Captain Admits Error In Treneglos Inquiry

Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30630, 22 December 1964, Page 3

Captain Admits Error In Treneglos Inquiry

(New Zealand Press Association)

WELLINGTON, December 21.

The master of the motor vessel, Trenglos, Captain R. B. Oliver, admitted in Wellington today that a misjudgment on his part had been responsible for the ship grounding near Timaru on November 12.

He said that he had been lured into an error by reliance on radar.

He was giving evidence before Mr L. M. Inglis, a retired Magistrate, who is sitting as a Court of Inquiry with Captain D. M. Todd and Captain E. J. McLellan as assessors.

Captain Oliver is represented by Mr L. G. Rose. Mr W. J. Kemp appears for Captain A. Grieve, the Timaru Harbourmaster. Mr N. A. Morrison appears for the New Zealand Shipping Company and Hain Steamship Line, and Mr D. P. Neazor for the Marine Department.

Captain Oliver said he held a Board of Trade Master’s foreign going certificate and a radar observer’s certificate. On the day of the stranding he took aboard Captain Grieve as pilot about 9 p.m. and sailed at 9.27 p.m. Captain Oliver agreed that before leaving port he had discussions with Captain Grieve. Captain Grieve had said that when he left the ship he would leave her on the leading lights and that he would get off just before they got to the eastern extension mole if that would be all right with him. Grieve told him he could go around the breakwater and steer to the south.

Captain Oliver said he had always used British Admiralty charts. A course had been laid on by the second officer before the ship left Timaru. He himself saw the course before the Treneglos sailed and it was acceptable to him.

When Captain Grieve left the Treneglos the ship was heading 046 degrees. He kept her on that course for about three minutes. He was keeping to the course by the compass and the leading lights. Captain Oliver said he did not remember any reference being made to his going on to the main leads. He had been entirely agreeable to Captain Grieve leaving the Treneglos where he did. Asked by Mr Neazor whether during his discussion with Captain Grieve at Timaru as to the course to be followed he had used the chart as a basis of reference, Captain Oliver said he thought he had.

He did not think the effect of the pilot’s advice was that he (Oliver) was to go a mile and a-half out to sea. To the best of his recollection Captain Grieve had said he could turn to the south after the ship got past the extension to the east mole light. He had rung full speed a minute after the pilot had

left the bridge. He gave him time to get his launch clear. Captain Oliver said he did not use the echo sounder on the New Zealand coast as a matter of general practice. It was the practice to use it in some places. He was relying solely or principally on the radar to keep him out of trouble in relation to the coast. There had been an almost continuous radar watch by himself. He had been using the three-mile range on the radar. Immediately before the stranding he could see Patiti Point and all the way from Timaru harbour and almost down to Tuhawaiki Point. At the time he had thought he was on the 10-mile radar range.

Mr Neazor: Is it fair to say that you attached no particular significance to the value lines (on the radar) because you thought you were going to pass much further off? Captain Oliver: Yes. I though I was going to pass two miles off.

Mr Neazor: If you had your echo sounder in operation could this error have happened?—Possibly. Mr Neazor: Would it not have indicated to you that the track you were making was not one that would take you. two miles off the point? —There is very little difference in the soundings. Dead Slow Captain Oliver said the first indication he had the Treneglos was in trouble was when

he felt the bows lift. At that stage he had been on course 175 for about five minutes. He thought the lift of the bows indicated they were caught in a back surge or that the swell had suddenly increased.

He immediately went over and put 20 degrees of helm and dead slow on the engines. He felt the ship shudder and knew she was aground. She was still afloat in places. He estimated that when she grounded her speed was 12 knots. The point of stranding was officially recorded as half a mile east of Patiti Point.

Captain Oliver said he was satisfied all the equipment had been properly checked before the ship left Timaru. He had been more than satisfied with the conduct of the officers and crew. It was evident that if the pilot had gone farther the stranding would not have occured, but he knew it was usual practice for pilots to leave inside the breakwater. The pilot had left with his consent.

Only Factor Mr Neazor: I take it you stand by the statement made by your counsel that it was admitted error of judgement on your part?—l do admit it. Do you consider any factor other than the course you steered contributed to the stranding?—No, sir. Captain Oliver said he had been advised that he would remain as one of his company’s masters and that there would be no touching of any superannuation or pension rights. There had been one previous incident in which he was in collision off Port Said. That had been through no fault of his and no inquiry was held.

Captain Oliver agreed that he had been lured into an

'error by reliance on radar. Asked how it came that he had been on the three-mile radar scale instead of the 10mile, Captain Oliver said that probably the radar had been on the one-mile scale on leaving the harbour and had been turned to the next scale. He had been accustomed to place quite considerable reliance on radar.

Mr Rose: Have you ever had a similar experience where a radar scale has been the wrong one?—No.

Radar Scale

Do you normally have radar on the 10-mile scale when leaving port once you are actually clear of the port itself?—Usually. Raymond William Naughton. third officer on the Treneglos, testified that he was on watch at the time of the stranding. He had been aware of the course steered when Captain Grieve left the ship, but was not satisfied with it.

He formed the impression that the ship was too close to the coast. He had based this impression on looking at the radar screen. He had mentioned to the captain that they were too close to the coast and the captain changed the course to 175.

Naughton said he had switched on the radar while the ship was alongside the dock at Timaru. It was then on the one-mile range. He altered it to the three-mile range. He had not told the master of the alteration. Earlier, Mr Neazor said the inquiry aimed at establishing safer procedures for overseas vessels on the New Zealand coast, as well as establishing responsibility for the Treneglos’s stranding. He said the Court was asked to attribute responsibility for the accident and recommend any disciplinary action.

Public Interest In the public interest, the Court, he said, was also asked to make recommendations on: 1. The need for the use of radar in coastal navigation round New Zealand. 2. The desirability of overseas ships having to operate on New Zealand conditions and with New Zealand charts while in these waters. 3. A clear definition of the duties of coastal pilots and of compulsory pilotage. Mr Neazor read 16 specific questions which the Court would be asked to find the answers for relating to the charts and navigational aids on the Treneglos, the facts of the accident, the responsibility for the accident, the duties of New Zealand pilots, the extent of pilotage limits here, the understanding between the master of the Treneglos and his pilot and whose responsibility it was for navigation of the Treneglos from the eastern extension of the Timaru breakwater to the point of the accident.

Repairs Cost Mr H. Webling, Marine Department ship surveyor, said the serious damage to the Trengelos amounted to 144 feet of the forepart and 100 feet of the afterpart. The cost of permanent repairs, which would not be done in Wellington, would be about £115,000. He considered the ship was not in danger of sinking once it was off the reef.

Captain Grieve, said he boarded the Treneglos at 8.55 p.m. preparatory to departure from Timaru wharf.

He talked to Captain Oliver in the ship’s chart room and saw a British Admiralty chart there, with Captain Oliver’s course to Dunedin marked on it.

Captain Grieve said the course plotted on the chart would have taken the Treneglos 1.4 miles off Patiti Point or one mile clear of the Patiti reef.

He said Captain Oliver asked him if the course was all right and he said it was. Captain Grieve said he considered the British Admiralty chart satisfactory for the Timaru area, though the New Zealand chart of the area would be better. He said he never mentioned the Patiti reef to Captain Oliver at any time—he assumed, after seeing his course marked on the chart, that he was aware of the reef.

The hearing will continue tomorrow.