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N.A.C. Preference For Boeing 737 Disputed

CA'etr Zealand Press Association/

WELLINGTON, September 9.

Statements by the chairman of directors of the National Airways Corporation (Sir Andrew McKee) and the general manager (Mr D. A. Patterson) supporting the Boeing 737 in preference to the B.A.C. 1-11 as a replacement aircraft for the airline, were challenged tonight by Air Commodore G. Carter, managing-director of the British Aircraft Company in New Zealand.

He said that Sir Andrew McKee’s “dire predictions” of the 1-11 having to off-load passengers to cope with some sectors in “closed-in” weather were ill-founded.

“N.A.C. told us these predictions were based on rare flight-plan permutations, such as Wellington to Auckland with Dunedin as the diversion airport.

“Even under these extreme cases I can say, categorically, that the 1-11 will carry its full passenger load and their baggage with ample margin. The Boeing 737 is not an aircraft capable of doing this.

"On the subject of the Boeing 737’s superior operational capability—so far only on paper—suffice it to say that the 1-11 is known to have very quickly earned itself the reputation of being a pilot's aeroplane,” said Air Commodore Carter.

Demonstrated “The 1-11 lands at the same speed as the Viscount, it has better pilot visibility from the cockpit and greater reserve of power for emergencies in a landing than the Boeing 737 and, more important, it has been satisfactorily demonstrated on all N.A.C. trunk routes.” Air Commodore Carter said N.A.C. officials had adopted a "somewhat ambivalent” attitude regarding guarantees, stating that Boeings had given guarantees on spares and replacement aircraft. “I can only comment that N.A.C. requested the same from B.A.C. and were given unconditional assurances that replacement aircraft will be available until well into the

19705, and spares for them as long as the 1-11 is flying. “Recently the managingdirector of the British Aircraft Corporation in London had reason to repeat this assurance.

“It is probably quite true that 100 Boeing 737 s will be operating by the time N.A.C. wishes to introduce its jets, but the first of these will have seen only eight months’ airline service by that time. “The 1-11 on the other hand, has already had 18 months’ intensive airline experience, which comes closer to meeting N.A.C.’s declared policy in existence at the time of their last re-equip-ment decision.” Air Commodore Carter cited the opinion of another airline. Laker Airways, which carried out a similar reequipment study to N.A.C. This airline stated as one of its reasons for preferring the 1-11 that the Boeing 737 “looked good, but its cost per hour was 50 per cent higher.”

More Pilots “The airline also said it believed the Boeing 737-size of jet aircraft would eventually require three-pilot operation. Australian pilots are already demanding this for their big twin jets,” said Air Commodore Carter. “N.A.C.’s insistence that four 1-lls would be needed is obviously based on the assumption that the 1-11’s utilisation will be held down to the same level as the three larger Boeing 737-20 Os. . “The big profitability margin claimed for the Boeing 1737-200 depends heavily on leaking up profitable loadings [with freight, a hint that future profitable passenger loadings may not be forthcoming. From experience a mixed passenger-freight operation costs time, let alone 'passenger inconvenience.”

Flying Time Air Commodore Carter said 1-lls would move the same number of passengers as 737 s at an equal load factor because. without the large

amounts of extra freight handling, they would conservatively save on turn-rounds 100 minutes on, say, 10 secI tors, giving extra revenueearning flying in the same length of day. “The 1-11 is already being scheduled on six-minute through-stops and 10-minute turn-rounds without mechanical handling.” he said. I “The bonus is more services for the travelling public and consequently even lower 1-11 unit costs due to higher utilisation. “The rate of growth of express freight offering must be assessed in the light of other transport developments, notably the reliable new roll-on, roll-off ferries, cargo-contain-ers, and the present policy of giving the bulk air-freight responsibilities to Straits . Air Freight Express. “Rail, shipping and road operators are generally agreed that mixed passenger and freight services make poor economics.” Australian Move Air Commodore Carter said the dangers of an aircraft re-equipment decision being based on over-optimis-tic traffic-growth predictions

were only too clearly demonstrated by the Australian Government’s decision to defer deliveries of some bf their airline’s twin jet aircraft of the same size as the Boeing 737 at the same time as the public were seeking more frequent flights. v “The result is that, now being committed to these big jets, their delayed deliveries only further deny growth of frequencies to the public. “The 1-11, however, is designed for precisely this important flexibility requirement—to handle peak-hour traffic, yet maintain profitable low-load, off-peak services. “The bonus is earlier deployment and profitability on the secondary routes because of the 1-11’s outstandingly lower operating costs.”

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19660910.2.3

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31161, 10 September 1966, Page 1

Word Count
814

N.A.C. Preference For Boeing 737 Disputed Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31161, 10 September 1966, Page 1

N.A.C. Preference For Boeing 737 Disputed Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31161, 10 September 1966, Page 1