Dilemma For Russia CHOICE OF AGENTS IN MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Press, Volume XCVIII, Issue 28958, 28 July 1959, Page 12

Dilemma For Russia CHOICE OF AGENTS IN MIDDLE EAST POLICY

[By MARTIN MOORE in the "Daily Telegraph”) (Reprinted by Arrangement)

In trying to support both Nasser and tfie Communists in Iraq, Russia is learning a lesson with which we have long been familiar: that you cannot help friends in the Middle East without also making enemies. For four years Russia has had nearly everything its own way in the Middle East. That was because its way was so simple. From the day in September, 1955, when Russia stepped in as armourer of Arab nationalism, in

the person of its hero, Nasser, Soviet prestige continued to soar Posing as disinterested friends of the Arabs, the Russians needed to do little more than sit back and watch the embarrassment, discomfiture and retreat of the West —which had indeed begun before then. Britain was negotiated out of the Suez Canal Zone and the Sudan, and pitchforked out of Jordan. France withdrew from Tunisia and Morocco. Nasser nationalised the Canal. When the West did assert itself, it sparked resentments which the Kremlin had only to fan. The Bagdad Pact was denounced as a deliberate device to frustrate Arab unity. The Eisenhower doctrine flopped. Defence of our friends, in Oman, Buraimi or the Aden Protectorate, was represented as imperialism in action and the bolstering of feudal autocrats against progressive nationalism. Western fortunes reached their nadir in the Suez intervention, when the friends whom we seemed, in Arab eyes, to be helping were the Israelis. The humiliation of Britain and France brought fresh prestige to the Russians, who pretended to have compelled our withdrawal —and none at all to the Americans, who were actually responsible for it. Second Climacteric

Meanwhile Nasser’s attempted penetration of the Arab world by plot and intrigue was Soviet penetration, since it aimed at the subversion of Governments that remained allied or friendly to the West. Everything that threatened stability was grist to the Soviet mill. Communism? Of course, Russia was not trying to promote it. Had not her friend Nasser put Communists in prison? For years

those gaoled Egyptian Communists have been the most persuasive of Soviet ambassadors. If the Egyptian arms deal was the first positive stroke of Soviet j policy in the Middle East, it can now be seen that the Iraqi -revolution a year ago marked a second I climacteric. At first it seemed just one more setback for the 'West, weakening the Bagdad Pact and enabling the Russians to extend their influence through diplomatic trade and cultural missions, which had been excluded by the Nuri regime.

But a differing picture began to emerge with the rapid rise of the Iraqi Communists. Within nine months they sedmed on the verge of attaining a Popular Front Government, the classic prelude to a Communist takeover. It appeared that the Kremlin might be about to gain a satellite in the very heart of the i Middle East. i This prospect rang more than one alarm bell. The West, naturally, was deeply concerned. But so, too, were Arabs everywhere, from Kuwait to Cairo. And could it be that the Russians themselves were dismayed at the p ce of things? We can judge only by what has happened in Iraq so far. The Communists, while continuing to agitate for freedom of party activity, have suspended their demand to share the Government Was it simply that Kassem proved too strong for them? Or was this sudden retreat the response to a directive from Moscow? Soviet Embarrassment

Soviet embarrassment, is an embarrassment of success—but embarrassment it none the less remains. It arises from the fact that the Russians now have two ■possible channels for their Middle East strategy: penetration by client, and by satellite. Each is in itself valid tactics, offering tempting rewards. But pursued simultaneously, they must clash—and each could defeat the other. Penetration by client, exemplified in Soviet dealings with Nasser, can be very effective. His arms-dependence compels him. if not to do everything the Russians want, at any rate to refrain from doing anything in serious conflict with their interests. He can be kept sufficiently short of spares to prevent him from launching, without Soviet approval, on any major adventure —for instance, an attack on Iraq But unless he is prepared to abandon all thought of adventure and aggrandisement he cannot get off the hook. To break with the Russians would leave him militarily impotent for several years. Meanwhile Soviet war material is piling up in the United Arab Republic—Nasser is credited with the remark that he now has more than enough—and beginning to arrive in Iraq. General Glubb has drawn attention to the use ' which the Russians may already : be preparing to make of this. For a distant theatre of operations, he points out, it is the I dream of every commander to transfer his heavy material in oeace-time. before hostilities break out. The men can be flown out at the last possible moment. By economic penetration the Soviet Union could also exercise considerable political control over [Middle East Governments. Last j season the Communist bloc took 63 per cent, of Egyptian cotton exports: and since there is now a world surplus of long-staple cotton, virtually no other market exists. A Soviet threat to stop taking Egypt’s major export could confront Nasser with the choice of obedience or ruin. ■ Alluring Prospect I By comparison with this pene- ! tration-by-client the prospect of a satellite Iraq must seem far more dramatically alluring to the Kremlin. A Communist Iraq, in Turkey’s rear and on Persia’s | flank, would offer the strategic i nossibility of pre-positioning Soviet war material just where it would be most menacing. Meanwhile, there would be Iraqbased subversion against Kuwait; and if it succeeded the Soviet hand would be on the main taps of Western,.Europe's oil. Not. it

may be supposed, that the taps would forthwith be turned off; the threat to do so would serve Soviet policy for the time being. Russia's obvious interest would be to interfere as little as possible so that Western money would continue to flow in, to make Iraq a prosperous show-place of “independent” Communism in the Middle East. Some such ideas, it may be surmised, are being debated in the Kremlin. At present, Kassem stands in the way of their realisation. Russia may well believe that a little further pressure could topple him—but dare she yet allow the Iraqi Communists to exert it? On the other hand, can they be restrained from trying? The Russians must calculate that a Communist take-over in Iraq would do them immense harm in the Middle East. The threat has been sufficient to awaken suspicion of them throughout the Arab world. Nasser, indebted though he continues, has put himself at the head of an anti-Communist crusade. There is resentment in the Yemen at the presence of Soviet technicians and Chinese workmen. Fear of Communism on the Gulf now preoccupies King Saud more than his dispute with Britain. Our Opportunity How the Russians will resolve their dilemma—or whether it will be resolved for them—remains to be seen. Will they let Nasser down? Penetration through him has been too successful, and his potential usefulness as trouble-maker for the West in Africa is too important for him to be willingly abandoned.

By supporting the Iraqi Communists Russia has made enemies throughout the Arab world. But by withholding further support she might give Kassem time to consolidate his position, as he has been vigorously trying to do. Soviet policy is encountering the same sort of difficulty that we have long experienced: the apparent impossibility of helping friends in the Middle East without making enemies. No doubt the Russians will try to exploit both their openings. We cannot, in our turn, sit back in confident expectation that the attempt will crumble in its own contradictions. Russian embarrassment is our opportunity. It gives the West a fresh chance to justify its profession of disinterested concern for the welfare of the Middle East nations. Arabs, formerly obsessed with Western “imperialism,” now see Russia’s on their doorstep. Some of them are beginning to look again, less cynically, at our assurances that our sole interest is in stability and freedom.

The most significant index of a changing attitude towards the West is Nasser's reaction to the British promise of continued military aid to Iraq. At first reports of it, his press exploded in abuse of us for helping his enemy, a regime on the brink of Communism. But since the agreement was announced and explained, Nasser seems to have understood that its purpose was precisely the contrary: an attempt to prevent Iraq from swinging into complete arms-dependence on Russia. Such comprehension in such a quarter—hostile as Nasser remains in his general attitude towards Britain—shows what a shock Soviet penetration has given to the Arabs.