EAST OF SUEZ TORIES WILL FIND NOTHING AS IT WAS IN PERSIAN GULF

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32350, 16 July 1970, Page 12

EAST OF SUEZ TORIES WILL FIND NOTHING AS IT WAS IN PERSIAN GULF

I By

IAN COLVIN

in the “Daily Telegraph", London/

(Reprinted by arrangement > When Mr Heath turns his attention to the Persian Gulf, which he visited as Leader of the Opposition in March, 1969, he will find nothing quite the same.

In the context of Conser- ’ vative East-of-Suez policy he ' then rejected the Wilson i policy of go, and formulated i a policy of staying because I the rulers want us. The Shah asked to be excepted from 1 this generalisation, but it was an adequate summary of Conservative policy, especi-1 ally as Mr Wilson had never ! produced a convincing explanation for his own changes of mind. Nobody explained why, for instance, if financial stringency dictated the go-by-1971 policy, the offer of Sheik Zaid of Abu Dhabi was refused—an offer to pay the total annual cost of the British presence (£l5 million) out of his privy purse. There was, of course, a Foreign Office plan to cover withdrawal by a concord between Persia and Saudi Arabia which would provide protection for the tinier sheikdoms, but this plan, though ingenious and tending to avoid a further British confrontation with extreme Arab nationalism, did not take account of several factors. These obstacles to a perfect solution are more apparent today. How Far? How far has withdrawal progressed? A year ago there [were confident Socialist Gov[ernment statements that [withdrawal would become irrevocable before a General Election and long before the 1971 deadline. These predictions fell away early in 1969. The Persian Gulf force of about 7000 Army and R.A.F. personnel is intact and no transfer of bases to a Federal I Defence Force has yet taken [place. The future of the Trucial Oman Scouts is still undetermined. The unseen [and efficacious British naval [military and air presence continues in support ofi defence commitments to Kuwait that will not lapse until May, 1971, and will continue towards Bahrain and the seven Trucial Oman States for a period yet unspecified. I Conservative policy papers lon the Persian Gulf written in February, 1970, assessed that the position would not have become irredeemable if a change of British Government took place in 1970. The policy experts today will say that the options are still open; but with significant changes.

It is, for instance, no longer possible to draw on [the munificent offer of Sheik; I Zaid. He has since 1969 formed a small defence force •of his own. For two years the outgoing British Resident, Sir Stewart Crawford, has been edging the sheikS towards taking on new responsibilities for foreign policy and defence within a projected Federation. Although that has not come about the seeds of independence have germinated. I Not A Just Pretext I Nobody in the Gulf imagines that this process could be halted. The sheiks ;did jubilate when they heard I the election news, but their [leader. Sheik Zaid, said no more than a cautious “It is a [factor.” What is, however, lapparent is that financial stringency is no longer going Ito be regarded by Britain as a just pretext for. removing her presence by the end of 1971 irrespective of the results achieved in federating the shiekdoms. It is further open to the rulers to conclude with) Britain treaty arrangements' for defence which can be more comprehensive than Mr[ Wilson and Mr Healey would have considered necessary or I advisable. Since their 1968 decisions on withdrawal were announced there have been some events in this area which have become obstacles to a rapid withdrawal by Britain and also argue against annulment of treaty support. The first is a marked deterioration in the security of Muscat and Oman. This sultanate, in separate treatyrelationship with Britain, was the first country exposed to revolutionary penetration after the evacuation of Aden in 1967. The Empty Quarter has proved no barrier to the' Front for the Liberation of[ Arabia. Its guerrillas, with Communist Chinese assistance, have worked their way into mountainous and forested Dhofar, Sultan Said bin

Taimur’s favourite province. There is little possibility of dislodging them. Last month a Baluchi sergeant in the Sultan’s forces tracked a large guerrilla group to a cave near Izki, in the heartland of Muscat itself, where the Sultan’s forces seized a large cache of arms after a sharp skirmish. The reluctance of the Sultan to spend his £3O million yearly oil revenues on development of his country make the sultanate vulner-! able, and revolution in Muscat and Oman would gravely j affect the stability of the neighbouring Trucial Oman States. Claim On Abu Dhabi | The second big obstacle to Pax Wilsonia in the Gulf hasl been the sudden re-emer-; gence of Saudi Arabian! territorial claims on Abu[ Dhabi, the pivotal State of the proposed union of Arab Emirates which- Britain has been coaxing into being. From the sagacious King Faisal these have come as a surprise. In their least objectionable form they are a demand for Buraimi Oasis villages which were in fierce dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia in 1954 and 1955 and were rescued only by the arrival of the Trucial Oman Scouts. Even larger demands have been tabled for a broad belt of Abu Dhabi territory stretching from Buraimi to the coast next to Qatar State. Saudi Arabia says, with reason on its side, that the Trucial Oman frontiers were drawn without reference to neighbours. Indeed my

Bartholomew map of 1956 shows no inland international boundaries to the Trucial [Oman. These demands were restated by King Faisal in March during the good-will visit of Sheik Zaid to Riyadh. They have been a well-kept secret since, but have caused consternation in the Trucial circle of rulers. They are the bitter fruit of the British policy of evacuations of convenience, and remind me of a painful occasion at a dinner table in Arabia a year ago, seeing a ruling Arabian prince, all! [sheer lawn and diamonds, j [taunting the British Ambas ! [sador with Britain’s policy of appeasement of Arab revolu•tionaries.

ing the right to a carve-up, then the Foreign Office plan has miscarried. Detached Bahrain The third obstacle to plain sailing towards a union of nine Arab emirates has been the detached position of Bahrain. The Shah has dropped his ancient claim to suzerainty over this Arab island sheikdom, the seat incidentally of British influence in the .Gulf since the Residency was transferred from Bushire on the [Persian coast. Sheikh Issa formed a Cabinet of Ministers earlier this year and withdrew to j the position of a constitutional monarch. Bahrain's population of 200,000, its [settled administration and [educational attainments, befitted it better than any coastal Oman State to be the [centre of a Federation, [other considerations have [outweighed these in favour of the coast, but the Supreme [Council of Rulers was quite unable in October, 1969, to [agree on budgetary arrangements, military bases and the constitutional framework itself. If a meeting of Deputy Rulers planned for August 22 makes no headway, Bahrain may well go alone into independence. This would deprive the Federation of its most articulate member, but create no deep animosity and perhaps leave the way open later jo an association of Arab States, into which Kuwait would throw its weight and which might somehow rescue the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman from its present feudal oblivion. Dangers In Commitment These developments and possibilities all suggest that to commit the Gulf States to a final form of independence in 1971 might invite needless risks. There is the pressure of the Palestinian Arabs in the Gulf to be considered. They are already in charge of the media of information and anxious to draw the Gulf States into their own dispute with Israel a thousand miles away. The Arab guerI rilla bands at present making life uneasy for King Hussein [will soon develop an interest [in the Gulf Coast. The Baath (party of Iraq is already burlrowing in. In wishing generally for a I continued British presence the Rulers of the Gulf have

Saudi Arabia has since then j yet to clear their minds on exterminated a South Yemeni base facilities and the access battalion intruding within its that would be indispensible borders, and appetite comes to activA co-operation. There with eating. If Saudi Arabia may be hard words between regards its primacy of place Arabs over the continuing in British plans for the need for “the outside future of this area as imply- presence.”