MONTGOMERY IN EUROPE

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32322, 13 June 1970, Page 4

MONTGOMERY IN EUROPE

Montgomery the Field Marshal. By ft. W. Thompson. Allen and Unwin. 344 PP-

As a description of the nature and scope of this book, the sub-title cannot be bettered for brevity and accuracy: “A critical study of the generalship of Field Marshal, The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. and of the campaign in North-West Europe, 1944/45.” It spans in time the period from Christmas Eve, 1943, when Montgomery, then commanding the British Eighth Army in Italy, was appointed to command the ground forces assigned to ‘‘Operation Overlord,” the assault on the Norman beaches of Hitler’s Festung Europa, to May 5, 1945, when a forlorn group of German staff officers surrendered all the German forces in N.-W. Europe to him on Luneberg Heath. During that time, Montgomery fought four major battles against the Germans: three offensive—in Normandy from June to August 1944, at Nijmegen and Arnhem during September of the same year, and on the Rhine in March 1945—and one defensive—in the Ardennes during December 1944. Two

of these, the author considers, Montgomery won brilliantly (Normandy and the Ardennes). A third, on the

Rhine, he also won, though the victory was lessened in stature by the extreme weakness of the enemy forces, as well as by the fact that, as Thompson stresses, the battle was unnecessary: that had Montgomery given his American subordinate, General Simpson, a freer hand, a crossing of the Rhine could have been made as early as March 5, and a bridgehead established which would have made the final drive into Germany, begun on the twenty-third of that month, even easier than it was. Montgomery’s refusal to allow General Simpson to take what seemed to him a golden opportunity was due, Thompson believes, to the Field Marshal’s innate caution, to his devotion to the “set-piece” battle, and to his fear of the “expanding torrent” which could result from over-confidence in pursuit of a confused and beaten enemy. By contrast, his American counterparts, Generals Bradley and (above all) Patton, revelled in such conditions, and were always ready to

take risks in exploiting a fluid tactical situation. As a result American troops crossed the Rhine at two points before

the great Northern offensive began. Ironically, the battle which Montgomery lost, at Arnhem, ended as It did because of over-confidence on his part. He planned, in a double stroke hinging on the use of airborne troops, to take the key bridge towns of Nijmegen and Arnhem, and break out into the more open country beyond. He failed because of three factors, all known to him at the time the decision to attack was taken: the waterlogged nature of the terrain, the existence of only one road suitable for the armoured thrust, and the presence of German forces, weak, but capable of harassing his advance, on both flanks. The result, says Thompson, was almost a foregone conclusion. The “lightning thrust” of the British armour failed to materialise, and the Ist Airborne Division, which had been asked to hold out at Arnhem for two to four days, fought to retain a bridgehead for nine. As Thompson says: “The plain fact is that the Ist Airborne Division had been parachuted out upon a hopeless and impossible limb in accordance with a vain and irresponsibly optimistic plan, inadequately thought out.”

“Montgomery the Field Marshal” is not only about Monty’s successes and failures in dealing with the Germans, but also in dealing with his allies, the Americans. The problems of command were difficult, both politically and militarily. Problems of personality made the situation worse, Cautious, selfassured, and very English, Montgomery wanted the main thrust of the allied assault to be in his sector. Patton and Bradley, impetuous and very American, argued for a more southerly thrust. Eisenhower, too genial and conciliatory for a Supreme Commander, temporised until his American subordinates “proved” their case by crossing the Rhine, and then backed their moves. Montgomery was neither pleased, nor able to disguise his displeasure. R. W. Thompson is a man well fitted to consider the diplomatic as well as the military aspects of Montgomery’s Field Marshalship. As a war correspondent, he was with Montgomery from the Normandy landings to the surrender at Luneberg, which he recounts in the words of a despatch he sent at the time. As a writer, he has already published three volumes devoted to the campaign in N.-W. Europe, “The Price of Victory,” “Eighty-Five Days,” and “The Battle for the Rhineland.” He is also the author of a study of Mongomery’s earlier career in North Africa and Italy, “The Montgomery Legend.” “Montgomery the Field Marshal” builds magnificently on these. The result is a masterly analysis of the general and the man: clear in its general outline, yet subtle in its handling of detail; sympathetic yet uncompromising in its analysis of the shortcomings of a great soldier and almost great man.