COURSES OPEN TO BRITAIN

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26511, 28 August 1951, Page 7

COURSES OPEN TO BRITAIN

Clear-Cut Policy Advised

(Special Correspondent N.Z.P.A.)

(Rec. 8 p.m.) LONDON, August 27.

A London weekly newspaper, the -Economist,’’ to a ftOrtt-pxge article •n the Breakdown of the Persian oil discussions, urges the British Government to be forthright in its attitude to Persia. “Either use force, or else leave the Persians unequivocally to Stew in their own oil,*' it adVikes.

The “Economist” says it is now clear that Mt Richard Stokes’s mission had no chance of success. It continues: “When Mr Stokes's proposals for doing business were met with a Wealth of answers that did not match, he sensibly confined them to a single essential point: was it the Persian intention to retain the services of British technicians? If so, the only conditions oh which qualified meh would Work for the National Iranian Oil Company was under British management. “This the Persians refused to countenance. Mr Stokes therefore returned to London. “The only comforts than can be drawn from the failure of the mission art that Mr Stokes conducted it Well, and that it has revealed to the world, particularly the Americans, the difficulty of dealing with nationalists who rate slogans more important than domestic security or prosperity. New Negotiations “Futile” “It is perfectly elear that no ac«e bargain can be struck with ussadiq’s Government or any other Persian Government that is in sight “For the time being, Persian oil must be written off. Talk of reopening the negotiations is perfectly futile, end therefore harmful. It is to be hapea that this is clearly Understood in Washington, as in London. “But if negotiation is useless, what fellows? It goes without saying that the British case must be pressed at The Hague in orddr to establish that What the Persians are doing is illegal. "And when that has been done, the important thing will be to demonstrate to the Persians that felony does not pay—mot indeed for the purpose of punishing the Persians, but of providing ah object lessen for others who may be feeling the same temptation. “It will be said that this wul produce economic chaos, which can only play into Russia's hands. So it may; but there is going to be economic chaos in any case, and there is nothing to be lost by showing that it is a direct result of the oil expropriation. Abadan Refinery "What within this pattern should be done at Abadan? One possible course is to seize the refinery by force and Work it ah crude oil from other fburces. The disadvantages of this are that it wiu be likely to be frustrated by labour troubles on the spot, and that it will lead Britain into impossible complications With the Americans and the United Nations. “The other clear-cut solution would be to withdraw all British subjects in S body, so as to make It quite clear that what happens hereafter is entirely the Persians’ own doing. The British Government then could declare —as it hardly could as long as any British staff remained on the spot—that it would regard any oil coming Out Of Abadan as stolen property. “A middle course between these two extremes would be to leave at Abadan as many civilians as can be persuaded to stay, partly in order to be able to say that there is no withdrawal, and partly in the almost certainly vaifi patched 3 * sometllin ® may a^er “A middle course is not always the right one: in this case it may simply confuse the issues once again. It is touch better to be forthright: either use force, or else leave the Persians unequivocally to stew ifi their own ML”