Kashmir

Press, Volume XCIII, Issue 27912, 8 March 1956, Page 12

Kashmir

Pakistan’s endeavour to argue its dispute with India on Kashmir at the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation meeting at Karachi may be foiled by Britain, which is anxious to avoid any further deterioration in its relations with India. Unfortunately this will neither lessen Indian dislike of S.E.A.T.O. nor restrain . Pakistan from forcing this issue in other ways almost as embarrassing to Britain and her allies, which do not wish to be compelled to choose finally between the claimants. The Prime Minister of Pakistan (Chaudri Mohammed Ali), spurred by public opinion in Pakistan, has been trying to arrange further negotiations with Mr Nehru on Kashmir, or, if Mr Nehru refuses to meet him, to take Pakistan’s case to every international forum that will listen. Although "Mr Nehru is as determined as anyone to retain India’s grip on Kashmir, he would probably have agreed to the conference, because of the success of his talks with an earlier Pakistani Prime Minister (Mr Mohammed Ali) in relieving frontier tension. Indian public opinion, however, is quite as firmly against any concession in Kashmir as public opinion in Pakistan is against any recognition of India’s claims, so Mr Nehru has avoided discussions that might be construed as weakness. Pakistan is therefore likely to bring Kashmir again before the Security Council. Admitting Pakistan’s justifiable annoyance with India’s objection to a plebiscite in the disputed area, the reopening of matters at this stage is likely to please no-one except the Russians. They will have a choice between

two agreeable courses. Discussion in the Security Council would give them the opportunity to win fresh favour in India by attacking the more objective attitude of the Western Powers, and 5.E.A.T.0., too. A veto of any criticism of India would serve much the same purpose, but would have the additional advantage that the Russian delegate would later get another chance to make his speech when Pakistan took the matter to the General Assembly. In either case the efforts of Marshal Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev to win Indian goodwill would be reinforced. These considerations apart, Britain is still quite right to try to keep Kashmir out of the affairs of S.E.A.T.O. The alliance was made to defend its members against Communist expansion; however much Soviet diplomacy sustains India, this aim could scarcely be taken to include India’s negative attitude to a frontier problem which existed long before S.E.A.T.O. was created. Yet Kashmir is, in a way. a possible gateway for. Communist entry to the sub-continent. The present Chief Minister of Kashmir (Mr Bakshi), who was promoted when Sheikh Abdullah was thrown into prison for being too independent of India, has made himself thoroughly unpopular from Right to Left. His strongest opponent happens to be a friend of communism, Mr Sadiq. India’s difficulty is in choosing between keeping an unpopular Chief Minister in office by naked force and in risking the succession of a Communist sympathiser. This danger in Kashmir makes the Pakistani initiative at Karachi ill-timed, except, presumably, in relation to public opinion in Pakistan.