Policy For Europe-IV THE CASE AGAINST “DISENGAGEMENT"

Press, Volume XCVII, Issue 28513, 17 February 1958, Page 8

Policy For Europe-IV THE CASE AGAINST “DISENGAGEMENT"

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ANTHONY NUTTING,

fomwr British Stntam of jU.

—

' (Reprinted by ermnyement w«h the “New fork Berold TrtbiteA

Do the latest Bulganin proposals for a mutual disengagement of Western and Soviet forces in Europe offer a new opportunity or merely an old trap? In the present somewhat fidgety and frustrated condition of Westerri Europe we must expect to see a lively debate develop on this critical and controversial issue. Sir John Slessor’s recent articles make an Interesting contribution to this debate. In the first of these articles he suggests that we inform the Kremlin that we are all for seeing if “our planners . . . cannot work out a deal on this basis” (i.e., disengagement). As I propose to show in this and the succeeding article, I fully agree that the West must probe the precise meaning of the Bulganin plan, but I cannot agree that, before we have even found out what is in it, we should tell the Soviets, as Sir John Slessor proposes, that “we are all for it in principle.” No doubt this curious land dangerous) suggestion of cart-before-the-horse diplomacy springs from a misinterpretation of the Bulganin letters. Sir John Slessor says: “If these letters of Bulganin mean anything, they mean . . . a situation in which, between the frontiers of Russia and those of France, Italy, Greece and Turkey in Europe there was a belt of States, uncommitted to any military alliance with East or West, having no atomic weapons, with whatever forms of internal Government they themselves choose and associated economically, socially and culturally with whom they nice. . ■’ No Freedom for Satellites In fact Bulganin has at no point said anything so advanced. He has backed the Rapacki plan for an atom-free zone in Germany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and has suggested a mutual disengagement of N.A.T.O. and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. But never has he accepted, let alone suggested, genuinely free internal systems of government or freedom of association for the satellites. On the contrary, all Soviet policy and performance has precluded specifically, and, as with Hungary, at times brutally, any freedom of elections or associations. The satellites are not only bound by treaty but geared systematically to the Soviet economic machine. As for free elections, I remember hearing Mr Molotov’s famous admission at the 1954 Berlin conference that “the trouble with free elections is that you

don’t know how they're gofaw l turn out.” As for free amm. tions, I also recall that HMa Bulganin made the Soviet jK tion crystal clear to Sir AajßE Eden during the Geneva sum£ conference a year later. SpuSE of German reunification, he M] Sir Anthony Eden quite trsttjE “I just cannot go back to and tell my people that given away East Germany.’ To paraphrase a notable a*, time pronouncement of Sir Win. ston Churchill, Mr Bulganin bat in effect, told the Soviet and the world that he did not become the Soviet Union’s Fir* Minister in order to preside over the break-up of the Soviet empteg Therefore, do not let us draak ourselves about Soviet intention today. Russian Fear-propaganda, Nothing has happened imide Russia since Berlin and Geneva to make the Soviets any readier to make concessions to the West or any less dedicated to the disintegration of the Western alliance. Every subsequent developmentincluding most notably sputnikcan only have strengthened and stiffened their diplomatic postun. I just do not believe with sone wishful-thinking experts that the decay of international communion is now a factor leading Ruaeia to more amenable policies. Stalin's famous question. “How many divisions has the Pope?” has beam in Khrushchev’s day. “How many sputniks has the West?” In the light of this analysis at Russia’s political strength and intentions, now are we to regard the Soviet suggestions for an atomfree zone and for a mutual military withdrawal from Europe? The Soviets have always been adept at fear-propaganda about atomk weapons. They know there id much appeal in the glib argument, for which Sir John Slessor has fallen, that the two Germany), if left confronting one another with atomic weapons, are mog liable to stumble into war. In fact, recent history has shown 'that wars do not happen by accident. The revolver shot at Sarajevo which sparked World War I was the most calculated act ia all the long history of assassination. Besides, neither West nor East Germany is, militarily, a free agent. Neither could stumble into war unless the alliances to which they belong connived in the stumble. As Sir John Slessor himself admits, neither the Soviets nor the West would ever resort to such “mutual suicide.” In any case, whatever the superficial attractions of an atom-free zone in Central Europe, it is too late to take this up with tbi Soviets. The N.A.T.O. heads-of government meeting has decided in principle to base American 1.R.8.M.’s in Europe. To go back on this now would suggest a tstri weakness to the Russians. It would imply that the N-A.T.O. governments, including Dr. Adenauer’s, had been repudiated, whereas ia fact they have been upheld, by public opinion. The recent debate in the West German Bundestag showed a clear majority in favour

of the NATO, decision!. Aimed st NAT.O. What of the further Bulganin proposal for mutual disengagement? Let there be no mistake about this. As presented, it alma at the disintegration of NATO. —withdrawal of N.A.T.O. foreel from “Germany and other N.AT.O. partner countries’’—leaving the Soviet armies free to threaten Eastern Europe from bases a few miles away across a common frontier. It is, in effect, a case of “Yanks go home and Russians stay put." Worse than this, disengagement a la Russe is Intended as a slippery slope. If the Soviets could achieve this much, they would demand, as the logical corollary, neutralisation of “Germany and other N.A.T.O. partner countries' From what Bulganin put in and still worse from what he left out of his recent letters, it 1J obvious that the Russians would not only insist that Germany sews all ties with NATO, and the West but also that German unity would only be acceptable if—■ they demanded at Geneva— tin Communist structure of East Germany were preserved. Small wonder that even Mr Aneurin Bevan had to admit in the House of Caw mons debate on December 30 that the outcome would be a Gennnr neither united nor free. Nobody can feel quite satifOJJ with the present gy it is surely preferable to a tion” which leaves Germany na»a and unprotected to face the munlst monster, destroys u* N.A.T.O. alliance, and relay** American forces to positions frs* which they cannot, for some tfcßJ at least, retaliate effectively • defence either of their own CO ®J* try or of their friends. —Copyright 1958, New York Herald Tribuna. (To be concluded)