is not seen in Washington by observers as carrying as great a significance with Tokyo as, for example, with Bangkok. In fact a number of foreign affairs analysts believe that whatever the outcome of the war. the Thais will move ovei the next few years toward a position of Indonesian-type neutrality showing proWestern leanings but no longer standing out as a prominent member of Western defence alliances. Pattern Envisaged

These analysts feel that provided a Thai move toward “benevolent neutrality” took

place gradually, the Administration would not be greatly upset, perhaps seeing it as fitting into the pattern of Asian development it now envisages. While Vice - President Agnew spelt out to America’s Asian allies during his tom a major part of the “Nixon doctrine”—that the Administration wants its Asian allies to carry the combat burden of their wars themselves the White House source indicated that American troops were most unlikely to see service against guerrillas in the Phillipines. The sources indicated the Administration felt that if the Philippines Government, with American technical and perhaps financial assistance, could not handle its own guerrillas, American troops would probably not be very successful.

The sources added the Administration believed that American troops did not lend themselves particularly well for guerrilla wars because they tended to give the opposing side a foreign enemy as well as give the Government an opportunity to fight it as a conventional war.

This, the source added, did not apply to the Vietnam conflict in the past as it was “a combination of conventionalguerrilla war.”