“Invisibles” Cost N.Z. £131.1m

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31384, 1 June 1967, Page 17

“Invisibles” Cost N.Z. £131.1m

In the last seven years, invisible expenses increased at an average annual rate of 11 j per cent to reach a record £131.1 million in 1966-67. This was equal to almost one-third of New Zealand’s export receipts.

Making this comment in his annual report to the provincial conference of North Canterbury Federated Farmers in Christchurch yesterday, the president (Mr R. H, Bedford) said these statistics emphasised the urgent need for developing ways of reducing payments for “invisibles” substantially. Provided prices for all other produce remained at present levels—and indications were that they would do so—it had been estimated that export receipts should not be down by more than 7J per cent at the outside. This, in itself, was serious when it was realised that New Zealand would have between £2O million and £3O million less to spend overseas, but when it was taken in conjunction with the steady erosion of overseas earnings by invisible payments, it was even more serious. After referring to the cost of “invisibles” Mr Bedford said he could not emphasise too strongly that farmers were the one section of the community which had to absorb all increases in costs of production, while selling their produce in world markets over which they had little, if any, control.

More Wheat It had been estimated that an additional 30,000 acres of wheat would be grown this year. This could produce another 1} million bushels, and achieve a further saving of overseas exchange. The withdrawal of the flour subsidy, with which he agreed, had created problems within the wheat industry, and the

most important concerned what financial arrangements would be made to enable flour millers to buy their annual requirements of wheat in advance, as in the past. If millers were required to pay the full 14s 6d a bushel without any special financial arrangemepts being made for them, it was obvious that they would have to restrict their buying to short-term requirements. Molyneux Report Mr Bedford said the report of the Molyneux Committee had been extremely comprehensive. “While I must agree that any avenue which would speed up the turn-round of shipping with a consequent reduction in the overseas freight bill, must be explored, a preliminary study of the report does reveal many unresolved problems,” Mr Bedford said. “A reduction in our overseas freight bill is essential, but it must be kept in perspective, and it would be of little consequence if an additional £2 had to be spent on internal transport to save £1 in overseas exchange.” Mr Bedford disagreed with the apparent relegation of Lyttelton to a secondary role for both import cargo and export cargo of meat. He supported the remarks of the senior vice-president (Mr W. N. Dunlop) that Lyttelton was an ideal port for the handling of container cargo—one which could handle container ships now, with comparatively little additional capital outlay. For the shipping lines it would be admirable to have only two container ports in New Zealand, and having regard to the volume of cargo handled, it would be impossible to quarrel with the recommendation that Auckland and Wellington should be container ports. However, it was imperative that the South Island should have a container port, and because of its preparedness and geographical situation, Lyttelton was the obvious choice. “I can see little point in ships coming to Lyttelton to discharge residual cargo, and then proceeding to Timaru or Bluff to load meat which is already on hand at freezing works less than 20 miles from ' Lyttelton,” Mr Bedford said.