GHANAIAN ARMY PRESIDENT NKRUMAH AND HIS BRITISH GENERAL

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30938, 20 December 1965, Page 16

GHANAIAN ARMY PRESIDENT NKRUMAH AND HIS BRITISH GENERAL

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R. H. C. STEED

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The crisis in Rhodesia, with all its" wider impiicationa, has put a premium on authentic inside information about African military potential, African leaders, and East-West diplomacy in Africa. Most opportunely Major-General H. T. Alexander, who was for two years Chief of Staff to President Nkrumah—in which capacity he saw him officially three times a week until he was sacked, without notice, in IWl—now become free, through retirement from the British Army, to tell his story and express his opinions. “AfricanTightrope”by General Alexander has just been published in London by Pall Mall Press.

The nails in General Alexander*! Ghanaian bed were long and sharp. He was at the beck and call of a capricious dictator. He was expected to turn a small country’s modest colonial-type internal-security army into a fully Afrlcanised. sophisticated land, sea and air striking force in almost a matter of months. For good measure, he had to lead his untried little embryo into the Congo at the height of the first wave of bloodshed and confusion, in circumstances that would have tested the discipline of the Guards. Status Symbols When he arrived in 1959 he Inherited from hia predecessor, General Paley, a plan to complete Ghanaianlsation by 1970. Under pressure from Nkrumah he advanced, this to the end of 1962. This was, in the event, expedited by 15 months by his own involuntary departure. The army was high up in the list of President Nkrumah’s many status symbols, on which most of the £2OO million that Britain left behind in the Ghanaian reserves (more than twice the annual revenue) was soon spent. The point of departure was strikingly demonstrated to the newly arrived general when; on Inspecting one mortar battalion, he found that, of six 31n mortars on establishment, four were completely wornout and unserviceable. In a mortar platoon only one man had fired his mortar, and that was three years ago. The Russians had produced reports for Nkrumah proving that the forces he wanted could be produced very quickly. Pilots for Jet aircraft (he wanted to start his Air Force with two squadrons of nothing less) could, they assured him. be fully trained in six months from scratch. The British general, they explained. was in an imperialist plot to keep Ghana weak. By perserving in appeals to Nkrumah’s underlying shrewdness General Alexander at least persuaded him to let the R.A.F. train the Ghanaian Air Force, and to leave most of the training of the armed forces in the hands of British and Western missions. The general gives Nkrumah full credit for “putting Ghana on the map” politically. He describes him as a man of great charm, whom he liked in spite of all his faults, and wished to help. On the negative side there is a terrifying account, even from such a restrained witness, of a dictator corrupted by power. “He rules by fear a docile people, and

has few scruples. His golden days are g0ne....“ ‘‘Nkrumah is not a brave man ... nowadays be keeps himself very much confined. Frightened men. egged on by other frightened but singleminded men, carry out extreme acta." Consuming Passion Nkrumah’s consuming passion is Pan-Africanism—with himself cast as the leader of the continent He is an opportunist Only to the extent that the Russians have persuaded him ("a notable propaganda victory over the western Powers”) that Communist and Pan-African aims are identical is he a Communist He chafes at having such a narrow base as Ghana, and to in a desperate hurry before bigger African Powers outclass him. Thus he is the “eternal revolutionary” whereas what Ghana needs is peace and quiet With Britain Nkrumah has a love-hate relationship. As to the Commonwealth, although he attends all its meetings and takes much interest in it his attachment is purely opportunist. The genera) wonders how much longer Nkrumah can cling to power. “The drama of Nkrumah may be drawing to Its climax, and 1 fear the result may not be a happy one.” The main danger is a military coup. Ambitious and envious officers notice how easily corrupt and upstart politicians gain power and affluence. It to only natural that they should consider using the army’s monopoly of physical force in an unstable society for their own ends. When the Congo exploded in 1960 Nkrumah tried to get a union of the two countries, assuming—in spite of the disparity of their size—that he would take the lead. General Alexander was sent rost-haste to arrange for the reception of Ghanaian troops. While he was there United Nations contingents began to arrive, with little idea of what to do or how to do it. The U.N. Force Commander did not arrive until some days later, so General Alexander, as the senior officer, found himself in something like de facto command. This was the first of several trips, in most of which he found himself negotiating with rival leaders, and haranguing rebels and mutineers from the tops of lorries, with little to back him up other than rank and force of personality (he quickly found it safer to go unarmed). Left-wing Intrigues The Ghanaian troops became increasingly unpopular because of Nkrumah’s Leftwing intrigues. The Ghanaian Ambassadors in the Congo were invariably openly hostile to the British General. He describes his part in resisting Lumumba’s last despairing effort to get the Russians in. He found this saint and martyr of all good African Left-wingers to be “an excitable, emotional, inexperienced uncontrollable and unreliable man” who was doomed to destroy himself. He blames Nkrumah for not restraining him. To avoid, on a future occasion, the chaos that characterised the U.N. intervention in the Congo, General Alexander urges the establishment of a military planning cell at

the United Nations. This should ensure that a ftttoro istratively self-supporting. He finds th* assumption that the «nye_pteence ,of blue-helmeted “Peace Soldiers,” with no dear orders or authority, would restore peace and tranquility, naive and disastrous lfc««lly wrong was Mr Hammarskjold’s belief that the problem in the Congo was political. The general is convinced that the problem was military in the form of the Congolese Amy. It should have been disciplined, restrained and reduced. Everything followed from the failure to grasp this nettle at the start. • The general 16 sure that the efforts of the Communist Powers in Africa, already enormous, will increase. But the Communist emissaries are not at home In Africa, do not understand the African, and have no contact with him. In the long run the Africans discover that the WM delivers the goods and, on the whole, has no ulterior motives. For a few years longer, however, the Wert mupt be prepared to suffer, and patiently to ride out the natural wave of antieolonialism. Final Interview Writing before the Rhodesian U.DX General Alexander says: “I see little danger of Africa’s going Communist I do,, however, see the danger of South African and Southern Rhodesian problems dragging on so long that the African States unite in turning to the East for help. Thereby we shall lose, politically and economically, throughout Africa. We must not lose in Africa, because if we do. N.A.T.O. is outflanked and becomes meaningless."

General Alexander’s dismissal was the result of President Nkrumah’s acceptance, during a “red carpet” visit to Russia, of an offer to send 400 cadets to be trained there. The general was instructed by the Defence Minister to arrange that they should go within a fortnight. He pointed out that the whole of Ghana’s education system produced in one year, for employment of all kinds, public and private. 700 boys of the standard necessary to pass the cadet examination. Of these 120 had already been selected for officer training courses. To find another 400 to send to Russia would leave hardly any for essential Jobe outside the armed service*. He refused to do this until he had discussed It with the President personally. The interview came some weeks after Nkrumah’s return from Russia. He thanked General Alexander for hia services, but said that, in view of the British Government’s Attitude throughout Africa, he wanted him to hand over at once to Brigadier Otu, who was present in the room. As so often in Africa, shock and drama were relieved by incongruity. As the two officers left the Presence together the Ghanaian said: “General, excuse me bothering you at thia time, but can you possibly lend me some major-general's insignia?”