VC-10 Dilemma

Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30498, 21 July 1964, Page 12

VC-10 Dilemma

Parades to the House of Commons by workers petitioning for Britain’s aircraft industry to be “ saved ”, the approach of the parliamentary recess, and the looming shadow of the General Election are hurrying the British Government towards its difficult decision about the VC-10 jet airliners. The British aircraft industry must depend primarily on orders it gets from the British airlines; foreign lines cannot be expected to buy British if British airlines reject British products. But 8.0.A.C. does not want the VC-10, fearing it may be more expensive to operate than the Boeing 707; and the day when British airlines could be told to accept British aircraft uncritically has now passed.

Faced with heavy losses by 8.0.A.C., the Government appointed Sir Giles Guthrie to be chairman of the corporation from January 1, specifically charging him with the task of preparing a long-term plan that would allow 8.0.A.C. both to pay its way and to remain one of the great airlines of the world. The corporation has ordered 12 standard VC-10 jet airliners (six are already in service) and 30 super VC-lO’s, all of which have yet to be delivered. Sir Giles Guthrie’s report was submitted to the Minister of Aviation (Mr Julian Amery) early in June; and though the report has not been made public, concern in the aircraft industry (to which the gist, at least, of the report is presumed to have been made) has suggested that the course recommended for 8.0.A.C. was to cut its orders for VC-lO’s. This would be a stunning blow to the aircraft industry. No matter how carefully the cut was explained, it would be interpreted abroad as a vote of no-confidence in the VC-10, an aircraft to which Britain looks to win a share of the market for long-haul subsonic jets through the 1970’5. The air correspondent of the “ Financial Times ” has defined Mr Amery’s dilemma in this way: he must decide how far he can accept proposals put forward by his own nominee in the chair of 8.0.A.C., realising the risks to the aircraft industry inherent in the proposals; alternatively, he can reject the 8.0.A.C. plan as too drastic, in which case he will still be faced with the problem of what to do to get the corporation on to a sounder long-term basis. Can any acceptable compromise be found here? If it is decided to cover by a subsidy the difference between the operating costs of foreign and Britishmade aircraft, there will be considerable risk of hiding—and perpetuating—inefficiency in either manufacture or operation, or both. A more enduring solution to the British aircraft industry’s problems may be found in closer co-operation with aircraft industries in Europe. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the European industries to meet the competition of American manufacturers, whose development costs are largely financed by the United States defence programme. Already something is being done along these lines. Britain and France are working together on the Concord; France, and, perhaps Germany, are to help produce the B.A.C. One-Eleven. The VC-10 dilemma might yet inspire European co-operation in producing a long-haul jet for the next generation.