RHODESIA BRITISH RECOURSE TO WIDER SANCTIONS “MOST RELUCTANT

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31225, 24 November 1966, Page 16

RHODESIA BRITISH RECOURSE TO WIDER SANCTIONS “MOST RELUCTANT

(By

RONALD BUTT.

Political Editor of the "financial Times". London!

(Reprinted from the “financial Times" bp arrangement i

The British Government’s expected verdict on the Smith regime s response to Britain’s proposals for an accommodation over Rhodesia seems likely to be that Salisbury's attitude constitutes no acceptable basis for a settlement on the lines of the six principles accepted by both the major political parties in Britain.

All the signs are that if the Prime Minister and his colleagues have come to this decision they have done so most reluctantly. Mr Wilson and the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr Herbert Bowden, have bent over backwards to interpret Mr Smith’s recent response to their proposals as negotiable, and if they have failed it is not for want of trying.

Everybody knows—and this includes the leaders of the Conservative Party—that the Prime Minister has been most reluctant to take sjhis step because it means that in accordance with his commitment at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, he must ask the United Nations to impose selective mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia. Slippery Slope For obvious reasons, the Government is reluctant to do this. It has always maintained that Rhodesia is a British problem and, like the Conservative Party which is totally committed against any reference of Rhodesia to the United Nations, it realises that asking for sanctions could be the edge of a very slippery slope on which Britain could totally lose what control it has over this difficult situation. Because Mr Wilson has every political inducement to come to terms with Mr Smith, the Conservative Party should not only recognise that he has genuinely tried, but also acknowledge the political problems that now face him. Any suggestion of a sell-out to Rhodesia could involve both the break-up of the Commonwealth and an extremely grave position for Mr Wilson inside his own Party.

So far as the Commonwealth is concerned, there have been signs here that the leaders of African countries, while making threatening noises, are anxious not to push Britain further than she can go. Thus, while rebuking the British Government for complacency in handling the Rhodesian situation, President Kaunda, of Zambia, last week called for force or mandatory sanctions and the second option seemed a clear indication of his wish not to exacerbate the situation. Pliancy Of M.P.s Equally there is a limit to the forbearance of the Commonwealth countries themselves and to the self-restraint of the Labour Party in Parliament. Mr Wilson has already asked his followers to accept so many policies that are fundamentally distasteful to them, both in economic and foreign policy, that it is superficially tempting to assume that he could get his Party in Parliament to accept anything. But this is to set too much store in the pliancy of M.P.s. Governments often seem to be getting away with all they want because they know just how far they can go and do not try to go an inch further. Anything that was blatantly a “sell-out” to Mr Smith could unleash a fury within the Labour Party (as well as within the United Nations, and the Commonwealth), and might be the straw that broke the accommodating back of the Parliamentary supporters of this Government. In turn, the Government

must recognise that the Conservative Party also has its problems over Rhodesia. There are deep and passionate feelings in the Tory Party against directing punitive action at Rhodesia, and the Government would be wise to acknowledge that these feelings, far from being confined to the Tory Party, are widespread among Labour voters.

For all these reasons, there [is every reason to hope that the leadership of both parties will approach the subject cautiously and will be careful that the situation should not generate anything like the passions of a “Suez-type” crisis. Mr Smith would be most unwise to set any hopes on this sort of development from the understandable reluctance of many in this country to see the Rhodesian problem handed over to the United Nations. Stumbling Block The essential stumblingblock between the British Government and Salisbury seems to be the Smith Government’s response to British proposals for progress towards majority rule and for a “blocking” element of African M.P.s in the Rhodesian Parliament who could prevent any backtracking on an agreed Constitution. If Mr Smith can really be shown to refuse to meet the British Government on this general point, plainly the British Government must stand out against him. It can, of course, be argued that Mr Wilson was wrong to have issued an ultimatum to the Smith regime or to have set a time limit on it. But again, one has to accept the pressures under which he had to do so. Further, the Government can fairly claim that if it did not now ask the U.N. for selected mandatory sanctions, the Afro-Asian majority at the U.N. could make much higher demands and put Britain in a very difficult position if it was forced to veto them.

As things are, the British Government can stand on the agreement of the Common-

wealth Prime Ministers—which was that it would propose selective mandatory sanctions only provided that there is no attempt by the Commonwealth members of the Security Council to turn this proposal into something more extreme.

This is essentially the British safeguard against being driven into provocative sanctions, and there seems little doubt that, if other Commonwealth countries went back on their part of this bargain, Britain would feel free to refuse to sponsor or even participate in selective sanctions. Obvious Dangers The immediate question now is what these selective sanctions will be, and it appears that the Government will not announce its detailed proposals when it states the result of its talks with Salisbury. The present dangers are obvious. There is the fear of disrupting the Commonwealth if nothing more is done. On the other hand, there is the danger of sanctions, involving South Africa, not only by driving her into closer association with Mr Smith than she has been prepared to undertake so far, but also by leading to attempted punitive measures against the South African economy. Such involvement of South Africa would have a serious effect on the British balance of payments and therefore, even, on the timing of British entry into the E.E.C., supposing this is feasible on general grounds. The relationship of Rhodesia to so many other current political problems makes it particularly worrying. On the other hand, if British politicians play their hand responsibly they can still prevent it from getting out of hand and, if there has to be recourse to sanctions, these need be no more than a tightening of the existing policy which later, even if not sooner, may force the Salisbury Government to see reason.