NORTH KOREA WHAT ARE CHALLENGES TO U.S. MEANT TO GAIN?

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 31985, 12 May 1969, Page 12

NORTH KOREA WHAT ARE CHALLENGES TO U.S. MEANT TO GAIN?

(By

BERNARD KRISHER.

Newsweek feature Service.)

, l Tw ‘ ce i?}. i, as i 18 months, the world’s greatest military power has been humiliated by a country with a population of only 13 million—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, better known as Communist North Korea.

First, there was the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo and its crew in January 1968. Then, last month, two Korean MiG’s downed a United States Navy intelligence plane 90 miles away from the North Korean coast. In both cases, the United States, wary of risking a full-scale confrontation with Communist China or the Soviet Union, limited its response to expressions of diplomatic outrage.

Amid the touchy discussions about how much provocation the United States could stand without retaliating were several more basic—and more bewildering—questions: why does North Korea, labelled by a campaigning Richard Nixon last year as a “fourth-rate military power,” suddenly feel confident enough to challenge the United States? What can it hope to gain? Experts Puzzled There are no hard and fast answers. Some experts, in fact, have thrown up their hands in puzzlement. As one Kbrea-watcher in Tokyo observes helplessly: “We long ago built in an insanity factor with regard to assessing potential North Korean policy or actions.” Part of the reason for the difficulty in analysing North Korea’s motives is that the country is one of the most remote and inaccessible bastions in the Communist bloc. Only a handful of Westerners have ever been granted entry. According to their reports, North Korea is a drab, dull, poor (but not impoverished) model of Communist austerity. Most workers in Pyongyang, the capital city which was all but obliterated during the Korean war, live in gray concrete apartment buildings and ride to factories on trolley buses. Food Rationed If few people starve, fewer still over-eat Food is carefully rationed. The best wedding present parents can give a bappy couple is a food coupon. And when one member of a family visits another, he always brings his own coupons. Consumer goods are rare and expensive. Labourers, who make around SU.S.3O a month, have to pay SU.S.I9 to 5U.5.27 for ready-made, synthetic-fibre suits; Koreanmade watches sell for 5U.5.39, sewing machines for SU.S.lll. Kitchen appliances, while extant, are virtually unobtainable. The only amusement in the capital—for foreigners and natives alike—is a trip to the movies, most of which are propaganda films. Controlled Austerity The lack of luxury items goes largely unnoticed by the Koreans. “They are not familiar with foreign goods,” says one Japanese observer, “and there is no advertising in North Korea, so all they know is their own circumstance. They do not recognise their austerity as a type of austerity.” But austerity it is—meticulously and systematically con-

trolled by The country’s rotund, 57-year-old leader, Premier Kim II Sung, who maintains an iron rule over his subjects. There is a critical difference, however, between Kim and other major Communist leaders like Mao and Ho Chi Minh—a difference that many analysts believe solves a piece of the puzzle of Kim’s current audacity. Kim never led a revolution, never inspired a guerrilla uprising, is the father of no country. He was installed as a puppet of the Russians in 1948 after United StatesSoviet negotiations fell through on the reunification of Korea. Independent Image For 20 years he has been trying to build an independent image. By constantly calling for the union of the two Koreas—at any cost—and by establishing himself as a daring and virulent crusader against “United States imperialism,” Kim hopes to become a world figure of his own. No-one should believe, however, that Kim’s anti-Ameri-canism is anything but sincere. He has hated the United States with a profound passion ever since its troops almost annihilated his armies during the Korean war. (Only the intervention of a million Chinese soldiers prevented Kim’s forces from being driven out of North Korea.) The permanent presence of 55,000 United States Army and Air Force personnel in South Korea—the sole stumbling block in Kim’s plan to conquer the South—continues to rankle. Angry Impotence And Kim has been forced to watch in angry impotence as massive United States aid has built South Korea’s economy to a level of prosperity that shames the North. The South is the breadbasket of the region, and its 30 million people—helped by injections of United States cash—have

built a strong industrial economy as well. Kim tried his own “Great Leap Forward” in 1958, and for a few years it seemed to work. But it has stumbled and all but halted since 1964 when Kim began pouring money into defence. Kim continues to press for industrial and agricultural growth, but more and more he is directing his people's attention to the manufactured threat from outside their borders.

The country seems to exist in anticipation of war. Nursery-school children are taught songs and rhymes that crow hatred against the United States. All able-bodied men between 17 and 45 years serve in the army. And all citizens, including pregnant women (but excluding active mothers), must take at least four hours of military training every week. Fantasy a Reality The possibility that Kim’s fantasy “war of liberation” will some day become a reality is what disturbs the anxious experts who try to unravel the man’s mind. He has promised to reunify the two Koreas by 1970; but without substantial backing from either Russia or China, the promise is a puff of bombast. And neither Peking nor Moscow is longing for another major outbreak of violence in Asia. In his fierce drive for independence Kim has successfully alienated both of his powerful potential allies. Peking most recently called him a “fat revisionist,” and the Soviets’ prompt offer to help the United States in its search for the crew of the downed ECI2I aircraft is regarded as a definite sign of disapprobation of Kim’s belligerence. Two Prime Goals But Kim apparently believes that by continuing to harass United States ships and planes he can accomplish two prime goals: 1. He can fan the isolationist sentiment created in the United States by the Vietnam war and, thus, make the South Koreans doubt the depth of Washington’s commitment to defend their country. 2. By persisting in sending his troops on guerrilla forays into South Korea, be hopes to force Seoul to divert much more of its gross national product to defence, thereby weakening its economy. Most Western military analysts consider North Korea the most dangerous enemy the United States now faces in Asia—a small country, yes, but led by a fanatic who knows that aggressive midgets can trigger explosions between giants.

“If they wanted to take the heavy casualties,” warns one United States expert, “the North Koreans could break through the Demilitarized Zone and invade the South. And the Pyongyang leadership is considered just coldblooded enough to try it.”