BRITAIN IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA CASE MADE FOR RETAINING A MODEST MILITARY FORCE

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 32031, 4 July 1969, Page 10

BRITAIN IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA CASE MADE FOR RETAINING A MODEST MILITARY FORCE

("Reprinted from the “Economist” by arrangement)

If Mr Heath and the Conservatives do keep British troops east of Suez after 1971—and the debate in Britain seems to be swinging their way—they have just been given a demonstration of the problems thev will have to deal with.

Last month five countries with an interest in the security of South-East Asia— Britain, Australia, New Zealand. Malaysia and Singapore —met in Canberra. The communique at the end of their talks was dutifully cheerful. The decision by Australia and New Zealand to keep forces on the South-East Asian mainland after 1971 was welcomed. So was Mr Healey’s announcement that there would almost always be a number of British troops training in the area after the departure, in 1971 on the present Government’s schedule, of the last permanent British force. Best of all, perhaps, it was confirmed in Canberra that an efficient radar system will be set up for the defence, under an integrated command, of both Malaysia and Singapore against air attack. But there the list of what the conference achieved ends. The creation of a system of regional security that the local powers can have confidence in is still a long way off. Fragile Stability May’s riots in Malaysia showed how fragile the stability of South-East Asian governments is. There is a danger of racial strife in Indonesia as well as Malaysia and Singapore. Guarding against this is a job for the home goven- : ments; outside assistance is i usually irrelevant. But there are two other dangers which the countries represented at the Canberra conference can reasonably regard as their business. One is subverision by local Communists whose principal loyality is to China. Indonesia narrowly escaped being the victim of precisely that sort of subversion four years ago. There is an insurrection, largely Chinese Communist in character, still going on in Malaysia; and Singapore lives on the edge of a street revolution. The second danger comes from Marxist movements which pay tribute to neither Moscow nor Peking but to some third centre: in this case, North Vietnam. It is countries farther north, like Laos and Cambodia, and to some extent Thailand, that chiefly have to worry about this at the moment; but Malaysia is certainly not wholly immune. Note Of Distrust The Canberra conference ended on a note of distrust when a Malaysian spokesman said his government could not accept the Australians’ apparent limitation of their commitment to West Malaysia. Mr Gorton, the Australian Prime Minister, had offended the Malaysians by talking about the indivisibility of “Malaya and Singapore,” thus excluding Sabah and Sarawak. Mr Gorton’s worry seems to be that the presence of Australian troops in West Malaysia might free Malaysian troops for operations in the east, presumably in defence of Sabah against the Philippines. Australia and New Zealand do not want to get involved with that one. The trouble is that, after a British withdrawal, Australia and New Zealand would be the only countries outside continental South-East Asia in a position to sustain friendly governments in the area. If their support was equivocal, there would be little left for Malaysia and Singapore to do but tp increase their own military and security budget to a point where their economic development would be seriously hindered.

In any case, Mr Gorton made it clear that if a situation arose that the 1200 Australian and New Zealand troops were manifestly incapable of dealing with his own country would insist that outside help be sought. He plainly wants to keep a ceiling on the level of Australia’s commitment: its defence spending is already rising this year by an estimated 9 per cent.

Widespread Harm

These uncertainties do harm not only to Malaysia and Singapore but also to the countries on their borders, notably Thailand and Indonesia, which would be affected by disorder in the area. The lesson is fairly plain. Australian and New Zealand need an assurance from Britain that they, will get effective help in certain kinds of emergency.

It is doubtful whether anyone except the British can give this assurance. The United States is unlikely to plunge any deeper into South-East Asia, given its experience in Vietnam and its responsibilities elsewhere. Japan may well increase its economic aid (which in 1968 came to sBssm, an increase of a quarter over the previous year but still only 0.74 per cent of its gross national product) but it is not going to come into a military organisation in the next few years. Neither its own public opinion nor that of the countries it occupied in the second world war is ready for that. Of course, there is always Russia and Mr Brezhnev’s offer a fortnight ago of an “Asian security pact.” Russia has become Malaysia’s biggest customer for rubber, buying £4om worth a year; and Indonesia is in debt to the Russians to the tune of around £4oom.

But countries whose chief worry is about their local Communists, even if these are not the Russian sort, are not going to think of the Soviet Union as their most obvious source of protection. The Most Acceptable In these conditions some sort of continued British presence, which does not have to be anywhere near the 30,000 troops in South-East Asia at present, would indicate to all concerned a willingness to help to maintain the stability of countries where a British presence and a British contribution is more acceptable than anyone else’s.

The presence of British ships exercising in the area, and the airlift next year of a brigade group to the Far East, may demonstrate Britain’s technical ability to send out reinforcements after 1971. But this is not accepted as being of much worth by the governments in the region because Britain has not yet demonstrated the political will to make any valid military effort. The more Britain hopes that Europe will open its doors, the more Tories like Mr Heath may be tempted to put South-East Asia on one side. Yet membership of the European Economic Com-

munity would not erase Britain’s responsibility—or that of other European countries —to lend a hand in lessfavoured areas of the world.

Greater Deterrent .The political will to help can be seen only if some force—not necessarily much more than a battalion in the Commonwealth brigade —is in the area all the year round. Troops on the spot have a greater deterrent effect than troops promised, with the risk that there may be delays in getting them there, or that they will not be acclimatised when they arrive—or that the promise will not be kept. It would be as much of a mistake for Mr Heath to say that Britain will keep men in South-East Asia indefinitely as it was for Mr Wilson to say that he was going to pull them out prematurely. The governments of the region will have to look after themselves some time. But there is a job to be done, for a while yet, in training the local armies and counter-guerrilla forces: and in being there to help to back them up in a crisis. Mr Heath, in recognising this, may yet take the last historical opportunity to restore a degree of consequence to British policy in Asia.

The only way for Britain to prove that it has the will to help Lee Kuan Yew and its other friends in SouthEast Asia is to keep some men there after 1971—as Mr Heath has said he would like to.—The “Economist”