U.S. Concern About Casualties

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30919, 27 November 1965, Page 15

U.S. Concern About Casualties

(N.Z. Press Assn.—Copyright) WASHINGTON, November 25.

The reporting of American casualties in Vietnam is now the topic of lively controversy in Washington, writes James Reston, associate editor of the “New York Tinies.” Reston wrote: The American casualties last week were three times greater than the highest total for any previous week of the war. They numbered 240 killed in action, almost all of them at la Drang, 470 wounded and six missing in action. In this same week, the South Vietnamese lost 357 dead and 807 wounded. The enemy losses were far higher: the official figures were 2262 dead and 136 captured. At the end of the week’s fighting at la Drang, it was the Americans who were still in possession of the battlefield, and the American commanders who were being congratulated by their colleagues on a great “victory.”

Even so. the claims of an American “victory” can be as misleading as the casualty figures. It was the policy of the American command at la Drang to “find, fix and fight" the enemy. This was no mere exercise in helping the South Vietnamese troops in trouble, or defending American bases by deep patrols. The United States troops were out to hunt and destroy the enemy and they found the enemy willing to stand and fight and take seven casualties for every one they inflicted. The question of victory, however, depends on how long both sides are willing and able to take such losses. There are now, according to United States official figures, seven confirmed North Vietnamese regular army regiments in South Vietnam, and reports of two more. Also, there are at least nine of the organised Viet Cong regiments and reports of four more.

United States forces and arms now in Vietnam and planned for Vietnam can no doubt deal with enemy forces of this size and win more battles like la Drang if the Communists continue to risk organised battles of this sort, but there are a lot more

Communist regiments where these came from. The over-all strategy of the North Vietnamese regulars is apparently to dominate the central high plateaus. More infiltration from the, north is expected, and while] we know from captured troops that the attrition from sick ] ness is substantial and from 1 fighting and bombing even | worse, the estimate here is ■ that the enemy can increase his troops from the north to i at least four divisions in the 1 next six months. It will not be easy to supply such a force from the' north with rice and ammunition and medical aid. The feeling here is that the North Vietnamese will be taking quite a risk with such a force, but that remains to be seen. So far the American costs in men have gone up with the military gains, but talk of victory except in a very limited sense is misleading. We are only at the beginning of what promises to be a bleak and bloody winter. The “find, fix and fight” strategy may decimate four divisions of enemy troops and break the will of the enemy, and then again it may lead to four more divisions from the north and as many mul-

tiples of four as the North Vietnamese wish to commit.

We simply do not know. We do know that we cannot hunt and destroy the enemy without casualties, and these have to be reported in proportion to the larger picture. Otherwise emphasis on victories without reports of the costs can be damaging.