Appeal Against Docking Of Tails

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31345, 15 April 1967, Page 3

Appeal Against Docking Of Tails

(New Zealand Pren Association)

AUCKLAND, April 14.

The hearing of an appeal by Albert Victor Garrick, president of the Waikato branch of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, against the dismissal of two charges against William Earl Silcock, a farmer, of Tahuna, last year, began before Mr Justice Speight in the Supreme Court at Hamilton today.

Silcock was charged with cruelly illtreating a cow and with mutilating a cow, causing it unnecessary pain and suffering, by removing part of its tail with dehorning shears.

He pleaded not guilty to both charges, which were heard at Morrinsville on June 14, 1966, before Mr T. B. Mooney, S.M. In a reserved decision

the proper interpretation of the Animals Protection Act included in the words ‘reasonable or necessary’,” he said. Mr Feenstra also submitted that the Magistrate was wrong in considering that he could only find that the animal suffered unnecessary pain by looking at the observed physical reactions. Mr Feenstra contended that the Animals Protection Act was designed for the protection of the animals. “The necessity for removing the tail must be related to the animal first and not to the man," he said. “A domestic animal is used by man and its usefulness relates to the domestic use to which it is being put “This cannot under the Act be related to economics. If a farmer holds that because the cows’ tails are cut off, he can milk two cows in the same time as one, under the Act, this is not a reason for removing the tails.” He said that apart from some forms of efficiency stated under clause 19 (1) of the Act any other forms of efficiency were not acceptable because efficiency is not of itself under the Act reasonable or necessary.

given on September 6, 1966, Mr Mooney dismissed both charges. Mr Garrick is represented by Mr P. F. Feenstra. Mr Silcock is represented by Mr R. F. Annan. Mr Feenstra submitted that the test as to whether it was reasonable or necessary to inflict pain on an animal was an objective and not a subjective test as held by the Magistrate. He submitted that the Magistrate was wrong in considering that because the Animals Protection Act made exceptions under certain cases it might be said that it may be reasonable or necessary to inflict pain on animals for their more effective use. He claimed that there was no evidence before the Magistrate that proved that the docking of cows’ tails was an advisable dairying practice. He submitted that the justification accepted by the Magistrate as a defence was largely economic. “Such reasons are not, upon

The hearing will continue.