New Communist Split CHINA ATTACKED FOR POLICY OF RACIALISM

Press, Volume C, Issue 29557, 5 July 1961, Page 14

New Communist Split CHINA ATTACKED FOR POLICY OF RACIALISM

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London. June 23.—Moscow goes on to charge Mao and the Maoists with arrogance and -dizziness with success ' j which overcomes them when! they contemplate "the territory occupied by the People's; Republic of China, its enormous reserves of manpower, and its considerable influence . . . on the peoples of the Middle East and Africa.” But the size of a country and the teeming millions do not; necessarily make for "ideological reliability." Moscow! warns. In their arrogance,' the Chinese may provoke a schism in world communism comparable to the old-age schism between Eastern and Western Christianity "The leaders of the Chinese, Communist Party have, hatched, without daring to formulate it categorically, aj sort of plan for the division of world communism into: two zones, a so-called West-! ern zone for which the! U S S R, should be responsible . , . and a so-called Eastern zone under the Peoples Republic of China." Moscow rejects this plan, saying that “it has a flavour of racialism about it, because, if carried to logical conclu-' sion, it would lead to a division between the w’hite and the coloured races." Such a division “would not do away with the existing differences and disputes, but would be contrary to the principles of Communism.” Albanian Purges The Khrushchevite Indictment relates how the Chinese have tried to build up their “zone” and to turn the Communist Parties of Vietnam, Korea, and Indonesia into their domain; but it does not say whether th--y have succeeded. Instead Moscow exults in Mao's “failure to get support from the leaders of European Communism;” and it mocks at China's sole ally in Europetiny and backward Albania. Enver Hoxha, Albania's dictator, is charged with exterminating the Khrushchevites in his country, sending spies to Jugoslavia, and “provoking dangerous frontier clashes between Jugoslavia and Albania." In the Albanian purges twelve members of the Politbureau have been imprisoned and three of them have been! shot; and Soviet-trained com-j manders of the Albanian armed forces have been executed as "American and Greek spies", only because they were Russia's friends. Khrushchev reproaches Mao with aiding and abetting the Albanian dictator, and warns that this policy may provoke in that little country an explosion similar to the Hungarian uprising of 1956 Delighted though Moscow is with Mao's “failure in Europe,” it claims that the Chinese are working feverishly to make this good, to win the allegiance of Western European Communists, and to play them against Russia. Moscow bitterly complains that Mao is setting up pro-Chinese factions in the Western European Communist Parties and is using for this “subversive activity 1 ’ his diplomatic personnel. This charge is supported by the following specific illustrations: Chinese Intrigue 1. The Chinese Consulate, in Berne, Switzerland, is a hotbed of intrigue against Khrushchevism. Western European adherents of the Chinese party line are making regular pilgrimages to the the Berne Consulate, where they get their instructions. 2. The “Chinese Charges d'Affaires" in France are conducting factional activities within the French Communist Party, here probably some Chinese semi-official or unofficial representatives are meant.

3. The Franco-Chinese Friendship Society and similar bodies are used by Peking for the same purpose. 4. The Chinese have used a recent international conference of Communist lawyers in Sofia as a forum for incitement against the U.S.S.R.

Addressing itself especially to the French Communist Party, Moscow says that the Chinese have made common I cause with those French Communists, who have never made peace with Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress, i.e. with the French-Stalinist I die-hards. Maurice Thorez, i the French Communist i leader, and his wife, Jean- ! nette Vermeersch, are taunted I for their ambiguous be-. . haviour and for turning a ' blind eye on the intrigues; \of the pro-Chinese elements jin their party. 1 Threat of Open Breach This formidable list of ac-; cusationa ends with the threat that if the Chinese do: not mend their ways. Khrushchev will take the dispute out of the twilight of semi-secrecy and bluntly denounce them before international Communist opinion.' “We have not been afraid of an open breach with the Jugoslav revisionists; and we shall not be afraid of an open breach with the Chinese dogmatics either.” Moscow refers here not to the Stalinist denunciation of Tito in 1948, but to its milder breach with Tito of 1958. as to the precedent it is prepared to follow with regard to Mao Tse-tung. In other words. Khrushchev threatens to arraign the Chinese as “deviationists and ultra-left dogmatists.” but not to denounce them as traitors. Such a move would still entail the withdrawal of Soviet economic aid to China i (which is already greatly reduced*; but it would pro-i bably not lead to a diplo-l matic rupture. Al! the same.! the struggle between the proRussian and the pro-Chinese: elements would in conse-1 quence grow far more bitter and would spread to every l corner of the world.

This grave dispute is not lacking in its comic touches. Imagine, for instance. Marshal Tito’s amused surprise when some days ago he received word from Khrushchev that if Jugoslavia, “in reply to repeated Albanian provocations." broke off relations with Albania, Moscow would look upon such a move with a favourable eye. Who would have thought, even a short time ago. that Khrushchev would incite the Jugoslav “revisionist" heretic to give the “faithful" Albanians such a rap over the knuckles" Tito, however, has refused to comply with Khrushchevs wish. He has answered that, much though he resents Albanian provocations, he prefers to maintain restricted diplomatic contact with the Albanian government, so as to remain in touch with the potentially explosive developments in that country and, if {possible, to influence them. The main question arising out of all this is how the Russo-Chinese quarrel is going to affect Khrushchev's attitude over Berlin when the international tension over the Berlin issue mounts to a climax.

The need to compete with Mao for leadership in the Communist camp has been an important factor in Khrushchev's decision to take action over Berlin. He has to refute Mao's charges. He has to show himself tough and determined. He has to demonstrate that he is not “appeasing Western imperialism". He has to calculate his diplomatic moves with an eye on their effect on the intense Russo-Chinese contest for the allegiance of so many Communist Parties in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Mr Khrushchev's Difficulty This makes it difficult for Khrushchev to engage in genuine bargaining with the West, and imposes on him that diplomatic rigidity which so surprised President Kennedy in Vienna. On the other hand. Khrushchev is anxious to avoid the risk of war, because by courting it. he would not only endanger Russia's interests, but virtually surrender to Mao. Khrushchev is thus facing the prospect of a difficult and ; complicated operation over [the German peace treaty and Berlin, an operation ostensibly directed only against the West but actually aimed at China as well. To hold his ground against Mao. Khrushchev must be able to produce results and to flaunt a success, however small, and to follow up the first success by another, imaginary or real. But he has also to beware of pressing too hard add overreaching himself. Much will depend on how the Chinese react to his indictment between now and the autumn. In all probability Khrushchev will bring up his quarrel with Mao before another international conference of Communist leaders, which will be convened to Moscow either for October, when the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party takes place, or in November. Khrushchev has already summoned Mao to attend in person this planned international conference, and not to send just the deputies and subordinates who represented him at previous conferences. Will Mao respond to the summons? If he does, there will be a dramatic encounter between him and Khrushchev in Moscow this autumn—an encounter which will have a close bearing on the Berlin crisis.—(World Copyright reserved by Isaac Deutscheri. (Concluded)