THE FIVE UNPLEASANT ALTERNATIVES IN ASIA

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27374, 12 June 1954, Page 6

THE FIVE UNPLEASANT ALTERNATIVES IN ASIA

PLANNING UNITED ACTION

[From the

“Manchester Guardian”]

(Reprinted by Arrangement)

What if there is no armistice in Indo-China? “United action” is supposed to be the answer. But what action? An analysis of alternative courses ought by now to have been prepared jointly by France, the United States, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. The analysis, noting all the risks and ramifications of each course, should be available to the five governments as a basis for agreeing on “united action.” That seems elementary sense. Yet the most elementary things have been neglected lately in Allied planning. Mr Dulles called first for united action without finding out what was practicable or what his own country and Congress would support. The French took him at his word and asked for American intervention in Indo-China without realising what stringent conditions the United States would attach to intervention (such as full independence for the Associated States and United Nations’ approval of action). Both the French and the Americans have been surprised by events which could have been foreseen many months ago: the French by the fact that the Chinese might send heavy weapons to the Vietminh forces, and the Americans by the fact that the French would be reluctant to enter E.D.C. while Indo-China was draining away their strength. These obvious possibilities were overlooked, and elementary Allied planning was neglected. The object of this article is to consider the courses open, their risks, and their merits. It can be no more than a flimsy shadow of the kind of analysis which should be available to the Allied governments, with all their resources of information. It can make no claim to completeness or authority. At best it may serve as a stimulus to thought. Broadly, there are five courses open if no armistice is reached: 1. The Allied governments can enter the Indo-Chinese war at the side of France and treat it as General MacArthur would have treated Korea, respecting no “privileged sanctuaries” in China and carrying the war to the enemy’s distant bases, industries, and sources of supply. 2. The Allied governments can enter the war but try to limit it to IndoChina, driving the Vietminh back into the' northern hills, but not following them across the Chinese border. 3. The Allied governments can leave the Franco-Vietnamese forces to continue the fight alone, although a vague threat of Allied intervention may be held over the Vietminh and Chinese. 4. The French can abandon the attempt to hold their present areas in Vietnam and can withdraw to small beachheads round Haiphong and Saigon. 5. The French can abandon IndoChina entirely, leaving on the other Allied governments the task of protectirig Siam, Burma, and Malaya so far as they think fit. One of these, pr a course close to one of these, will have to be chosen.

I—Unlimited Intervention The immediate objection is that this carries the risk of world war. The bombing of bases in China, especially if atomic weapons. were used, mightwell draw Russian retaliation on “bases” in the United States and Britain. It might not; in advance there could be no certainty. But the risk of retaliation against New York and London would have to be counted in Allied calculations. Another practical objection is that such intervention might not, in fact, prove effective. “Taking on Red China,” as General Bradley said of General MacArthur’s proposed strategy, “could lead to a larger deadlock at greater expense.” A further objection is that public opinion would be hostile. The French want if possible to reduce, not increase, their commitments in the Far East. . The British will not mobilise to defend Bao Dai. In America it would be hard to raise enthusiasm for a crusade against Communist China, for people want one. In non-Commun-ist Asia opinion would be universally against the Western Allies if they were to bomb China, and they would forfeit all support except from the Chinese Nationalists and South Korea. Finally, the moral objection to such a course is overwhelming. So far China has not been clearly guilty of aggression in Indo-China. ll—Limited Intervention

Moraljy this might be justified if certain conditions were met. It would have to be clear to the world, and especially to the non-Communist countries in Asia, that every possible effort to negotiate an armistice had been made. It would have to be clear that full independence was being granted to the Associated States, including the right to leave the French Union if ’ they wished. It would have to be clear that the United Nations, through the Security Council or the Assembly, had given approval. Yet grave objections would remain. The prospect for Vietnam would be jyears of fighting, with the wrecking of villages, ruin of rice-fields, and scattering of families. The death and devastation wrought in Korea would be repeated on a greater scale. Could this be justified? Again, the practical objection is great. The Allied governments have no troops ready to send to IndoChina, and the two or three divisions they might raise by the autumn are thousands of miles away; the Chinese have perhaps 20 divisions now near the Vietnam border. Air power could limit the Chinese reinforcement but not stop it, as we learnt in Korea. Even if atomic bombs were used against the main roads below the Vietnam border, they could only delay the Chinese. There is a chance, of course, that the Chinese might decide that the cost of victory in Vietnam would be too high and might stay within their own borders. But again there could be no certainty in advance; Allied calculations would have to count on the risk of full Chinese intervention, as in Korea. We should not repeat General MacArthur’s mistake of being caught unprepared. To win, with limited intervention, the Allied governments might' eventually have to send large forces. That

would mean either mobilising, public opinion in America and EuroS is unready to accept, or strip D iJJ the European continent of its S tective garrison, which would be strategic mistake. It would invobJ us, 4o borrow again from General Bradley, ih “the wrong war, in wrong place, at the wrong time.’’ Ill—Holding the Delta This would Jeave the military tasl on France alone, although the French might ask at least for an open threat of Allied intervention. The American Australians, and British would S wrong to threaten intervention unless they intend it seriously. If it was bluff the bluff could easily be called, mak’ ing future threats of resistance worth’ less. If intended seriously, it could lead us progressively to actual inter vention and perhaps unlimited war The French suggestion that a threat might be backed by the sending of token forces is open to the same ob. jection. The token forces by them, selves would be militarily valueleai being insufficient to make the Franck Vietnamese forces any more secure in their present areas; and we should have to count on the chance that their arrival would provoke an im. mediate and massive Chinese assault In addition, there would be a strong, popular demand in the United States that the French raise their national service from 18 months to two yean and send conscripts to Indo-China. The American public, after the feeling of being left to fight alone in Korea, would not agree to sending American draftees unless the French accepted the same terms. (There are, of course, no non-conscript American troops to send, and American draftees serve two years.) The French would have to consider whether they cat do this without bringing their Government down. Their allies would have to consider, whether, in fact, the lengthening of French military service is not a greater burden than France can reasonably be expected to bear How much of the Red river delta the French can hold without reinforcements is uncertain. Numerically the Franco-Vietnamese forces have immense superiority over the Vietminh. But the French Command appears despondent; and the enemy enjoys the initiative, being able to strike at individual French forts with locally stronger units. The raising of French reinforcements seems at present politically impossible for the French Government. IV— -Withdrawal of Beachheads Superficially this is the most attractive course because it is economical It obviates the need to send reinforcements, yet leaves the Franco-Viet-namese forces with a footing in Vietnam. But would it really be so economical? And would Kit not be regarded by the Vietnamese as a betrayal of their cause? The holding of small beachheads is, in military terms, expensive. The defenders cannot risk t sudden penetration reaching their harbours and supply depots. So—as at Pusan, at Anzio, and in Normandy—they must pack their front with troops and try to hold a continuous line. This would require a greater concentration than has apparently been usual in Indo-China. The task would not be easy. Nor would the act of withdrawing be simple: there would be many casualties merely in evacuating the forts and retreating down insecure roads to the cbast. What of the Vietnamese view? They would surely be justified in thinking their cause betrayed. Although • many, perhaps a majority, of the people in the country are apathetic, there must be many others who are wholeheartedly committed tq Vietnam and against Vietminh. They should be remembered. V— Abandonment of Indo-China The thought of betrayal enters here with still greater strength. The opponents of communism not only in Vietnam but also in Laos and Cambodia would be left to fend for themselves; and their countries would gait no genuine independence. Possibly Laos and Cambodia might be saved through creation of a Buddhist block (they are predominantly Buddhist countries) with Burma and Siam, but that would call for swift diplomacy. The Western governments, in addition, would have to consider what guarantees they could give to the Buddhist countries. At present, having no ground troops available, their only military guarantee would be a promise of air forces and atomic weapons for use against an open aggressor. Is that the kind of guarantee Asian governments would want? And is it one which the Western Governments would give, remembering the risk of world war? The Western governments would have to face the facts that any guarantee must* be backed by force, that they have no force readily available except atomic-air power, and that if they rule out the use of atomic-air power the next best thing they can do is merely to promise supplies. They can also, of course, continue economic assistance to those countries apart from any security guarantee. What of the effect on France? The loss of Indo-China would be a severe blow 7 . Yet might it not, in the end, make France stronger? The terrible drain on French manpower and money would be ended, and the gain would be Europe’s. Once over the shock—provided that was not fatal to French democracy—France might well be restored to her former strength in Europe. Freed of the Indo-Chinese burden, she might be less fearful o' Germany’s domination in Europe and more able to pull her weight in a European partnership. The security of the .most vital area of all, Europe itself, would be increased. In the United States, however, there would be a good deal of disgust. Some influential Republicans, and perhaps a few Democrats, would regard the with* drawal as a weak surrender to communism. Some would say that it was further proof that the Europeans are unreliable.

These are the five choices. Not one is pleasant to contemplate. At least France, the United States, ’ Britain. Australia, and New Zealand, in considering “united action,” ought J consider it together and in all its aspects. They ought, in addition, to be seeking the views of India, Pakistan. Ceylon, and Burma.