Out Of Russia's Embrace? BREAKAWAY SPIRIT SPREADS AMONG RUSSIA’S SATELLITES

Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30395, 20 March 1964, Page 10

Out Of Russia's Embrace? BREAKAWAY SPIRIT SPREADS AMONG RUSSIA’S SATELLITES

By

DAVID FLOYD

in the 'Daily TeUpraph,” London.)

(Reprinted bp arrangement J

As Mr lon Gheorghe Maurer, the Prime Minister of Rumania, flew across the Siberian wastes with other leaders of the Rumanian Communist party, he sent the Kremlin the message which protocol demands. While it reminded the Russians of something of which they were only too painfully aware—that the Rumanians were on their way to a friendship visit to Peking—the message lacked other things.

It failed to send the customary ■ personal greetings to Mr Khrushchev, and it failed to mention the undying friendship between the Rumanian and Russian Governments and Communist parties. Rumanian friendship was reserved for “the Soviet people,” a formula which always means that something is wrong with relations at other levels. The Rumanian flight was interesting for other reasons. The special plane heading for Peking did not bother to put down in Moscow. It landed only in Omsk, where the Rumanian leaders were met by some petty local officials. The journey symbolised both the Rumanians' independence of Moscow and the Russians’ impotence to prevent a Rumanian rapprochement with the Chinese. The decision of the Rumanian Communist leader, Mr Gheorghiu-Dej, to have toplevel political talks with the Chinese Communists is an act of defiance of Moscow that cannot fail to have far-reach-ing effects in Eastern Europe. It is the most striking deevelopment in the Communist world since Albania's defection to the Chinese. Only the inclusion of Mr Gheorghiu-Dej himself in the delegation to Peking could have made it weightier than it is. This surprisingly shrewd and tough dictator presumably has good reasons for not leaving Bucharest at such a moment of tension with his Russian neighbour. Someone has to mind the shop.

No Secret The Rumanian Communist’s discontent with the Russians and their other Communist allies in Eastern Europe has been growing over the last couple of years. They have long since ceased to make a secret of their conviction that they were getting a raw deal out of the Communist “Common Market." They have rejected Russian controls and plans, and have started to look outside the Soviet bloc for support. They have increased their trade with the West, strengthened their links with “non-committed” Jugoslavia, and offered their oil to China. But until recently it was reasonable to suppose that the Rumanians’ neutral attitude to the quarrel between Moscow and Peking, and their flirtations with the rebellious Albanians, were no more than devices for extracting economic concessions from the Russians. Now, by accepting a Chinese invitation to poli-

tical talks, Mr GheorghiuDej has carried his defiance of Mr Khrushchev far beyond economic blackmail. The jubilation to be heard from Peking is sufficient evid ence that the Rumanian dec ision is a major victory foi the Chinese in their struggle against Moscow. Rumania it the first East European country bordering on Russia to break out of the Russian embrace.

The only two successful rebels against Russian control in Europe-Jugoslavia and Albania—both had the advantages of unrestricted access to the West and no border with Russia. Hungary, the unsuccessful rebel, had neither of these advantages But Rumania is in the same position as Hungary. The fact that the Rumanians can act with such independence of Moscow without incurring the sort of reprisals the Hungarians suffered in 1956 shows how much the situation in Eastern Europe has changed. There is some irony in the situation, too. In 1956, according to the Chinese, it was they who urged Mr Khrushchev to suppress the Hungerian revolt by force. In 1964 it

is the Chinese themselves who have driven a wedge into Eastern Europe.

Kremlin’s Limit Mr Gheorghiu-Dej’s particular contribution to European history is to have reached the conclusion, and to have acted on it, that in 1964 there is absolutely nothing the Kremlin can do if a "satellite” country chooses to defy it He must also have decided that there is a definite limit to what the Russians are able and willing to do economically to keep a satellite sweet.

What does this imply for the other Communist rulers in Eastern Europe? They all head regimes which are unpopular, unnatural and, above all, economically unsuccessful. Until Mr Khrushchev came along with his “revisionist” ideas, the men whom the Kremlin had appointed to rule Eastern Europe could afford not to worry about such “Western” concepts as popularity and prosperity. They could always fall back on the ultimate sanction of the force which had created them: Russian power.

But Mr Khrushchev has most unkindly pulled their supports away, and now they have to try to stand on their own feet. There are various ways of doing this. They can screw the dictatorship down even harder, if they have the means; or they can relax it and try to win a measure of genuine acceptance for Communism. They edn try to make an economic success of Communism and win the people over by material rewards; this involves either modifying the economic system or relying on aid from Russia. They can exploit national sentiments and pose as defenders of their nations’ rights. Different rulers have chosen different combinations of these methods.

The Rumanians have made the clearest choice of all—unremitting toughness at home, coupled with an allout effort to make the country economically successful, plus a challenge to Russia. The Bulgarians have chosen a different path. Unlike the

Rumanians, they are Slavs, with some natural feelings of affinity for the Russians. And Bulgaria is a small country with few natural resources. So their formula is: toughness at home, plus the hope of economic progress through Russian aid. Their loyalty was rewarded last week by a £lOO million loan from Moscow.

The Hungarians (like the Rumanians, non-Slavs) have chosen.a different combination. Feeling that the people s anti-Russian feelings had been purged in the revolt of 1956, and that a reversion to Rakosistyle leadership was out of the question, Mr Kadar has softened the impact of the dictatorship and concentrated on economic progress, while remaining quietly loyal to Moscow. The presence of Russian troops in his country is a determining factor. Czechoslovakia presents a different picture again. With the best-organised Communist party and most efficient secret police in Eastern Europe, a people with some Slav feelings, and the most advanced economy of any Communist country, the rulers have been under no unbearable pressure from below. But, while they remain loyal to Moscow, they have failed to make Czechoslovakia the show-piece of Communism it could have been. The economy has been drained dry, there are demands for the abandonment of Communist economic dogma, and some longing looks in the direction of Western Europe. Eastern Germany is a special case with no room for subtleties. It remains the only true “Satellite,” in which Herr Ulbricht has no choice but to rule with an iron fist, secure in the knowledge that in case of trouble the Russians must come to his aid, both political and economic. He has no room for manoeuvre.

Temptations Ahead Saddest of all is the position of Poland, where the prospects seemed so bright in 1957. Though he has retreated a long way, Mr Gomulka cannot be really tough, for the party and the police have both been weakened, and he dare not provoke the revolt which was only just staved off in 1956. As with Herr Ulbricht, but for different reasons, there seems to be no way out for Mr Gomulka.

Yet he and all his colleagues in Eastern Europe are now faced with the problem of making good their claim to rule, of giving the regimes that were foisted on Eastern Europe after the war some element of legitimacy. And just at this time the inadequacy and, above all, the economic inefficiency of these systems has become painfully apparent Each of the rulers has seen Marshall Tito defy Stalin and keep Mr Khrushchev at arm's length, and yet continue to receive favours from Moscow They have seen little Albania cock a snook at the Kremlin and survive. Now they see one of their close neighbours —Rumania—break out of the herd with apparent impunity. If Mr Gheorghiu-Dej becomes the first successful dictator in Eastern Europe, there will be great temptation to follow his example.