THE CYPRUS SCENE U.N. KEEPS THE PEACE BUT FINDS NO SOLUTION

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31143, 20 August 1966, Page 14

THE CYPRUS SCENE U.N. KEEPS THE PEACE BUT FINDS NO SOLUTION

(By a correspondent of “The Times”) (Reprinted from “The Times”)

The United Nations force has been in Cyprus for more than two years. That little is heard of its activities is some tribute juccess. though the fact that it is still there, and has had its mandate renewed once more, is a mark of the failure of the L. . 1 ... as a whole—that is. the combined task of the force and the mediator, whose efforts were to have been complementary.

There are those who expected the United Nations to impose a solution on Cyprus. This has never been the function of the force, which w’as instructed in the Security Council resolution of March 4. 1964, “to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.” The same resolution made clear that responsibility for the maintenance of law and order lay with the Government of Cyprus, and appointed a mediator “for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus.” Words And Meanings Most of the difficulties of the force arose from the fact that these carefully chosen words meant entirely different things to different people. The mediator’s task was clearly the most difficult and, in spite of the efforts of Mr Tuomioja, who died in the saddle, and of the energetic Senor Galo Plaza, whose realistic and clear-headed proposals, made in March, 1965, were not accepted by the parties to the dispute, the task remains unachieved and the post in abyance. The “Government of Cyprus" had no doubt as to how to set about its part: it was to “restore normal conditions” in the island by enforcing a return to a situation in which the authority of the Government in every field, and particularly that of law and order, extended into every part of the republic, in other words into Turkish-Cypriot inhabited areas and villages as well as Greek-Cypriot. This entailed the disarmament and disbandment of the TurkishCypriot armed men of all kinds and the abolition of the partially successful TurkishCypriot attempts to set up parallel authorities within their areas, responsible only to Turkish-Cypriot Ministers. That this “Government,” recognised as such, at any rate “de facto,” by the United Nations and others, was without its TurkishCypriot element was, in the

view of the President and his Greek-Cypriot Ministers, entirely the fault of the TurkishCypriots for leaving it. The Turkish-Cypriots pleaded that they were forcibly prevented from taking part, and that all acts committed in their absence were unconstitutional. Guidance Lacking the lack of any clear guide to the ultimate solution and the greatest possible degree of disagreement about the legal status of the officials and armed men of various kinds of the Greek-Cypriots, the Turkish-Cypriots, .the Greek and Turkish Army contingents and indeed of the U.N. officials and soldiers themselves were the principal difficulties of the force. They came as no surprise to those familiar with the situation, least of all to the members of the British peace-keeping force already holding the ring. Others were more optimistic. One group of optimists were the Greek-Cypriots, who expected the United Nations force to help them to disarm and disband the TurkishCypriot “rebels”: to prevent direct Turkish national interference, military or political, and to co-operate with them in restoring their version of “normal conditions.” Another hopeful group were the Turkish-Cypriots and Turks, who expected the United Nations force to protect and guarantee them in every way against the activities of the Greek-Cypriots and to restore their idea of “normal conditions”—i.e., that TurkishCypriots could live peaceably in the island without interference of any kind, least of all from officials of “the Government.” Group Of Optimists A third group of optimists was drawn from those who were enthusiastic supporters of the United Nations. Yet a fourth came from those who were not. The third expected the United Nations to have a greater moral and political influence over the parties to the dispute than turned out to be the case. The fourth, whose voice was not unrepresented among the British public, paradoxically expected the United Nations, whose capacity they continually decried, to be able to achieve by force what the British themselves with greater resources had been unable to.

The British peace-keeping force had realised, as soon as it had intervened in exiguous strength after the bloodshed in Nicosia and Larnaca around Christmas, 1963, that the use of force by the peacekeepers was seldom judicious, effective or rewarding. To suggest that the apparent ineffectiveness of the United Nations force, when it later was faced with similar situations, was due to a pusillanimous restriction on the use of force showed a lack of appreciation both of the facts of the situation and of the function of the force. These facts included the awkward one that the GreekCypriot armed men, originally largely irregular but later organised with considerable assistance and reinforcement from Greece, greatly outnumbered the peace-keeping force both in the island as a whole and in any particular spot when trouble arose, for the peace-keepers, to execute their task, had to be widely dispersed in order to be present wherever Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities made contact, as they did almost everywhere. The other fact was that the TurkishCypriots had armed men who were determined to defend their communities, often with

scant regard for their true welfare. Persuasion The Order Persuasion had to be the order of the day, and, to be able to persuade, the force had to be truly impartial and remain on good terms with both sides —and indeed with all concerned. This was not at any time an easy task, for the Greek-Cypriots resented impartiality as conceding the Turkish demand for equality of treatment for only 18 per cent of the population, and the Turks saw it as a timid concession to the greater power of the Greek-Cypriots, who in their opinion were quite capable Of looking after themselves. The United Nations secretariat too often saw a purely physical interposition of the United Nations force between the two sides as the solution to every problem, enabling it then to plead self-defence as a reason for opening fire if this was considered necessary. Not only was this seldom effective in the particular conditions of the incident but it ignored the fact that it almost always turned the peace-keeping troops into reinforcements for the weaker side, generally the TurkishCypriots, who were certainly not always blameless. This was the accusation frequently made against the purely British force in the earlier days.

The British element of the U.N. force, eventually reduced to the level at which it has remained for two years—basically one infantry battalion and one squadron of armoured cars—has become accepted as a permanent and welcome part of the force. The other contingents come from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, with police both from some of these countries and from Australia and New Zealand. Britain also provides a large share of the headquarter organisation. the whole of the basic administrative and logistic support and the essential helicopter flight. The commander of the British contingent also acts as Chief of Staff to the force commander. British Commander For several months, after the death of India’s General Thimmayya and until the recent appointment of Finland’s General Martola, he in fact acted as force commander —an almost unique position for a British officer. That no objection was raised from any quarter was a tribute not only to his personal qualities but to the secure position which the contingent has achieved in this United Nations force, which has certainly served well the first of the tasks given to it by the Security Council, which was that of preserving international peace and security. To have achieved more in restoring normal conditions was not within its power, given the lack of political advance. Indeed, as U Thant warned in one of his periodical reports on the Operations of the force, there is a danger that the existence of such a force can, by removing most of the pressure, actually work against the achievement of a solution, relieving as it does the sense of urgency. Palestine, Kashmir and the Congo are reminders that difficulties are not resolved by merely putting them into cold storage.

As the mandate is renewed once more it is hoped that the conversations now in train between the Greek and Turkish Governments will bear fruit; but the lesson of the last 20 years is that agreements are not likely to stand the test of time if they are reached over the heads of the people of Cyprus.