U.S. Pressure For Immediate Asian Defence Plan

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27405, 19 July 1954, Page 9

U.S. Pressure For Immediate Asian Defence Plan

(N.Z. Press Association—Copyright) (Rec. 8 p.m.) WASHINGTON, July 17. The United States, fearing that the Western Allies might be trapped by a major emergency in Asia, was applying heavy pressure on Britain to agree to an immediate plan for collective defence in the area, informed sources said in Washington today. The United States was reported to want Britain to lend her voice to a joint declaration of determination to meet further Communist aggression in South-east Asia with instant and stern measures. Informed quarters said that the United States regarded the Indo-China situation as explosive and wanted this declaration—or some similar commitment by Britain—as a stopgap measure pending formation of a South-east Asian TreatyOrganisation. Responsible observers said that the United States could expect whole-hearted backing from France in this endeavour, while Australia and New Zealand would be more inclined to support than oppose it.

American leaders felt that the present negotiations in Washington for a South-east Asian Treaty Organisation might be too late if the Geneva Conference should fail to .effect a cease-fire in Indo-China, and if the Communists broadened their offensive and carried the conflict into Laos and Cambodia. Mr John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, was reported to have already sought Australian and New Zealand support for this type of defence treaty. In his Paris talks he told France’s Prime Minister, Mr Pierre MendesFrance, and the British Foreign Secretary, Mr Eden, of the deep concern of the United States about South-east Asia. The United States already had a series of collective defence and military aid measures with Pacific nations, including Australia, the Philippines, New Zealand and Siam. Some observers felt that the application of these measures could form the “hard core” of the type of stop-gap agreement that the United States wanted. However, with France still driving her bargain with the Communists at Geneva over Indo-China, it was not known yet where a line could be drawn to check further Communist expansion, or whether the United States would guarantee a line of partition in Indo-China if it felt this line conceded too much to the communists. Britain was reported at the moment to still feel that the projected SJE.A.T.O. organisation would have to be properly negotiated to be effective. a While Britain agreed with France and the Anzus Powers that these negotiations should be expedited, British experts were reported to be wary of any hasty action. Informed sources said that Britain held the view that entering into stopgap measures at this stage could seriously prejudice the delicate negotiations that France was now carrying on with the Communists. The New York "Herald-Tribune” said in a leading article today that the object of the Indo-China negotiations was to secure “a line or status” in South-east Asia that would be politically and militarily defensible. “It is always a tragedy to see any people delivered into the hands of the, Reds,” the newspaper said. Anything that would reduce the area over which the Vietminh would rule would be to the advantage of the free nations, and anything that extended Communist control southward in Indo-China was to be deplored. The main objective, however, to be secured was a line in South-east Asia, or a status, that would be politically and militarily defensible.