Collision At Sea

Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30366, 15 February 1964, Page 10

Collision At Sea

[Specially written for “The Press” by BRIAN O NEILLI

VL HO was to blame? The crack destroyer V oyager which now lies at the bottom of the ocean with nearly 80 dead or the stately carrier Melbourne, her naval comrade whose gigantic prow guillotined her?

In coming to his decision, the Commonwealth Judge who is to conduct the inquiry into this week’s disaster will undoubtedly be referred to the decision of his Lordship, Mr Justice Pilcher, in the case against Cunard White Star, Limited . . .

In the annals of maritime tragedies collisions often seem the worst because on paper they are so patently avoidable.

And sb it was early on the afternoon of October 2, 1942, as the mighty Queen Mary hurtled towards the Clyde at over 28 knots, the better part of a division of American troops packed into her huge, grey hull. To make U-boat attacks difficult the Queen Mary was changing course at intervals that, although they were irregular, were pre-arranged with the escort cruiser, H.M.S. Curacoa. Air Protection The 24-y ear-old Curacoa was no longer a ’ first-rate man-of-war, but' she bristled with anti-aircraft guns intended to cover the Queen Mary with a protective umbrella of high-explosive in an attack from overhead. The coast of Ireland was not far off when the Queen Mary zigged under the Curacoa’s stern; and at 2.12 p.m. on the dot. according to plan, put over her helm and—not according to plan—zagged into her escort. The irresistible force of more than 80.000 tons travelling at over 30 miles an hour made short work of the Curacoa.

■Two-inch armour plating was useless against a juggernaut whose bow cut through a hull 28 feet from stem to keel and 43 feet across. In less time than it takes the sand to trickle through an egg-timer, the Curacoa, how in two pieces, was lost beneath the Atlantic, and so were almost , all the 430 men who manned her. There were more -than. 11,000 men in the Queen Mary, and those who had not seen the accident knew of nothing amiss. There had been a slight hesitation in the liner’s motion, it was true, but no ■ worse than that of a Chrysler floating over a road rut, the Americans thought later. The Queen Mary was slightly dented for’ard; and she had lost quite a bit of paint. That was all. Long Silence The news of the incident was not released until nearly three years later; and by then the joy of the peace and horrors of the concentration camps occupied greater public attention. It was of more concern to the “Wills, Wives and Wrecks” Division of the High Court of Justice, which was considering a suit by the Admiralty Commissioners on behalf of the Curacoa against the Cunard Line owners of the Queen Mary.'

Mr Justice Pilcher heard evidence over a period of many months in support of

the litigants' cases, and in 1947 he gave his decision. ...

His Lordship considered it axiomatic that under ordinary convoy conditions it was the duty of faster and more manoeuvrable escort vessels to keep out of toe way of. units of a convoy.. The Elder Brethren sitting with His Lordship concurred. The Navy lost its case against Cunard. The Court found the Curacoa was “seriously to blame” for bad lookout, for failing to starboard in due time or sufficiently, and for putting her wheel to port at the last. The collision, Mr Justice Pilcher said, was “solely due to the negligence of those on board the Curacoa.’’ The unequal contest between the 81,000-ton liner and the 4300-ton warship was notable enough: but the most celebrated disaster of this nature claimed more than 10 times as many lives. What is worse, it occurred in clear, fine, peacetime weather and resulted from

slavish obedience to a foolish order given by an officer recognised in his service as a master of ocean monoeuvres. On June 22, 1893. while the Mediterranean fleet was manoeuvring off Tripoli on its way from Syria to Malta on a calm, sunny afternoon, the iron-clad Camperdown, of 10,600 tons, rammed the Victoria, of 10,470 tons, forward of the starboard turret In six minutes the Victoria, flagship of the fleet, went down in 80 fathoms and 472 men were mangled to death or drowned. Among the survivdrs from the H.M.S. Victoria was a young officer, John Jellicoe, in the ship’s hospital with fever. In his pyjamas, he grabbed a lifebelt, jumped into the sea and lived to lead the Grand Fleet at Jutland and become New Zealand’s Governor-General. Miscalculation and enforcement of obedience to signals by the fleet commander. Admiral Sir George Tryon; led to the disaster. Steaming abreast and six cables apart, the Victoria led five ships and the Camperdown four. Surprise orders were given by Tryon that the leading ships were to turn simultaneously towards each other and proceed side by side, in the manner of country, .dancers, down the middle lane separating the

[columns to an anchorage. ! If an unusual manoeuvre it | was not difficult. Its execuI tion would bring the two | columns into line ahead again I in the same order, but Steaming in the opposite direction. Although Captain the Hon. M. Bourke. staff commander, had emphasised that the turning circle of the Victoria alone was four cables and suggested that the distance between the columns should be eight cables Tryon refused i to alter his signalIt was with amazement that Vice-Admiral C. R. i Markham, in the Camperdown, read the signal; but it was a command; and it had to be obeyed. Killed By Sharks Had the Camperdown turned perfectly the two ships would have met head on; Markham's slight hesitation in relaying Tryon's command to the helm meant the Victoria swung first and the Camperdown’s stem went right into her at the cable locker. The Victoria heeled and went down by the bow, her anchor chains, which had run out, and the weight of the turrets hastening the dive. When the order to abandon ship was given the screw of the capsizing Victoria was still turning and as they slid down the side of the hull many sailors were killed. The shark-infested sea was soon red with blood. Tryon went down with his ship. After a 10-day hearing, a court-martial at Malta blamed Tryon for the disaster, exonerated Bourke and mildly reproved Markham for not having protested more strongly against the manoeuvre. Markham was not given another command. No satisfactory find was made for Tryon’s extraordinarily risky manoeuvre. As his men made their last parade on the sloping decks of the Victoria he remarked gloomily to Bourke: “It is all my fault.” Reasons Unknown Why he gave the order and why he persisted in carrying it out, in the face of warning by and apprehension of his staff, will never be known. He had a reputation of being the coolest master of tactics in the Royal Navy and of being a specialist in manoeuvres. He was for a time admiral on the Australian station, and planned the auxiliary fleet which has its counterpart in the naval organisations of Australia and New Zealand today.

The ghosts of Tryon and the company of the Curacoa will be oppressively present in the atmosphere of the inquiry into the loss of the Voyager this year.

Probably the most serious collision was in the St. Lawrence in the spring* of 1914 when the Canadian Pacific liner Empress of Ireland sank with the loss of more than 1000 lives after being rammed by the Norwegian collier Storstad.