Macmillan’s Plea Of Insanity Rejected

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30901, 6 November 1965, Page 3

Macmillan’s Plea Of Insanity Rejected

(New Zealand Press Association)

AUCKLAND, Nov. 5.

A jury in the Supreme Court at Auckland today found Daniel Huntwell Macmillan guilty on a charge of attempting to break out of Auckland Prison and on two charges of assaulting prison warders.

Macmillan was remanded for sentence by Mr Justice Hardie Boys.

The jury returned its verdict after a retirement of more than four hours.

The jury found Macmillan guilty of charges that on July 20 he attempted by force to break Her Majesty’s prison, Auckland, with intent to set himself at liberty; that he assaulted Edward Charles Marchant with intent to facilitate the commission of a crime and that he assaulted Walter Joseph Weir.

It found Macmillan not guilty of a charge that with reckless disregard for the safety of others he discharged a firearm at Richard Henry Alexander Grubb.

Macmillan, aged 28, unemployed, had pleaded not guilty to the charges. He was represented by Mr P. A. Williams and Mr K. Ryan. Mr D. S.

Morris, conducted the case for the Crown.

Continuing his summing up today his Honour said a special verdict of not guilty on the grounds of insanity should be considered only if the jury would ordinarily have found Macmillan guily on one or more of the charges.

He read a section of the Crimes Act, 1961, on insanity: "No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of an act done by him when labouring under a disease of the mind to such an extent as to render him incapable of knowing that the act was morally wrong having regard to the normal standards of right and wrong.” Each psychiatrist called by Mr Williams, he said, had given evidence flatly in favour of the defence. Each said Macmillan did not know he was morally wrong. However, Dr. Savage, called by the Crown, said he was not prepared to say Macmillan did not know he was morally wrong. One of the difficulties was that, although Macmillan was first arrested on June 24 and the alleged riot occurred on July 20, no-one had considered Macmillan’s mental condition until very much later— September 16. But the jury had to consider his mental state in July, he said. If Macmillan did not know his action were morally wrong, why the elaborate plan? His Honour reminded the jury of the acquiring of the gun in prison, the escape from the cell, their secretly getting into a toilet and with another prisoner having armed and disguised thmselves attacking warders and taking their keys to try and open a grille to the outside.

“Does that smack of the lack of ability to know that it was morally wrong, or of the knowledge of its wrongness—of the need to avoid detection and to surprise and overpower prison officials? Is that incapability of knowing it was morally wrong:” There were four points to consider. Was Macmillan labouring under a disease of the mind on July 20 and 21? If so, what was the extent of this disease? Were his particular acts within the extent of the disease or were they within an area where he could and did exercise normal judgment, although there were other areas in which he was deluded? Within the extent which any disease had affected him, did he know whether his acts were morally wrong, having regard to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong?