Possible Successor To de Gaulle

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31539, 29 November 1967, Page 14

Possible Successor To de Gaulle

(By

SIMON KAVANAUGH)

Francios Mitterand, possible successor to de Gaulle, enigma of the French Left, can perhaps best be described as the Harold Wilson of France—but Harold Wilson before the election.

His socialism is impeccable for a modern technocrat-intellectual society: massive social welfare-schemes, aid for the underdeveloped countries, abandonment of the force de frappe, working for a united Europe, creating a rapprochment with Russia, but being kind to the Americans. All this would be paid for by a reorganisation of the chaotic tax system, the basis of which would be “fair shares for all”.

Unhappily for Mitterand. French political observers are I already seeing his theories at work in Britain, and they I need make no comment on i the results in order to harm '! his image. Nevertheless, the ' voters are restless, and want i a new Moses to follow, or at ' least to look forward to; de Gaulle, after all is 77. The realities of opposition to de Gaulle are formidable, but Mitterand has survived better than most, and is merging—quite rapidly in some respects—as the most likely victor of the power struggle that will inevitably overtake the republic one day. He is not especially liked, admired or even respected by his professional colleagues, but he is at least there, an able and more-than-willing candidate to succeed

I “Chairman Moi." Not Liked ; . He is not liked because he 1 is vague in his promises, grey jin his personality, leaning to- . wards the austere in his ideology. He can be all things l to all men too readily, and his critics are quick to use ' such words as “two-faced” . and “opportunist.” In one I hour, he once managed to patch up a coalition-opposi-I tion to de Gaulle comprising Mr Mendes France's sup- ’ porters, right and left-wing Socialists and the Comi munists, too. It did not last long, but he did it—though whereas in any other democratic country that might have been regarded as an achieve- j ment, Mitterand emerged only I with something akin to discredit—all parties complaining that they had been! tricked. Mitterand is a serious contender for de Gaulle’s crown, however, because he is. above all, a realist. Only he could have produced a 55-45 per cent result in a national vote against de Gaulle, as he did in 1965. Only he could have convinced the Communists that they had to compromise with the Liberals to achieve this result. Only he could actually beat Premier Georges Pompidou (the semiofficial heir-apparent) in a nation-wide opinion poll, as he did in September. Successful Barrister What he lacks for the average French voter still, though. • I is a personality. Born the son) of a small-town stationmaster. Mitterand, now just 50, spent; the first 20 years of his life buried in books. He studied ; philosophy, economics, sociol-l: ogy, literature, history and i law. He became a bar- i

rister and a successful one, before being attracted to politics. But the war intervened and he was interned in a German prison camp. After three attempts he successfully escaped, joined the Resistance and became a courier between Algiers, Occupied France and London. At this time his political sympathies were pro-Right, so much so that Gaullist propaganda has accused him of collaborationist tendencies, in spite of his distinguished Resistance record. In August, 1944, de Gaulle appointed him to the “insurrectionary government” inside France—a job which suited him admirably, and which gave him the idea, perhaps, for appointing peacetime France’s first “shadow cabinet” 25 years later. By 1954 he was firmly est-

| ablished as a professional survivor of political turmoil; he was 11 times a Minister, and! e when war broke out in ' y Algeria held the precarious post of Minister of the j s Interior. s j Motives Suspected 5 There were several assas- ™ sination attempts—but, typi- » cally, they were written off ) | by his opponents as publicity . gimmicks. That may have , seemed unfair, it may have' been unfair, but Mitterand' > had already created a reputa- . tion which attracted cynicism' [ and suspicion of his motives, I i At elections, for instance, he . would sing the Marseillaise' : with a catch in his voice, and! lat parties and banquets he I i would extravagantly praise' men whom he privately des-i | pised. j Nevertheless, his technique for survival stood him in good stead; for twenty years' he has never been out of the I, limelight in French politics, , 1 and he has sensibly opted for 1 slow and steady progressi rather than the meteoric rise i and fall. of. say, Poujade and ; Mendes-France. i ] Preparing Plan Currently he is working on a huge project—the writing of an international policy for r France in the 19705. At his i elbow, it is said, is the Bri- i tish Socialist Party, work J “Signposts for the Sixties” a which resolved the policy si conflict in the Labour Party 1 and swept Harold Wilson into power in two elections. His critics are as vocifer- m ous as ever, but their disad- »■ j vantage is that they are ini 1 ' j disarray. “They cannot even jp. agree on my bad points,” he' it i says. I oi And he knows very well!" that anyone who can comejyi

second to de Gaulle in a national poll, as he has, is someone who must command respect in the most reluctant Frenchman. his plan is finished he will have to present it to the voter as an old-style admiral nailing his colours to the mast—and that is something he has never had to do before. De Gaulle is no doubt impatiently waiting for that moment too, for his big guns have never had a specific target in the Mitterand camp. For France, the battle might be crucial.