THE VIETNAM WAR AND EUROPE A EUROPEAN EXAMINES U.S. ATTITUDE TO ASIA

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31333, 1 April 1967, Page 12

THE VIETNAM WAR AND EUROPE A EUROPEAN EXAMINES U.S. ATTITUDE TO ASIA

(By

ALFRED GROSSER,

I. tn "Le Monde")

< Reprinted bp arrangement)

The Vietnam war is certainly not in the forefront of each American’s daily preoccupations. Economic development goes on.>Cultural life goes on Political life goes on.

And yet we are witnessing the slow absorption of United States politics in this distant war; internally, where confrontations arise and grow, where financial impossibilities, social and economic brakeapplications proliferate; externally, above all, just as, during the last years of the Algerian war, French leaders and diplomatists were led, willy-nilly, to concentrate on

one single, solitary problem, so, today, there is hardly a discussion held in the United States on Europe which does not turn very quickly into a debate on Vietnam; hardly a high official in the State Department or a military or political strategist who has really the time and inclination to devote himself to other questions. Few of these, however, will admit that, among the harmful consequences of war, this one should be considered as highly important from the mere point of view of American efficiency. Especially by cool strategists, who explain to you that there is no hurry, that China’s weakness makes all escalation problems manageable, and that, anyway, it can go on for a good while because this war had not yet become "a question of life or death,” massive atomic death being, apparently, the only form which counts. “Confusion Discernible” But it ia hard to see if these are the people who carry decisive weight in the great decisions in American politics. Indeed, a confusion of thought is constantly discernible. The same person will talk, now of possible victory, and now of a desirable solution similar to the French solution of 1954*. finding a face-saving, negotiated way out; that is, - keeping South Vietnam not openly dominated by the Communists for a certain period of time, say, until the 1972 Presidential elections. Victory? To European scepticism, which refers back to Algeria or Suez (If the expeditionary force had succeeded, what would one have done then?) two examples are put up which are supposed to justify the waging of war: South Korea and Greece. Yes, Syngman Rhee’s regime was detestable. Yes, the United States was forced to undertake many things after throwing the Northerners back over the 38th parallel. But today the economy is on the way up, the political system is growing more liberal, the American presence is dwindling. And if, in 1946-1947 they had yielded, as today’s “doves” propose, would not the Greeks be living under a Communist domination which a majority of them would reject? Poly-Communism A Communist domination whose definition, however, has become strangely contradictory. When people speak to you of Rumania, or even Bulgaria; when they set the U.S.S.R. over against China, they accept the fact of poly-com-munism, but forget the existence of a world revolution prepared by a sort of sole planmaster. But as soon as Vietnam comes into the question, communism always appears monolithic, bringing to bear an identical threat on all South American, African, and, above all, Asiatic countries. The argument of antiAmerican, anti-Western Asiatic solidarity which napalm could rear up is ruled out by tales of approaches made by Japanese, Indian, Malaysian and Burmese leaders to urge the United States not to go, and to take no notice of the public utterances of these same leaders. Approval On Right As for the European countries, their moralising attitude is one of irresponsibility. Moral talk is all very fine for him who wields no power. And not even for everybody; the idea that there are Germans condemning the Vietnam war may shock an American, even if you tell him that they are the same ones, generally speaking, who are struggling against neo-Nazism, and that unreserved approval of American policy resides, in Europe, just on the extreme Right In any case, Europe is far and unhelpful. It has forgotten the cold war period , when the United States saved it and refuses to allow that Asia, too, has a right to be saved. Irritation or disappointment with Europe are only side issues. Much more serious is the starker and starker absence of any American policy regarding an evolving Europe. It is true, they are seeking an understanding with Russia, particularly to reach a limitation to the disastrous anti-missile armaments race. They are raising no opposition to an easing of tension between the two Europes. But they treat the loyal Germans in terms of financial needs arising from the Vietnam war. They have stopped really discussing with their Atlantic partners on any question of the future'

because, for lack of time and interest, they have no clear view.

Fourth Republic How much longer? A long time yet, no doubt. From many points of view, the United States today recalls the dying days of the Fourth Republic. Is Johnson, carrying out a policy opposed to

that for which he was elected, so different from Guy Mollet in 1956? And Dean Rusk from a Robert Lacoste? And what about the flight from any decisions but those suggested by the “hawks.” And what about the fear of public opinion, though at the same time they refused to mould it in any way but by guile? What about the ineffectiveness of the brave protesters, often developing extreme viewpoints, which prevent them from getting their teeth into other sectors of that same public opinion? But economic resources, institutional stability, military might, are such that it can go on for a long time yet. And then, too, there is the absence of a man who, like General de Gaulle, might confer nobility and prestige on a solution which was being written off as a humiliating militaiy defeat. It is not unthinkable that the way out might come from a change of attitude on the part of the Republicans, sounding the note, not of no-compromise, but of saving prosperity. A “nationalist” could venture to propose solutions virtually denied to men on the liberal side of the political chessboard. Can Europeans Help Can Europeans help to push on American evolution? Not much, for the moment. The best they could do would be to avoid hardening American attitudes. If de Gaulle’s speech at Phnom-Penh on September 1, 1966, had any weight in the scales, it was

on the negative aide, inas- ■ much as, by its one-sidedness and aggressive tone, it made every solution it proposed unacceptable. They can, on the other hand, seek to bring pressure, even weak pressure, on an opinion essentially versatile and open to influence, by explaining the reasons for their concern and their grievances. The results of their actions may well be feeble. But they will certainly be nil if criticism of the Vietnam policy and the destructive war appear as variations on the theme of global condemnation of the United States, of anti-Ameri-canism based on ignorance and a refusal to learn. When Senator John Kennedy criticised French policy in Algeria, how sharply he was bidden to mind his own business! And yet, be did not go so far to see, in a blindalley war, in mass devastation, the virtually inevitable outworking of French culture.— Copyright of “Le Monde.”

When Senator Robert Kennedy visited Europe recently he was reported to be struck by the attitude of Europeans to what the United States was doing in Vietnam. The writer of this article, Alfred Grower, who recently returned to France from the United States, examines the American people’s attitude to the Vietnam war as seen through European eyes.