General Naguib’s Belligerence

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27038, 13 May 1953, Page 8

General Naguib’s Belligerence

The world is now accustomed to hearing General Naguib speaking with two voices about Egypt’s " national aspirations ’’—sometimes like a realist and statesman, at others like an emotional, extremist agitator. Some of his excited public statements, obviously designed to distract his people’s attention from domestic affairs, have been seen as concessions necessary to domestic politics. This is a common resort of Egyptian political leaders. But it has been apparent recently thet, hard-driven or not, as General Naguib moved more and n?ore towards an extreme position on the Suez Canal base issue, so .did his ability to compromise shrink, whatever his wish. General Naguib now seems unable to compromise, and it may be doubted whether he wishes to compromise. At a speech at a ceremony in Cairo at which the coffin of the Unknown Egyptian Soldier killed in the Palestine war was received, General Naguib spoke of Egypt having washed its hands of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Suez CanaJ; he spoke of

Britain as “the enemy", and of sacrifices of Egyptian lives and

blood in a “ great battle ” for freedom. It is suggested that General Naguib’s words were meant, partly at least, for the benefit of the visiting American Secretary of State; how these obdurate and rabblerousing words could be expected to impress Mr Dulles with the merits of Egypt’s case is difficult to see. Mr Dulles would be bound to tell any Egyptian who might have respect for American influence that nothing but reproof can be expected from the United States when its ally Britain is labelled an “ enemy ” against whom the Egyptian masses are exhorted to take up arms.

In present circumstances, as Mr Dulles has shown in Cairo, the Americans are as interested as Britain in preserving the vast Suez Canal base as the key-point for the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Strangely enough, the Egyptian Army is no less interested in preserving the base. The BritishAmerican viewpoint is reconciled to Egyptian possession of the base provided that it is preserved and that conditions for re-entry in case of need are provided. The Egyptian viewpoint demands unconditional evacuation and the absence of commitments on Egypt’s part to any defence system of the West. It would be impractical in terms of both British and world politics for any British Government to propose to hand over some £500,000,000 of British assets with no guarantees whatever. Britain thinks it preposterous for the Egyptians to assert that they have the resources and technical ability to maintain a military base which is larger than any Egyptian industry, which normally gives work to 14,000 Egyptian labourers, and on which the British Government spends annually more than £17,000,000 in Egyptian currency alone. It has been the British hope that Egypt woukj throw in its lot with the West, or, at least,' agree to do so after the withdrawal, except for an agreed number of technicians, of British troops from the Canal Zone. There would be clear military and economic advantages to Egypt in, this. But nationalism taught by the Wafd politicians long ago drove reason out of the minds of the Egyptian masses; and General Naguib has willingly or unwillingly followed a deplorable lead. Noone's interests are served by the present situation; and only damage to everyone’s interests would follow if Egypt pursued the course General Naguib prophesies for it. But it is difficult to see who is to make the next move, or what it should be. If General Naguib’s intransigence survives Mr Dulles’s visit, Britain can do no more and no less than stand on its clear treaty rights, which continue until 1956, and, as Sir Winston Churchill said in the House of Commons yesterday, “await developments with a com- “ posure which followed a combina"tion of patience and strength”.