Calculated Middle East Risk

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 31975, 30 April 1969, Page 6

Calculated Middle East Risk

(N Z. Press Assn —Copyright) ; | WASHINGTON. '] In his methodical; i way, President Nixon ! asked a while ago for a secret intelligence estimate on the risks of un- 1 dertaking a big power I effort to arrange a Middle East settlement, reports Hendrick Smith, of ' the New York Times , News Service. Back came the judgment . that there were risks all round, but the dangers of ( not trying were much greater than the danger of trying and ' failing. This suited President) )Nixon’s own inclinations. So| he look the carefully calculated risk of embarking on a) joint Big Four approach to) the Middle East. It marked the first signifi-! cant visible departure from the foreign policy of) the Johnson Administration,; which had left Middle East [mediation mainly to the) [United Nations representative. Dr Gunnar Jarring, of Sweden. So far. the difference be-1 tween the new administration: and the old has been primarily one of style and tactics. But there are signs that substance is also becoming involved. Israel is distinctly disturbed by the trend, although the Arabs are still far from satisfied. The Johnson Administration. mindful of Israel's oppo- | sition to anything that 1 smacked of an “imposed settlement," was wary of four-power talks. It reacted coolly to French and Russian proposals. Different Course The Nixon Administration, taking a different course, put

the most favourable interpretations on initiatives from i Moscow and Paris. But, morel important, it has been will-) ing to brook Israel's dis-it favour. i The Secretary of State (Mr William Rogers) made it clear recently what the Republican High Command has in mind a Big Four “formula" or a Middle East settlement, and then the use of "the force of public opinion" to get it, or some similar compromise, accepted by the Arabs and the Israelis. The contrast with the John- ; son Administration is marked. In part, it demonstrates the energy of a new team taking over from an old one too [exhausted and too preoccu- i pied with the nightmare of ) Vietnam to vigorously tackle ! the Middle East. In part, it exhibits Presi-. jdent Nixon’s desire for “pre-) ventive diplomacy" before a ) full-blown Middle East crisishits him. In part, it reflects the sheer) passage of time and mounting American impatience with the Middle East deadlock. On matters of substance, the language of the Nixon Administration’s proposals is so subtle and supple that it can be given various interprejtations, depending on the; diplomatic needs of the moment. Important Points J But the Republicans seem [ to have given a new ring to i three important points—refugees, Jerusalem and terri- . tories. Their proposal to the Big Four speaks of keeping JeruI salem “unified" and giving ■ Jordan a voice in its civil, I economic and religious life, i Initially, this was taken to imply overall Israeli control of the city, as the Israelis demand. Now, officials suggest, it i implies a form of joint Arab-

Israeli control of the entire ’ city. On the territorial question, I Mr Rogers called for “rec- < tifleations" in the old 1967 l cease-fire lines, emphasising, i however, that new borders 1 "should not reflect the weight of conquest." These were concepts to which the Johnson Adminis- , tration paid lip service, but , some diplomats suspect the i Republicans intend to press i Israel to give up more—that , [ is, virtually all—of the land i it captured in 1967. I On the Arab refugees, Mr i Rogers said the “desire and , aspirations of the individual ; human beings concerned" should be taken into account, alluding to the old idea of ; ; polling refugees to see whether they want to be repatriated to their former lands ior compensated for them. ) ) Israel mentions only compen- , sation. Considerable Obstacles ' I It is too soon, diplomats ' say, to judge whether Presiident Nixon's activism will i pay off. His success will depend on not only being [able to overcome considerable obstacles to agreement iwith the Russians on terms ) of a settlement, but also on being able to keep American ' public opinion behind him as ' ! [ he tries to sell it to Israel and , the Arab states. And no genuine compromise will be ) sold easily. i. Already some American i supporters of Israel grumble ■ privately about an “erosion"; ■ in White House support for - Israel. > The Israeli Prime Minister ■ (Mrs Golda Meir) has been ■ outspoken in opposing the . Big Four effort from the start. i Nor is Egypt’s President I Nasser happy. His diplomats > have objected to American insistence on eventual faceI to-face negotiations between • Israel and the Arabs. to>

Washingtons support for "contractual agreements” between the belligerents to establish peace, and to hints that the Arabs will not regain every inch of territory they lost in 1967. Wannest Reception The wannest reception has come from King Hussein of Jordan, who visited Washington this week. He applauded the Big Four effort and offered a titbit of progress of his own. He pledged explicitly for the first time with President Nasser's “personal authority" behind him—that a settlement would assure Israeli passage through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba In the upper reaches of the Nixon Administration there is disarming optimism about the prospects for success by the Big Four. But other diplomats with years of experience in the Middle East feel the odds are still against the new President