U.S. Democrats Face Split

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31633, 20 March 1968, Page 13

U.S. Democrats Face Split

(N.Z.P.A.’Reuter—Copyright)

WASHINGTON,

March 19,

The entry of Senator Robert Kennedy into the 1968 United States Presidential competition has had a severe impact, not merely on the two Democrats he is challenging but on major candidates of both parties all over the country, reports Warren Weaver, of the “New York Times” News Service.

It was to be expected, he writes, that the declaration of war by his most persistent Democratic antagonist would spur President Johnson and his political allies into action, dispatching VicePresident Humphrey off on a hastily-scheduled campaign swing through Wisconsin. Less predictable was the emergence among close associates of the President of a new attitude of tolerance, even a bit of affection, for Senator Eugene McCarthy, who had been the Administration’s chief political irritant until Senator Kennedy stepped in. Major Administration political leaders, including Mr Humphrey,. have begun quietly emphasising that Senator McCarthy, for all his misguided views on Vietnam, is an honourable man, not lacking in courage, who ran a good New Hampshire campaign.

President Johnson’s loyalists, it was becoming clear, were out to do just what Senator Kennedy had said he did not want done: Split the President’s Democratic opponents into two hostile camps, as angry at each other as they are at the President If this effort succeeds, it could make matters much more comfortable for the President in the Nebraska, Oregon and California primaries. All three of the Democratic candidates will be on the ballot in those States—by name in the first two and with a stand-in for President Johnson in the third. For example, the President could win in the Oregon primary with only 40 per cent of the vote- if the anti-John-son Democrats were so divided that Senators Kennedy and McCarthy received 30 per cent each. The Kennedy impact on Senator McCarthy and his expanding effort for the Presidency is, in some respects, an extension of the effect of the Minnesotan’s strong showing in the New Hampshire primary. Senator McCarthy is now forced to amplify his relatively modest political staff into a fully-fledged national campaign organisation; something that can provide professional competition with the structure Senator Kennedy is expected to reassemble from the lumber of 1960. A major problem for Senator McCarthy in this regard is likely to be money. His New Hampshire campaign was well-financed, at least $200,000 being spent on radio and newspaper advertising,

television, and several highlyprofessional mailings. To maintain this pace through seven more primaries—the exuberant Senator McCarthy added two more in the wake of his New Hampshire victory, before Senator Kennedy entered the race—is going to require a far greater fund-raising effort than anyone ever contemplated when the McCarthy campaign was launched. A major question today is whether Senator Kennedy will tap some of the revenue sources upon which Senator McCarthy was counting. One of the critical problems the Kennedy campaign has created for Senator McCarthy is the prospective battle for the loyalty of the nation’s politically-minded young people. There was no question that Senator McCarthy had that loyalty in full measure during his New Hampshire effort It enabled him to conduct a broader house-to-house canvass than any Democrat there had done. If the campus activists refuse to desert the McCarthy cause to rally behind Senator Kennedy, it will not deprive the New Yorker of very many votes, and his family fortune can always stand the strain of hiring manpower to replace the young workers. But the prestige loss that would almost certainly follow if Senator Kennedy was rejected by the younger generation could be substantial. This is something the New Yorker may try to avoid by continued attempts to make the common cause with Senator McCarthy that he broadly outlined at his announcement news conference.

The Kennedy candidacy is expected to have a profound effect on a number of Democratic candidates for Governor and Congress who had been chafing under the apparent necessity of making a strong commitment to the President.

In some instances, these State candidates will be able to plead for at least partial immunity from identification with the President, on the grounds that the Kennedy and McCarthy challenges have so divided the party that it would be better for all hands to run an independent race for, say, Governor. The effect of Senator Kennedy’s candidacy on the race for the Republican nomination appears pronounced, in its early stages, but of a totally different character. In the Nixon camp, the stated assumption was that Senator Kennedy’s entry would guarantee that the Democratic Party would be torn apart by the time its national convention meets in Chicago late in August, en suring Mr Nixon’s victory. This interpretation is at least partially dependent on President Johnson proving to be the Democratic survivor. If Senator Kennedy appears able to overtake Johnson, Governor Rockefeller supporters will feel their position is fav oured. Adherents of the New York Governor argue that the party could not take the risk of nominating Nixon, a two-time loser, to run against a votegetter like Senator Kennedy, or even perhaps one like Senator McCarthy, who would certainly develop a new reputation if he put together enough primary victories to win the nomination.