Thinking Of Terms For Vietnam Settlement

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30943, 27 December 1965, Page 10

Thinking Of Terms For Vietnam Settlement

(.N.Z. Press Assoctauon—Copyright)

WASHINGTON. Dec. 26.

One of the encouraging signs in Saigon at the end of the year is that a few influential Americans are beginning to think about the terms of a satisfactory peace settlement, writes the “New York Times" associate editor, James Reston.

Reston writes

They are not doing so 1 because they have any ' evidence that the other side iis interested in a negotiated I settlement, but because they want to be ready if a genuine peace offer comes. and ( because clarity of objective is important to the conduct of the war. Thus. Ambassador Henry i Cabot Lodge is going through the hard process of defining ; on paper both the possibilities and problems of a cease-fire: under what conditions and safeguards it should be negotiated, at what point it should be made, who has the power to negotiate it on the other side, how it can be policed, where the United Nations fits into the process and who is to speak for the combatants on both I sides.

This is a very important, but complicated and delicate business. It is easy to arrange a cease-fire for a few hours over Christmas, but a prolonged cease-fire is not the same thing. There have to be rules about where both armies stand, whether military supplies are to be stopped during the truce, and how such arrangements are to be guaranteed and policed. In short, a cease-fire is not the beginning of negotiations, but the result of preliminary’ talks that will probably have to take place while the fighting continues. What Ambassador Lodge is trying to do is to anticipate

the problems that will arise if the allies ever get to the point of talking to the Communists.

He spent several years as United States Ambassador at the United Nations, where he had to deal with the negotiating techniques of the Communists. Preparation He learned from that experience that it is important to be prepared before talking to the Communists, so he is being forehanded about the problem and urging his i associates in Washington to do the same. More important. Lodge is also trying to define the terms of a settlement that would protect the vital interests of the United States and the security of South Vietnam without creating a sense of insecurity—and therefore hostility to negotiations—on the Communist side. This is a very difficult but useful exercise, which is practical, not only for the future of negotiations, but for the present conduct of the war.

For example, whom do you negotiate with if you decide on a policy of bombing Hanoi and Haiphong and wipe out the North Vietnamese Government in the process? Would this not lead to counterattack on the vulnerable port of Saigon and open North Vietnam to the Chinese, whose expansion into Vietnam is precisely what we are trying to avoid?

I The definition of war aims has other implications for the conduct of the war. is the Allied aim to destroy the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese divisions in a ground war? Would American public opinion stand for the casualties involved in such a strategy of searching out and destroying the enemy? i Would the United States [achieve its purposes by holding the populous perimeter of [the Saigon area, and the (coastal bases and provincial (capitals? Anticipation I Mr Lodge is not. at this point, presuming to give answers to all these questions, but he is doing something even more important. He is trying to bring thought to bear on action. He has been a senator, a soldier, and a diplomat, and he is trying to anticipate the relationships between fighting and negotiating, and between diplomacy and politics. At the same time he is using his influence as head of the entire American mission in Saigon to wage the war in the broadest possible terms. He is working closely with General Lansdale on the pacifiation of the areas under (Allied control. In a few weeks, South Vietnamese political leaders will be put into villages in ?” four corps areas of the country to try to produce some political stability in these communiI ties.

He is also paying attention to the problems of psychological and economic warfare in Vietnam, in the hope of encouraging dese-tions from the other side and denying the enemy essential supplies to continue the war. It is difficult to estimate just how far all this is affecting the military establishment in Saigon or the State and Defence Departments in Washington, but Mr Lodge is clearly working on the constructive aspects of his mission and urging all his colleagues here and in Vietnam to do the same Saigon is probably Mr Lodge's last critical mission in a long life of constructive public service. He is working hard to concentrate, not on the mistakes of the past, but the constructive possibilities of getting out of the mess.