The Press WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1963. After The Test-ban Treaty

Press, Volume CII, Issue 30215, 21 August 1963, Page 14

The Press WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1963. After The Test-ban Treaty

WHat is to follow the testban treaty signed by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Russia, and Britain? The question is being anxiously canvassed everywhere by people whose hopes have been raised by a positive sign of thaw in the cold war. It is accepted that on the one hand it would be imprudent to minimise the differences between Russia and the West; on the other hand, it is felt that, after the limited agreement in so vital a field as the control of nuclear testing, further steps to ease East-West tension must seem attainable. Both President Kennedy and Mr Khrushchev agreed in public statements that the treaty signified no more than a beginning to the immensely difficult task of reducing cold-war pressures and improving the attitudes of the respective sides. Everywhere it is agreed that the treaty creates opportunity. The most arresting passage in President Kennedy’s message asking the Senate to ratify the treaty was the statement that it was “ rarely possible to recapture missed opportunities “ to achieve a more secure “ and peaceful world ”. The treaty has yet to be ratified by governments; in America ratification depends chiefly on the approval of the United States Senate. The note of urgency in the President’s message may have been inspired by the historical fact that it was the Senate that caused the United States to miss an opportunity to become an international force for peace when it rejected the League of Nations Covenant in 1919. This time it is confidently believed that the Senate will ratify—after the usual searching examination. In the meantime, it must be hoped that the prevailing propitious atmosphere will not be soured either by the grumblings of recalcitrant Senators or by the Administration’s efforts to placate them. If there is such a thing as public opinion in Russia—especially opinion opposed to Mr Khrushchev’s policies it must have been shocked to learn of the Secretary of Defence (Mr McNamara) assuring dubious Senators

that the treaty “could at “ least retard Russian pro- “ gress and sustain United “States technical superior- “ ity ”.

A projected meeting of Foreign Ministers at the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations may provide the opportunity to explore the possibilities of new accords. There is little enough room for manoeuvre. The most sensitive area of East-West relations is, of course, Germany, which has had its doubts and hesitations about the treaty. Fears that East Germany might exploit the treaty to obtain recognition in the West were not easily allayed by the American and British Governments, even though the German Government knew well that neither could afford to sacrifice the interests of West Germany any more than Russia could forsake the East German regime. Fortunately, after discussions with Britain and the United States, West Germany has found it possible to “ take a positive attitude ” on the treaty, a decision that will avert any danger of Germany's being thrown into the arms of President de Gaulle, who remains aloof from the treaty, his ambition to lead and speak for Europe still further impaired. It remains to be seen whether the Russian cordiality which is chiefly responsible for the improvement in East-West relations will persist. Few expect the Russians to be in any hurry to make further concessions. Yet most observers agree that the Russians are genuinely interested in maintaining the current improved relations with the West. They are thought to be unlikely to press for action on issues on which they would be certain to meet strong Western opposition. No-one would doubt that the Russians are moved by self-interest in this, as in all questions of relations with the West Even so, the West must do its part to prolong the new atmosphere and to make use of it. No more promising climate for the advancement of the cause of peace has been encountered since the war.