INDO-CHINA (3) VIET NAM INDEPENDENCE MENACED BY COMMUNISM®

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26357, 27 February 1951, Page 6

INDO-CHINA (3) VIET NAM INDEPENDENCE MENACED BY COMMUNISM®

(By

COLIN D. EDWARDS.)

Singapore, February B.—ln the, earlier articles I described the fighting round Hanoi where the Viet-minh are mounting powerful attacks against the French perimeter defences of .the delta area. This week. I will discuss the situation in other parts of Indo-China. All the 22 provinces of South Viet Nam are now under Viet Nam Government con tool and the last few months have been fairly quiet there. The local Viet-minh—that is, the Communist forces—are not very well organised in this region. They operate mainly in gangs of between 100 and 200 men. The centre of Viet-minh activity in thesouth is the Plain of Camau, about 140 miles south-west of Saigon, where there" are thought to be around 5000 Viet-minh adherents. Another Vietminh stronghold is the Plaine des Jones, which is another swampy area, north-west of Saigon. In Annam the viet-minh control two large sections of the coast below ana above Hue, the Viet Nam capital, and Tourane, the French air base. In the Hue area, battalions of troops raisea by the Viet Nam Government are completely replacing French garrison units. North of Hue, the Vietminh control the coast right up to Song Jang on the southern edge of the Hanoi delta. It is in this territory that the Viet-minh have established their own “capital”—at the city l of Vinh.

In the areas they control, the Vietminh operate a Communist form of government, exacting heavy taxes from the population and exploiting their resources and manpower to the full for the Viet-minh war effort. The family system is being destroyed; the young people are I'eing turned against their elders; and religion Is held up to scorn. Political enemies of the Communists and other “unreliables” are being exterminated. In schools, workplaces and village squares, the Communists are turning on the full force of their propaganda to wean the people to the Communist viewpoint. In the mountainous country to the west of the coastal areas, the French exert a fair degree of authority. The local Moi tribespeople are fighting alongside the French against Vietminh elements.

Laos and Cambodia So much for Viet Nam. The other two Associated States. Laos and Cambodia, are comparatively free of Vietminh activity, although the announcement by Ho Chi-minh, the Viet-minh leader, that he means to establish a United States of Indo-China, incorporating Viet Nam. Laos, and Cambodia, may presage a renewal of activity by the local rebel movements, the KhmerIssaraks in Cambodia, and the Lao-Is-saraks in Laos. All three of the Associated States have heterogeneous populations. The main racial elements in Indo-China are the Annamites, Laotians, Khmers, Thais, Mois, and Nungs. There are, too, targe Chinese populations in the big business centres, Hanoi, Haiphong, and Saigon. As well as racial divisions, there are also many religious and political groups, and some of these maintain

private armies. The Catholic Unlaf Militaire de Defence de Chretieni®? the Cao Daists, and the Hao Hoas uS) supporting the French and the VM Nam Government forces against th» Viet-minh. Need for French Troops If one could put aside the pcc»U bility of Chinese Communist in terven J tion, the solution to the Viet-minh: trouble would be clear. It lies in the building up of a strong Viet Nuh national army. Many groups, who are? now “sitting on the fence” in the pre. sent situation, and some who are fighting on the Viet-minh side, would glover to the Government if they wer*. convinced of the reality of Viet Nameta independence. One or two political organisations have changed sides since! the French signed the independence; agreement, but others remain uncon-' vinced. They object to the continued; presence on Viet Nam soil of French troops. Unfortunately, the Viet Nam? Army is still far too weak to counter' on its own the Chinese-backed Viet-' minh assaults, so French troops must' remain in Indo-China for some time Je ®very effort is meanwhile being made to expend the Viet Nam Army? as fest as possible. The French are ’ lerfding all the instructors they can spare; a military academy has been'' opened which is already training 250 new Viet Namese officers, and Ameri- 1 can arms-aid will help equip self-can-; tained Viet Nam mobile divisions. The French Army is also releasing Viet Namese officers and men serving in her own forces so that they can help build up the new army. ,4 Reality of Independence The real ty of the independence of the three Associated States is not Immediately apparent to a visitor because of the prevailing French influence in the towns. However, as soon at you approach the functionaries of Government, you find that it is the Vtet Namese —or Cambodians or Laotian*— who are actually administering their countries. You only find Frenchnfen in office where they are concerned with the administration of French ’forces in Indo-China, with, the operation of French educational institutions, or in jobs which no Viet Namese are yet qualified to fill. In the latter case, the French personnel stay on until they have trained Viet Nameoo to tako over their jobs. . ' ® As I see it, the Viet Nam Go*«TO> ment—and the same applies the Governments of Laos and Crbbodia—has three main tasks ahead of it. One is to conquer the vtet-giinh menace with the aid of French ttitoa, which will then be withdrawn. Tfc second it to create a national unfr amongst the diverse elements in the population; and the third is to rehabintato the country and- establish a aou*l economy. I will only add that in trying to achieve these aims they tit faced with a persistent, unscrup I<4* enemy who in the interests «f owq munist world imperialism will tinue to do all in his power to trate their efforts. ... El