THE V1 AND V2 OFFENSIVES

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30739, 1 May 1965, Page 4

THE V1 AND V2 OFFENSIVES

The Battle of the V Weapons. 1944-1945. By Basil Collier. Hodder and Stoughton. 183 pp. In 1957, Basil Collier, as an officially-accredited historian to the Cabinet Office, published “The Defence of the United Kingdom” and this has been described as a “blue print for the missile age.” In his latest book, Mr Collier has treated this particular aspect of World War II both as a detailed documentary account of the VI and V2 offensives of 1944-1945, and as a discussion of the decisions which shaped the events of that climactic period of our history and the implications behind those events. It is this latter part of the book which makes this an important addition to what must by now be the most welldocumented period in history.

The author considers that both the VI and V2 were unsound in the military sense

since they achieved little for the German High Command other than causing the Allies to expend considerable effort in attempting to destroy them —effort that would otherwise have been directed into other theatres of war. From the Allies’ point of view, it seems to the author, doubtful whether continuous bombing raids on missile-sites did much to reduce the rate of missile launching. Lack of co-ordination on the question of bomber-target priorities and the difficulties of supply for the Germans served as the major limitations on both sides. Whereas for World War II neither the VI nor the V2 were of major importance, in ushering in the missile age they made their major contribution. Given hind-sight it would have been logical to expect that the V2 would have been developed rapidly into long range ballistic missiles, replacing manned bombers for

many purposes. A similar rapid post-war replacement of fighter aircraft by antiaircraft and anti-missile missiles might also have been expected. Such expectations, as the author points out, were not realised. Pilotless aircraft along the lines of the VI, in spite of its proven vulnerability, were not dropped. Long-range missiles did not supersede the manned bomber in 10 years or anything like that time. Antiaircraft missiles competed with rather than replaced fighters. Millions were spent on programmes which led nowhere and resulted in the loss, so claims the author, of the huge technological lead that the West could claim over the East in 1945. Historians are rather naturally given to smugness and Mr Collier cannot avoid pointing out how all this might have been avoided if the West had observed the age-old principle of economy of effort and concentration on the aim.