ACUTE PROBLEM ARISES IN CHINA

Press, Volume XCIII, Issue 27875, 25 January 1956, Page 10

ACUTE PROBLEM ARISES IN CHINA

HARRY S. TRUMAN]

[By

TRUMAN MEMOIRS—3

Efforts To Avert Full-Scale Civil War

Americans have always had friendly feelings toward the Chinese. American missionaries, American doctors and American teachers have spent many years m China, and their Christian and humanitarian efforts were long supported with real fervour by the people at home. Furthermore, within the memory of many Americans, China had shaken off the yoke of monarchy and had begun to wrest herself free from the medieval institutions that were so deeply rooted in that ancient land.

This struggle, however, had not yet attained success when, m 1931, the Japanese began their long programme of aggression which, as the years went by, brought ever more extensive areas of the once great kingdom under Japanese control.

The fall of 1945 brought the United States face to face with the serious complications which had been building up in China over the years. Few realised the depth of the split within China, the tenuous hold of the National Government over outlying areas, and the lack of popular participation in the Government.

We in America always think of China as a nation. But the truth is that in 1945 China was a geographical expression. Not since the Manchu Empire broke up in 1911 had there been in China a central government with authority over all the land. This was the state of China when V-J Day came. Chiang Kai-shek’s authority was confined to the south-west corner, with the rest of South China and East China occupied by the Japanese. North China was controlled by the Communists and Manchuria by the Russians. There were no roots of any kind of a central Chinese Government north of the Yangtse river.

The task of creating a new nation was colossal. President Roosevelt had built up the idea that China was a' great Power, because he looked to the future and wanted to encourage the Chinese people. In reality, it would be only with the greatest difficulty that Chiang Kaishek could even reoccupy South China. To get to North China he would need an agreement with the Communists, and he could never move into Manchuria without an agreement with the Communists and the Russians. It was impossible for Chiang to occupy North-east China and South Central China with the Communists in between the rail lines.

It was perfectly clear to us that if we told the Japanese to lay down their arms immediately and march to the seaboard, the entire country would be taken over by the Communists. We ■ therefore had to take the unusual step of using the enemy as a garrison until we could airlift Chinese National troops to South China and send marines to guard the seaports. . So the Japanese were instructed to hold their places and maintain order. In ! due course Chinese troops under i Chiang Kai-shek would appear, the Japanese would surrender to them, march into the seaports, and we would send them back to Japan. Communism *in China The problem of Communism in China differed considerably from political problems elsewhere. Chiang Kaishek was not confronted by a militant political minority Scattered throughout the population, but by a rival government that controlled a definite portion of the territory, with about onefourth of the total population. Our position in China offered us little choice. We could not simply wash our hands of the situation. There were still nearly 3,000,000 Japanese in China, more than 1,000,000 of them military. Unless we made certain that this force was eliminated, the Japanese, even in defeat, might gain control of China simply by their ability to tip the scales in the contest for power. The other alternative was equally impracticable. That would have been to throw into China unlimited resources and large armies of American soldiers to defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese from the mainland, and compel Russian withdrawal from Manchuria by force. The American people would never stand for such an undertaking. We decided, therefore, that the only course of action open to us was to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China, to support the Generalissimo politically, economically and, within limits, militarily. But we could rot become involved in a fratricidal war in China. Throughout the war the United States had demonstrated her friendship for China in more than one way. Appropriations for military and economic aid, for example, had exceeded 1,500,000,000 dollars. We had given strong diplomatic support. Our Ambassador in China (General Hurley) reported to me that, in spite of all weaknesses, the prospects for peaceful development in China were favourable. General Hurley had just succeeded in bringing the Communist leader (Mao Tse-tung) to Chungking for direct discussion with the National Government. Out of these discussions there came an agreement between the Chinese leaders. The agreement called for a constitutional convention, a national assembly that would write a new constitution, and included provisions that would enable all political parties to take part.

This was a good agreement, and I congratulated Hurley on the fine work that had made it possible. However, the agreement never bore results. Chiang Kai-shek’s forces were moving into areas held by the Japanese, with a large part of his troops being ferried north by our Air Force transports. We had also landed 50,000 of our marines at several important ports so that, through these ports, the removal of the Japanese could be carried on. ’ National Government’s Troop Movements The Communists wanted the National Government to stop these troop movements, for they believed that Chiang was taking advantage of the situation to strengthen his positions* against them. Nor were they passive about it. They cut the rail lines wherever they could, and the National Government soon began receiving reports that the Communists, contrary to the agreement, were moving into Manchuria. Resentment was rising on both sides as the charges and counter-charges increased.

I discussed the seriousness of the situation with Hurley at the White House on November 27, 1945, and we agreed that it would be best if he returned to, Chungking without delay. He assured me that he would only wind up a few personal matters and then return to China. -This conversation took place about 11.30 a.m., but less than two hours later, while the members of the Cabinet were with me for the weekly Cabinet luncheon, I was called to the telephone. One of the White House correspondents called from the National Press Club and, to my astonishment, told me that Ambassador Hurley had just delivered a fierce speech there attacking the Administration, the State Department, our foreign policy and me personally. To me, this was an utterly inexplicable about-face, and what had caused Il 1 cannot imagine even yet I realised, however, that Hurley would have to go, and the Cabinet concurred- The following day, it is true, a letter of resignation” from Hurley was given by him to the press; but

he would have been out, with or without that letter. Hurley was an impetuous sort of person. A few weeks later —in January, 1946 —he made a special effort to see my press secretary, Charlie Ross. He explained to Ross that he was anxious to serve me anywhere and at any time, and he wanted Ross to tell me that nothing he had said at the time of his resignation had been intended as a personal criticism of me. China Heading for Trouble

China appeared now to ..be headed for more trouble. The only thing we could do was to exert whatever influence we might have to prevent civil war. The man for this job would have to possess unique qualifications and rare skill. General George C. Marshall had just turned over his duties as Chief-of-Staff of the Army to General Eisenhower. No man, probably, had more fully deserved ah honourable and restful retirement than Marshall. Yet I could think of noone who would be better qualified for a difficult mission to China. I went to the telephone in the Red Room of the White House and called the general at his home in Leesburg. Without any preparation I told him: •‘General, I want you to go to China for me.” Marshall said only, ‘‘Yes, Mr President,” and hung up abruptly. When General Marshall came to the White House two days later to discuss his mission with Byrnes and me, I asked him why he had hung up on me without asking any questions. The reason, he explained to me, was that Mrs Marshall and he had just driven up to the house, and he had been m the process of unloading some of their belongings when the telephone rang. He had not wanted Mrs Marshall, who was concerned about his health, to know how short-lived their retirement would be, and so he had hung up before she might hear any part of the conversation. He expected to break the news to her gradually, but when he turned on the radio a . few minutes later, the very first thing she heard was the news flash announcing the general’s mission. ‘‘There w’as the devil to pay.” he confessed. ? v ? r the Chinese situation with Marshall and Byrnes at great length. On December 14 the final instructions were handed to Marshall by me: ’ Specifically. I desire that vou endeavour to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in North China „ In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek, and other Chinese leaders you are authorised to speak with the utmost trankness. Particularly, you may state in connexion with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance in the economic field, and military assistance (I have in mind the proposed United States military advisory group which I have approved in principle), that a China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place for American assistance along the lines enumerated. Attached was a document entitled “U.S. Policy Toward China.” It read: The United States recognises and will continue to recognise the National Government of China and co-operate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. The United States is cognisant that the present National Government of China is a “one-party Government’’ and believes that peace, unity, and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country.

In line with its often expressed views regarding self-determination, the United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves, and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate. Marshall’s Negotiations Marshall arrived in China on December 20. He talked at length to Chiang Kaishek, who had little to say about the Communists but showed much concern over the continued presence of the Russians in Manchuria. Marshall also interviewed party leaders of all shadings, our own Embassy people, correspondents and other Americans on the spot. He found everyone favouring a united China, but no-one with practical answers as to how this ideal might be attained. Marshall did everything he could to avoid any semblance of pressure or dictation. He always waited for the Chinese (of both sides) to ask him to join their talks; otherwise, he only talked to them as one individual to another. This, of course, was a drawnout process, full of frustrations. Marshall decided wisely to remain aloof from the political discussions, even though he might officially be asked by both sides to act as mediator. His correct view of his mission was that he was to bring the fighting to an end, if possible. In the military field, however, he took a most active part. In the early stages the Communist representatives appeared more tractable to Marshall than the leaders of the Central Government, and it was his impression that the Communists felt that they could win their battle on political grounds more easily than on tactical fighting grounds because they had a more tightly held organisation, whereas on the Nationalist side there were many contentious elements. The Nationalists, so it seemed to Marshall, appeared to be determined to pursue a policy of force, which he believed would be their undoing. On February 4, 1946, Marshall could report to me that “affairs are progressing rather favourably.” The general wrote coldly factual reports that included every detail. I could not have asked for a closer view without being a participant myself. (To be Continued. 1 ) [Copyright 1956 by Time Inc. (Life) World serial rights outside the U.S.A, and Canada in International Co-operation Press Service Inc. Exclusive rights in New Zealand reserved by New Zealand Associated Press. Reproduction in full or in part strictly prohibited.]