Six Minutes At Midway

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31772, 31 August 1968, Page 4

Six Minutes At Midway

Incredible Victory. By Waiter Lord. Hamish Hamilton. 331 pp. Illustrated.

This American account of the Battle of Midway (June 4 and 5, 1942) is graphic and clear. It takes its actuality from the testimonies of many participants on both sides.

The Battle of the Coral Sea in early May had not seemed a defeat to the Japanese. “Son of concubine gained a victory,” for it was the most inferior section of their fleet air arm which had been engaged there. While the battle underlined the importance of carriers, it subtracted nothing from the heavy infection of “victory disease" which afflicted the Japanese, with its under-estimate of enemy strength and, strangely, enemy morale. On paper the Japanese were very strong, far stronger than their opponents, when in late May they moved out in three divisions, against the Aleutians, against Midway Atoll, which they expected to occupy, and against the remaining American fleet, which it was hoped would accept the challenge and come out and be destroyed. Apart from the formidable armada —l9O ships were at sea—headed by a striking force built round four carriers, the strength of the Japanese lay in their combat-experienced aircrew and the qualities of the Zero fighter. Their only technical disadvantage was a lack of radar.

But they were to fight at a tactical disadvantage: the Americans had broken their codes and were aware of their intentions. The story of this cryptographic achievement has its own fascination. Only about 15 per cent of the Japanese radio traffic was actually fully understood and this required a good deal of interpretation. Admiral Nirnltz had to decide to trust information which many round him mistrusted. The Japanese succumbed to a ruse so transparent it would have needed little thought to see through. To confirm that a Japanese code name was really Midway, the fortress sent out a clear language signal about its failing water supply. Soon the Japanese obligingly filled in the identification by referring to this in their messages: they had overlooked that Midway had a secure signal channel, its cable link with Hawaii. Nimitz in Hawaii was somewhat in the position of Harold between Stamford Bridge and Hastings. He had to get back carriers from the South Pacific and repair the Yorktown in time for action. Meanwhile he reinforced Midway which was to act in the battle almost as a fourth carrier. The three American carriers, all he could muster, were planted in ambush to the north when the opening air attack hit Midway. The four Japanese carriers beat off the first eight American attacks unharmed, but the

ninth in six minutes hit three of the carriers, catching them with many planes on deck. The Hiryu, their fourth carrier, found and disabled the Yorktown (finally torpedoed next day by a Japanese submarine) before herself being destroyed. The victory—-which Admiral Yamamoto thought the turning point of the war—had cost more than the Yorktown: there were severe losses of American Army and Navy planes and pilots, most of whom had just completed training. Although a few other ships were sunk on both sides, the major prize and emblem of victory was the destruction of the carriers, without which the 11 Japanese battleships and their attendant cruisers and destroyers could only return to base.

The book shows skill in depicting the gap between plans and actual combat. It is especially good on the way in which both sides groped for knowledge of each other’s positions. (It was late in the morning before the Japanese realised that more than one carrier was in action against them and the Hornet and the Enterprise were not attacked.) The narrative verges on the tiresome when it conducts close inquests into which airman hit what carrier, but this is part of the price paid for what in the aggregate is lively detail. The plans and photographs are unusually informative.