The Nuclear Spread

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31085, 14 June 1966, Page 16

The Nuclear Spread

When the Geneva disarmament talks were adjourned last month agreement amongst the major Powers to prevent the spread of nuclear arms seemed as far off as ever. A London newspaper, commenting on a statement by the Indian Foreign Minister, Mr Swaran Singh, that the “passionately expressed desire of “ people all over the world ” was to end nuclear tests and the making of weapons, said that unfortunately proliferation was running well ahead of protest. That would seem to be true. Indeed, the day after Mr Swaran Singh spoke, both he and his leader, Mrs Gandhi, were forced to give ground on the question of nuclear defence. If defence requirements made it necessary, Mrs Gandhi told a cheering Congress, India would go nuclear. President Nasser had already made a similar statement about Egypt; and then the Japanese Government declared that while Japan had no present intention of making nuclear weapons, it could do so at any time if necessary. Japanese progress in the nuclear field has been watched with some concern by the United States Government for more than a year. In 1970, Japan’s controversial security treaty with the United States will come up for review, and there has already been a strong Socialist demand that it be scrapped. Mr Sato’s Government has replied that if the treaty were scrapped and the protective American nuclear cover removed, it might be necessary for Japan to acquire her own nuclear armoury. Mr Sato went to the root of Japanese anxieties a few weeks ago, when he told the Diet that China was a real threat to Japan, “ in view of its possession of atomic weapons ”. The Japanese are well aware, too, of the constant stream of warnings issued by the Government in Peking that the Chinese people must be prepared for possible attack by the United States. Only last week Peking alleged that American aircraft had attacked Chinese fishing boats, and that others had penetrated Chinese territory and shot down a Chinese aircraft. American repudiation of these and similar charges seems to make no difference. In any case, Japanese alarm over China’s weapons tests is real enough. The Government has argued that Japanese possession of atomic weapons would be permissible if they were acquired for selfdefence, and has been supported in that reading of the constitution by former government leaders. In the non-proliferation controversy, Mr Sato’s Government has also taken an unequivocal stand. It has refused to renounce possession of nuclear weapons unilaterally, and has said, at the United Nations, that it would not join any non-proliferation treaty unless all the nuclear countries, actual or potential (including China), were parties to it. Japanese planning against the possibility of a Sino-American conflict actually provides for the introduction of nuclear arms—American surface-to-air missiles. That was admitted in the Diet when the Socialists demanded a Government answer. The whole trend of Japanese military thinking, in fact, appears to reflect the necessity of acquiring strength independent of the United States. The former Prime Minister, Mr Yoshida, recently insisted that if Japan was to fill a positive role in the anti-Communist world she must procure nuclear weapons. In the prevailing international atmosphere the odds against a workable non-proliferation agreement are admittedly heavy. Egypt mistrusts Israel’s use of its 24-megawatt reactor in the Negev desert. And, it has been asked, if India, which already has a plutonium output, joins the weapons race, will Pakistan be content to stay out? No doubt the leading nuclear Powers will continue the search for an acceptable formula at Geneva. But the French and Chinese test explosions may be new reminders that time is running out