INDO-CHINA (1) NEW SPIRIT IN FRENCH RESISTANCE AT HANOI

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26353, 22 February 1951, Page 6

INDO-CHINA (1) NEW SPIRIT IN FRENCH RESISTANCE AT HANOI

(By

COLIN D. HOWARDS.)

SAIGON, January 27.

Within a few hours of landing at Saigon, I was sitting in the High Commissioner’s study listening to General de Lattre de Tassigny explaining the military situation to a group of correspondents. General de Lattre was recently appointed to the combined pests of High Commissioner and Com-mander-in-Chief of French Armed Forces in Indo-China. Heavily-built and wearing white civilian slacks and an open-necked shirt, the general stood against a large gold-paint mural of Viet Nam peasants. Before him on a long table was a map of the Tonkin delta area in Northern Viet Nam, where the Communist Vietmlnh forces have started their new offensive, backed up with troops fresh irom training and re-equipment in China. . .... « The General discussed the aims of the latest Viet-minh operations against the 350-mile perimeter which the French are holding around the fringes of the important Red River Delta, the rice-bowl of Northern Indo-China. The first Communist move had been to try to force the line north of Hanoi, striking south, isolating Monkay, and by-passing the port of Haiphong, which they then meant to take by siege. “The French reaction to this threat has been,” said General de Lattre earnestly, “to resist completely; not to give up one inch of ground.” He was composed but forceful. 'Che General digressed for a moment to explain the reasons for the replacement of General Boyer de Latour, who, as General Officer Commanding the Tonkin War Theatre, had been directing the French operations in the north. He has given up his command because of extreme sickness and his place has been taken temporarily by General Salan. It was General de Latour, however, who had planned and initiated the recent series of French countermoves, called Operation Becasrine

(Snipe), which successfully frustrated Viet-minh pressure against the Route Colonial No. 3, running due north from Hanoi and the town of Viet Tri an imnortant hinge Of the French defence line in the north-west. On the day that General de Lattre took over command in Indo-China (December 27) a French battalion ran into nine Viet-minh battalions that were moving up to attack Viet Tri. Despite their lack of numbers, the French engaged their enemy and, fighting until they had lost half their men, stopped the advance. The Viet-minh abandoned that assault on the town, bavin? suffered 850 casualties, including 250 killed. Heavy Fighting A concentrated attack by heavy Vietminh formations on the post of Phu Da Phuc on the Route Colonial No. 3, half way between Hanoi and the Vietminh headquarters at Thai Nguyen was also beaten off with heavy losses to the attackers.

Route Colonial No. 3 was threatened by viet-minh concentrations from the west. For five days the Viet-minh attacked French ports along the road. They brought mortars and heavy machine-guns to bear on the defenders and -lasted at the mud and brick walls of the forts with bazookas; but all the ports withstood the attacks. At one particular post, Huu Bung Yen Phu. the French suffered extremely heavy casualties, but they forced the Viet-minh to retire and afterwards counted 300 Viet-minh dead around the post. The Communists picked up many others of their dead and wounded before withdrawing. French columns working north from Viet Tri attacked and dispersed Viet-minh concentrations. further relieving the pressure of attacks on R.C. 3 from the west. The only place where the French have conceded ground since they drew their delta defence line was at Binh Lieu, 20 miles north of Tien Yen on the north-east coast. Coming under heavy attack, the defenders followed the set instructions or the previous Commander-in-Chief and evacuated the post. De Lattre ordered a French mobile column to retake Binh Lieu which it proceeded to do; but the post was again evacuated, as it was not considered useful in its battered condition.

To the east, at Dong Ngn. local partisans commanded by a Viet-namese corporal, held a French post against repeated Viet-minh assaults for 24 hours until they were relieved. Members of the local population, many of them children, braved the wrath of the

Viet-minli to pass food and water tn the defenders inSide the post After the Binh Lieu operation, 10 to 15 Viet-riinh battalions infiltrated between Binh Lieu and Mon Kay, threatening the security of that part of the ' coast which the French hold right up to the Chinese border. To counter this menace, the French mounted an operation by French metropolitan and colonial troops, Foreign Legionaires and partisans from the Nung tribes. Fighters, bombers and naval ships lent their support Starting on January 3 the French forces fought pitched battles with superior num tiers of Viet-minh that lasted until the sth. when the Vietminh were forced to retire’ with heavy losses.

“In French Hands” General de Lattre concluded on an optimistic: note, saying that the French position was improving and that the Situation was really in French hands. If the French had not heid the line between Binh Lieu and Monkay the Viet-minh would have cut the 'road linking the latter with Tien Yen, thereby isolating Monkay, which is the only important frontier town the Jrencn still hold in Northern Viet Nam. Also it would have given to the Viet-minli a useful route ior their supplies from Kwangsi and would have meant the abandonment of a vital piece ol coastline which the Viet-minh covet because of the entry points it would afford them for sea-borne arms-aid irom the Chinese. The overland routes (even the one through Langson to Taiping) are not particularly suitable for moving up supplies, and the Vietmlnh happen to be short of transport as well as petrol. For this reason, the Viet-minh nave not been able to bring up much heavy artillery to the fighting line so far. in many cases it has to be dismantled and carried by coolies or pack-animals. To expedite the flow of aid to the Tonkin frontier, the Chinese are reported to be completing a railway link between Hangkow ana Taiping, which is only about 80 miles by road from Langson. In thd second week in January, the Viet-minh staged their first big assault on. the northern edge of the roufgily-tri angular French perimeter. Moving up at night, they hurled 18 battalions against the defence line at Vinh Yen, which is only 26 miles north-west of Hanoi. Calling up throe mobile groups to meet the attack, and supported by aircraft which strafsi the Viet-minn with bombs, bullets, ana napalm-jelly, the French fought nock and kept their line intact They lost the equivalent of a battalion in doing so, but inflicted much heavier cam.alties on their enemies, who charged into battle like fanatics. That attack lasted throughout the next day ana into the night, and then the Vietminh with drew. The lull, However, was short, and on the following day the attack was resumed, the Viet-minh bringing up another 10,000 troops from their ample reserves. They are thought to have about 108 battalions in Tonkin, many of them fresh from training in Lama. From May to September, specially selected Viet-minh units were trained by the Chinese Communist Army in Yunnan and Kwangsi. They nave learnt all the Chinese tactics, including the habit of using English artillery orders, a survival from the days when the Chinese Army learnt its drill from American instructors. Before sending them back to Viet Nam for this offensive, Mao Tse-tung’s Army equipped them with weapons irom his own armouries, captured Japanese and American rifles, light machine-guns, heavy machine-guns, grenades, mortars, and light artillery, including 75mm. and some 105 mm. pieces. With each unit slso went some Chinese advisers.

Chinese-Trained Troops There are said to be over 30,000 of these Chinese-trained troops with the Viet-minh in Tonkin. The French say that these units employ better tactics than other Viet-minh forma* tions they have encountered, and that > their training, discipline, and morale are of the first order. Whereas a few rounds from a French “15” would previously result in a Viet-minh turnabout, these new troops hold titeir ground. In the second phase of the assault on Vinh Yen, the fighting was even more fierce. But that, too,•lasted about 33 hours; and then the Viet-minh retired with their dead and wounded. Again the lull did not last long, it was broken by another fanatical charge against the French defences—wave after wave in eve.i greater strength and with no one counting ths losses. But the French line held. The Viet-minh were meanwhile keeping up their pressure at two other points on the northern perimeter, around Phu Lang Thuong and north M Haiphong. Then they pressed their attacks from the south-West against Son Tay, it) miles down river from Viet Tri, and scarcely 20 miles behind the French defenders of Vinh Yen. The French have formed 1 number of mobile groups in TonKift, all of them self-contained task forces, comprising infantry, artillery, and armour, Which can lie rushed quickly to any sector of the front which is weaken* ing. It is proving ah extremely effective method of using all the defeafg resources. As the Americans demonstrated in the Futan bridgehead, by making the reserves mobile, they need not be left idle waiting for a crisis; they can be used and retain their advantages as reserves. Of courte, this only works in the defence of a small area that has good communication*. [This is the first of a serie* of articles from a correspondent who has been studying condition* in Indo-China.)