FINAL GERMAN OFFENSIVE BEATEN IN THE ARDENNES

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27193, 10 November 1953, Page 10

FINAL GERMAN OFFENSIVE BEATEN IN THE ARDENNES

"TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY”

[By the Rt. Hon. Sir WINSTON CHURCHILL! XV

There had meanwhile been much preparation on the Western Front for the advance on the Rhine. The November rains [1944] were the worst for many years, flooding the rivers gpd streams, and making quagmires through which the infantry had to St lUst?ntI U st?nt my comments to Smuts. Prime Minister to Field-Marshal Smuts. o.P e< k* “ .In spite Qf Metz and Strasbourg and other successes, Eisenhower has oi course sustained a strategic reverse on the Western Front. . “Before this offensive was launched we placed on record our view that it was a mistake to attack against the whole front and that a far greater mass should have been gathered at the point of desired penetration. “Montgomery’s comments ana predictions beforehand have in every way been borne out. I have the greatest regard for Eisenhower and am sure we must back him up. I imagine some readjustments will be made giving back to Montgomery some of the scope taken from him after the victory he gained in Normandy. “You must remember, however, that our Armies are only about one-half the size of the American, and will soon be little more than one-third. AU is friendly and loyal in the military sphere in spite of the disappointment sustained. • ’ . . ’ “We must now regroup and reinforce the Armies for a spring offensive. . . .” Three days later I addressed myself to the President. Though sympathetic, Mr Roosevelt did not appear to share my anxieties. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister. 10 Dec., ’44.

“ . . . Perhaps I am not close enough to the picture to feel as disappointed about the war situation as you are, and ?6rhaps also because six months ago was not as optimistic as you were on the time element. • ’ “On the European front I always felt that the occupation of Germany up to the left bank of the Rhine would be a very stiff job. Because in the old-days I bicycled over most of the Rhfhe terrain, I have never been as optimistic as to the ease of getting across the Rhine with our joint armies as many of the commanding officers have been. Thrust Through Weak Centre A heavy blow now impended. Within six days a crisis burst upon us. Eisenhower’s decision to strike hard from Aachen in the north as weU as through Alsace in the south had left his centre very weaJk.

In the Ardennes sector a single corps, the VlHth American, of four divisions, held a front of 75 miles. The risk was foreseen and deliberately accepted, but the consequences were grave and might have been graver. By a remarkable feat the enemy gathered hbout 70 divisions on their Western Front, of which 15 were armoured. Many were under strength and needed rest and re-equipment, but one formation, the Sixth Panzer Army, was known to be strong and in good fettle. This potential spearhead had been carefully watched while it lay in reserve east of Aachen. N When the fighting on that front died down in esrly December it vanished for a while from the ken of our Intelligence, and bad flying weather hindered our efforts to trace it. Eisenhower suspected that something was afoot, though its scope and Violence came as a surprise. The Germans had indeed a major plan. Rundstedt assembled two Panzer armies, the Fifth and Sixth, and the Seventh Army, a total of 10 Panzer and 14 infantry divisions. This great force, led by its armour, was intended to, break through our weak centre in the Ardennes to the river Meuse, swing north and northwest, cut the Allied line in two, seize the port of • Antwerp, and sever the life-line of our northern armies.

Hitler’s Desperate Plan This bold bid was planned by Hitler, who would brook no changes in it on the part of his doubting generals. In its support the remnants of the German Air Forde were assembled for a final effort, while paratroops, saboteurs and agents in Allied uniforms were all given parts to play. The attack began on December 16 under a heavy barrage. At its northern flank the Sixth Panzer Army ran into the right of the Ist U.S. Army in the act of advancing towards the Roer dams.

After a swaying battle the enemy were held. Farther south the Germans broke through on a narrow front, but the determined defence of St. Vith, where the 7th U.S. Armoured Division specially distinguished itself, hindered them for several critical days. The Sixth Panzer Army launched a new spearhead to strike west and then northwards at the Meuse above Liege. The Fifth Panzer Army meanwhile drove through the centre of the VlHth U.S. Corps, by-passed St. Vith and Bastogne, and penetrated deeply to Marche and towards the Meuse at Dinant.

Although the time and weight of the attack surprised the Allied High Command its‘importance and purpose were Quickly recognised. They resolved to strengthfen the “shoulders” of the break-through, hold the Meuse crossings both east and south of Namur, and mass mobile troops to crush the salient from north and south. Allied Reaction Swift Eisenhower acted speedily. He stopped .all Allied attacks in progress and brought up four American divisions from reserve, and six more from the south. Two airborne divisions, one of them the 6th British, came from England. North of the . salient the British XXXth Corps of four divisions, which had just come out of the line on the river Roer, was concentrated between Liege and Louvain, behind the American Ist and 9th Armies. These latter threw in all their reserves to extend a defensive flank westwards from Malmedy. ' By severing the front of General Bradley’s 12th Army' Group, the Germans had made it impossible for him to exercise effective command from his headquarters in Luxembourg over his two armies north of the bulge. General Eisenhower therefore very wisely placed Montgomery in temporary command of all Allied troops in the north, while Bradley retained the 3rd U.S. Army and was charged with holding and counter-attacking the enemy from the south. Corresponding arrangements were made for the tactical air forces.

Three of our reinforcing divisions lined the Meuse south of Namur. Bradley concentrated a corps at Arion and sent the American 101st Division to secure the important road junctions at Bastogne. The German armour swung north of Bastogne and sought to break their way north-westwards, leaving their infantry to capture the town.

The 101st, with some armoured fmits, were .isolated, and for a week beat off all attacks.

The wheel of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies produced bitter fighting around Marche, which lasted till December 26.

By then the Germans were exhausted, although at one time they were only four miles from the Meuse and had penetrated over 60 miles. Bad Weather and low ground fogs had kept our air forces out of the first week of the battle; but on December 23 flying conditions got- better and they intervened with tremendous effect. Heavy bombers attacked railways and centres of movement behind the enemy lines, and tactical air forces played havoc in his forward areas, starving him of reinforcements, fuel, and ammunition.

Strategic raids on German refineries helped to deny him petrol and slacken the advance. Last Bid In the Air

Baulked of their foremost objective, the Meuse, the Panzers turned savagely on Bastogne. The American 101st Division had been reinforced on December 26 by part of the 4th U.S. Armoured Division, and though vastly outnumbered, held the town grimly for another week. Before the end of December the

German High Command must have realised, however unwillingly, that the battle was lost, for Patton’s counteroffensive from Arion, which started on the 22nd, was steadily if slowly progressing over the snow-choked countryside Houffalize. The enemy made one last bid, this time in the air. On January 1 they made a violent low-level surprise attack on all our forward airfields. Our losses were heavy, though promptly replaced, but the Luftwaffe lost more than they could afford in their final massed attack of the war. On January 3 Montgomery also launched his northern counter-offen-sive against Houffalize to join Patton’s from the south. I visited the front at this time, and telegraphed to the President:

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Jan. 6, '45. “C.I.G.S. and I have passed the last two days with Eisenhower and Montgomery, and they both feel the battle very heavy, but are confident of success. I hope you understand that, in case any troubles should arise in the press, His Majesty’s Government have complete confidence in General Eisenhower and feel acutely any attacks made on him.

“2. He and Montgomery are very closely knit, and also Bradley and Patton, and it would be disaster which broke up this combination, which has i< 1944 yielded us results beyond the dreams of military avarice.

“Montgomery said to me today that the break-through would have been most serious to the whole front but for the solidarity of the AngloAmerican Army.” Stalin’s Prompt Offer

At this time Eisenhower and his staff were, of course, acutely anxious to know whether the Russians could do anything from their side to take off some of the pressure against us in the West. All efforts through the liaison officers in Moscow had failed

to obtain any reply from their opposite numbers. As soon as I heard of this I said to Eisenhower, “You may find many delays on the staff level, but I expect Stalin would tell me if I asked him. Shall I try?" He asked me to do so, and I therefore sent the following message: Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin, Jan. 6, ’45. ‘"•he battle in the West is very heavy and at any time large decisions may be called for from the Suprertie Command. You know yourself from your own experience how very anxious the position is when a very broad front has to be defended after the temporary loss of the initiative. "“It is Eisenhower’s great desire and

need to know in outline what you plan, to do, as this obviously affects all his and our major decision. . . . “I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front,

or elsewhere, during January, with any other points you may care to mention. ...” When one considers how serious was the decision asked for, and how many people were involved, it is remarkable that the answer should have been

sent me the very next day. Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister, Jan. 7, ’45. "I received your message of January 6. 1945, on the evening of January “It is most important that we should be ible to take advantage of our. supremacy over the Germans in artillery and in the air. This demands clear flying weather and an absence of low mists, which hinder aimed artillery fire. “We are preparing an offensive, but the weather is at present unfavourable. Nevertheless, taking into account the position of our Allies on the Westfern Front, G.H.Q, of the Supreme Command has decided to accelerate the completion of our preparation, and, regardless of the weather, to commence large-scale offensive operations against the Germans along the whole Central Front -not later than

the second half of January. “You may rest assured that we shall do everything possible to render assistance to the glorious forces of our Allies.”

Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin, Jan. 9, ’45.

“I am most grateful to you for your thrilling message. I have sent it over to General Eisenhower for his eyes only. May all good fortune rest upon your noble venture. . /. ” I quote this interchange as a good example of thp speed at which business could be done at the summit of the Alliance, and also because it was a fine-deed of the Russians and tjieir. chief to hasten their vast offensive, * no doubt at a heavy cost of life. “The Staunch American Soldier” From the north two American corps, with the XXXth British on their western flank, pressed down .upon the enemy. On January 7 they crossed the La-roche-Vielsalm road, an important escape route for the Germans. Struggling through snowstorms, the two wings of the Allied attack slowly drew closer, until they met at Houffalize on Janu- * ary 16. The Gerinans were forced steadily ® eastwards and harassed from the air, until by the end of the month they were back behind their frontiers, with nothing to show for their supreme effort except ruinous losses of material and casualties amounting to 120,000 men. .This was the enemy’s final offensive of the war. At the time it caused us no little anxiety. Our own advance had to be postponed, but we benefited in the end. The Germans could not replace their losses, and our subsequent battles on the Rhine, though severe, were undoubtedly eased. The German High Command, and even Hitler, must have been disillusioned. Taken by surprise, Eisenhower and his commanders acted swiftly, but they will agree that the major credit lies elsewhere. In Montgomery’s words, “The Battle of the Ardennes was won primarily by the staunch fighting qualities of the American soldier."

(To be continued.) (Copyright 1953 in U.S.A. by the New 7 or C.. , mes Company and Time, Inc. (publishers of Time and Life); in the British Empire by the Daily Telegraph, Ltd.; elsewhere by International Cooperation Press Service, Inc. ' World rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or £2l- in an y language strictly prohibited.)