Bases In Spain

Press, Volume CII, Issue 30057, 15 February 1963, Page 8

Bases In Spain

Unqualified acceptance among the allied nations of Western Europe has long been the predominant aim of General Franco’s Spanish Government. Spain is embarrassingly necessary to the Western alliance—em-

barrassingly necessary because the West is still reluctant to appear to condone a flagrant dictatorship even to help the antiCommunist cause. The present disarray of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the uncertainties caused by President de Gaulle’s sabotaging of the Common Market negotiations undoubtedly suit General Franco; and the Caudillo will exploit every opportunity of pressing the advantages of admitting Spain into full comity with the West. Recent events have raised the Falangist Government’s hopes that misgivings about its authoritarian rule will be submerged beneath Western strategic requirements—and this in spite of the damning report on conditions in Spain by the International Commission of Jurists. On December 31 last year a trade agreement with the United States brought Spain much closer to entering the 44-nation General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Spain has also applied for associate membership of the European Common Market Bilateral exchanges with France, mainly on economic and military matters, are re-

ported to have been satisfactorily concluded. Any assistance by President de Gaulle towards entry to the E.E.C. will be welcomed in Madrid; but it can safely be assumed that friendship with France will not be allowed to impede chances of a wider acceptance among all the West European Powers. At most, this cultivation of French goodwill serves as a bargaining device in far more important negotiations with the United States. In September, 1953, Spain signed the Pact of Madrid, securing to the United States three major air bases, the combined air and naval base at Rota (near Cadiz), and a number of minor military installations. This paet runs till next September, and may be renewed automatically for two periods of five years if neither Government wishes to end it. Additional clauses provide for United

States occupancy of the bases till March, 1965, even if Spain refuses to renew the pact. The Rota base is believed to have assumed a critical importance in NA.T.O. and American planning for the replacement of land-based missiles with Polaris submarinebased weapons. Spanish officials have always glossed over the United States’ equivocal relationship with Madrid. While the Spanish press often refers to the “United States - Spanish “ alliance ”, Washington carefully emphasises that such an alliance is a figment of the imagination, and that the Pact of Madrid consists merely of “ executive agree“ments”. Now, because of the alleged hazards of permitting a Polaris supply base on its soil, Spain wants its own missiles and a much more formidable arsenal of conventional weapons. The real prize that General Franco seeks is membership of the North Atlantic Alliance. By striving too desperately for it, and by failing to introduce worth-while political reforms, he may jeopardise economic programmes designed to raise Spanish living standards and to allay industrial unrest.