"THE HINGE OF FATE" USE OF RADAR IN AERIAL BOMBING

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26265, 9 November 1950, Page 6

"THE HINGE OF FATE" USE OF RADAR IN AERIAL BOMBING

[Bi/

WINSTON CHURCHIL]

XXIII

During the winter of 1941 our Intelligence suspected that the Ger mans were using a new' radar apparatus for giving th* direction and range of our planes to their aptl-airmaft foT 1™ S W«' out that a chain at Stat '? n^ f s along the northern coast of Europe, fete-oMisn souTdron leader of the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit happened To Y 1 ’'* our Intelligence Centre and learnt ot our suspicion. On his own initiative he flew over next day and spotted it. On December 5 he made another sortie, and took a brilliant and succe*sful photograph. Our scientists found that it Ls exactly what they expected. Although it was at the top of a four hundred-foot cliff, a shelving beach near by provided a possible landingplace, and a commando raid was planne On , the'night y of February 27, 1942. a commando raid on Bruneval capturedvital portions of a key piece of equipment in th* German radar defences, and gathered infomfation which greatly helped our air offensive. In the snow and darkness a detachment or paratroops dropped at midnight behind the German station on the cliff summit and held the defenders at .bay. With them went a carefully brieted party of sappers and an RAF radio mechanic, with instructions to remove as much of the equipment as they could, sketch and photograph the rest and. if possible, capture one of the German operators. In all this they succeeded, although a hitch in the timetable cut down their working period from half an hour to barely 10 minutes. Most of the equipment was found, dismantled under fire, and carried to the beach. Here the Navy was waiting and took the party off.

Work of Secret Agents Supplemented by a rapidly increasing network of agents who were specially briefed in radar intelligence, and bv friendly neutrals who brought back information from the occupied cquntries, dur knowledge of the German defences grew all through 1942. In speaking of and ‘ friendly neutrals” it would be fair to single out the Belgians for special mention. In 1942 they provided about 80 per cent, of all "agent" information on this subject, including a vijgl map, stolen from the German officer Commanding searchlight and equipment for the more northerly of the two sectors of the German night fighter line in Belgium. It was this map, in ' conjunction with other information, • which enabled ouiz experts to unravel i the System of the German air de- 1 fence. By the end of the year We knew not only how the hostile system worked, but how to cope with it. One qgtaii,'however, was still missing. and not to be discovered for many months. Towards the- end of the X ear Profewor Lindemann, now Lord Cherwell. told me that the Germans had fitted their night fighters with a new kind .q| radar set. Little was known about it, except that it was called “Lichtenstein.” and was designed for himting our bombers. It Was imperative to find out more about* it before the start of our air offensive. On the night of December 2, 1942. an aircraft of 192 Squadron w£s presented as a decoy. It was attacked many times by an enemy night fighter radiating the Lichtenstein transmissions. Nearly all • the crew were bit. The special operator listening to the radiations was severely wounded in the head, but continued to observe with accuracy. The wireless operator, though badly injured, was parachuted out of the aircraft over Ramsgate, and survived with the precious observations. The rest of the crew flew the plane out to sea and alighted on the water, because the machine was too badly damaged to land on an airfield. They were rescued by a boat from Deal.

The missing gap in our knowled** m the German night defence, wu cSe? . Late in 1940 Profcisor LindemZS bad begun to raise doubt, in my mind about the accuracy of our bnmwwe and in 1941 I authorised hi, statistical department to make an investigation at Bomber Headquarters. The rem lit confirmed our fear,. We learned tha< although the Bomber Command believed they had found the target, twotbirds of the crews actually failed to .strike within five miles of it. Th, air photographs showed how little dam- ' age was being done. It also appeared that the crew, knew this, and were discouraged by the poor result, of so much hazard. Unless we could improv, on this there did not seem much use in continuing night bombing. Several methods had been proposed to guide bombers to their targets bv radio aids but until'we redognised how inaccurate our bombing was there seemed no reason to embark on such complication,. Now attention was focused on them. We had developed a device called "Gee", by which radio pulse* . were sent out simultaneously from three station, far apart in Englano. By exact timing of their arrival at an aircraft it could fix its position within a mile. This was an improvement, and we began to use it on a large seal* about 10 days after the Bruneval raid. With its aid we struck at most of the Ruhr, but it could not reach deep enough into Germanv. Lubeck and Rostock were also bombed at thif< time, but not by "Gee." Another device on similar lines called "Oboe" was much more accurate. But since it involved flying for a considerable time in a straight line the bombers were exposed to great danger, from AA fire. And. as with “Gee." the radio waves for which it was designed were too short to curve round the earth’s surfaoe; hence it could only be used up to dis-’ tances at which the aircraft was above the horizon—say, 200 mile, at 25.000 feet. This limited seriously the region* we could attack. Something better was needed.

A Radar Eye Since 1941. when the idea had been shown to be feasible, Lindemann had argued that a radar set mounted in the aircraft itself could throw on to ’ a screen in the cockpit a map of the ground over which it flew. If the bomber navigated with the aid of “Gee" or other methods to within, sav 50 miles of the target, it could then switch on this apparatus and drop its bombs through cloud or haze without possibility of jamming or interference. Distance would not matter, as the plane would carry its radar eye with it wherever it went, and the eye could " see in the dark. This device, which afterwards became well known by the code-name I H2S. encountered many obstacles, and I I was for some time warned that It could not be achieved. Biit, as the following min- : utes show, I persisted in pressing the theme, and eventually it worked. well. Special ultra-short waves were used. The shorter the wave, the clearer the .picture became on the aircraft’s screen- The transmitting machine for these micro jvaves. as they were called, Was entirely a British invention, and it revolutionised the radio war both on land and at sea. It was not until tt fell into German hands that they were able to copy it. But all this lay in the future. In this critical period there wa, little to go on except scientific theories. The first step was to make a working model. If that functioned, then we still had to produce it in i numbers, fit it into our planes, and teach the crew, how to use it.‘lf too much time were scent on experiment, manufacture would be delayed, and so would accuracy of bombing. ■ (To be Continued). (Copyright 1950 in US A. by th* New York Times Company and Time* Inc. (publishers of Time and Life>: in the British Empire by the Daily Tele, graph Ltd.: elsewhere by International Co-operation Press Service. Inc. World right, reserved. Reproduction : in full or in any part in any langusgs strictly prohibited 1 '